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ABSTRACT 
Hedges are expressions used to communicate the speaker's weak commitment to 
information conveyed; i. e. by hedging, speakers may moderate the assertive force of 
their utterances. They include sentence adverbials such as probably and technically, 
adjectives such as regular and typical, particles such as ne and kedo in Japanese etc. 
Hedges crosscut parts of speech and therefore do not form a natural syntactic class. 
This thesis argues that existing analyses of hedging devices fall short of full 
adequacy and presents a Relevance-theoretic account. 
In Chapter 1, I argue that hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon as the effect may be 
derived via features of the ostensive stimulus other than encoded linguistic content; 
e. g. the speaker can communicate her weak commitment by using certain prosodic 
features, facial expressions, shoulder shrugging etc. Discussions of hedging often 
arise in sociolinguistic contexts. However, I argue that the moderation of social 
relations such as the consideration of politeness is not its intrinsic function. The 
inadequacy of existing analyses I point out in Chapter 1 is due to the lack of a 
sufficiently articulated pragmatic framework, and for this reason, I turn to Relevance 
theory. 
In Chapter 2, I outline Relevance theory which provides a cognitively based 
explanation of communication. The theory makes rigorous distinctions between 
encoded meaning and inferred meaning, between the explicit and implicit content of 
an utterance, between descriptive and interpretive representations, etc. which provide 
the concepts necessary to isolate the semantics of the hedging devices as I explain in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
In Chapter 3 and 4, I propose Relevance-theoretic analyses of particular English and 
Japanese expressions, which appear regularly in the literature on hedging. I try to 
capture the intrinsic semantic content of these elements and show how the familiar 
hedging effects arise as a result of the interaction between this encoded content, the 
particularities of context and considerations of relevance. 
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Chapter 1: What is it to 'Hedge'? 
1.1 Introduction 
Dictionary definitions of the English word hedge include; noun (i) the act or method 
of reducing the risk of financial loss on an investment, bet, etc. (ii) a cautious or 
evasive statement; and verb (intr. ) to evade decision or action, especially by making 
non-committal statements. (tr. ) to guard against the risk of loss in a bet, the paying 
out of a win, etc. esp. by laying bets with other bookmakers (Collins English 
Dictionary). Among these we are obviously interested in the definition (ii) as a noun 
and in the definition as an intransitive verb. Further, Oxford English Dictionary 
includes: to avoid committing oneself irrevocably, to secure oneself against loss on 
e. g. a bet by compensating transactions etc. All the senses share a common element, 
i. e. the reduction of a risk by not committing oneself. Much lay usage of the term, 
however, seems to imply a degree of insincerity or dishonesty. For example, a 
speaker does not give a straight answer as seen in the following example: 
(0) A: Did the boss admit he was wrong? 
B: He hedged; on the one hand he had always known it wasn't the right policy; 
on the other hand it would have worked if only........... 
A speaker can convey her psychological state of not being able to or willing to 
commit herself in various ways as seen in (1)-(3) and in linguistic analyses the 
italicised terms are considered to be hedging devices. 
(1) 1 suppose John speaks French. 
(2) John might speak French. 
(3) John probably speaks French. 
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Whether the speaker sincerely expresses her limited conviction or not, the hedging 
expressions (italicised) above communicate that the speaker has limited commitment 
to the proposition that John speaks French. Also, by hedging a speaker can secure 
herself from such a loss as damaging a good human relationship as seen in (4)-(6): 
(4) I suppose you could be mistaken. 
(5) You might be mistaken. 
(6) You are possibly mistaken. 
It is usually embarrassing that mistakes someone made are pointed out and it might 
cause offence and so damage relationship. Hedging expressions (italicised) in (4)-(6) 
above may help to prevent this. 
In line with the dictionary definitions, the italicised expressions in (1)-(6) convey 
the speaker's limited conviction in the propositional content of her utterance and this 
may form the basis of an adequate characterisation of hedging in verbal 
communication. However, as we will see in Section 2, existing analyses of hedging 
devices are various and sometimes counter-intuitive, in the sense that their 
definitions are so different from our usual understanding of hedging, i. e. from 
dictionary definitions such as the ones given by Collins and Oxford English 
Dictionaries, and from the way we all use the term. 
In this chapter, I am going to try to define the phenomenon of hedging in terms of 
its communicative effects and I will try to keep to our 'common sense' understanding 
of this phenomenon as far as possible. 
1.2 Hedges: surveys in the past 
The italicised expressions seen in (1)-(6) are called 'hedges'. Surveys of hedges in 
the past include Lakoff (1972,1987), Fraser (1975), Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) 
and Prince et al (1982). However, there is not a unitary definition of hedges and it is 
very unlikely that hedging expressions form a natural class of linguistic expressions. 
That is, a psychological verb, a modal and an adverb are used in (1)/(4), (2)/(4)/(5) 
and (3)/(6) respectively, which shows that hedging expressions cut across syntactic 
classes. Besides, an uncertain tone of voice or particular intonation patterns may 
convey a speaker's limited conviction, which indicates that hedging devices are not 
limited to lexico-syntactic expressions. 
In fact, there are probably non-linguistic means of hedging such as a gesture of 
shrugging and facial movements expressive of doubt. In 1.3, I will discuss what kind 
of phenomenon 'hedging' is. Let me first turn to how Lakoff (1972,1987) defines 
hedges. 
1.2.1 Lakoff (1972,1987) 
Lakoff s (1972) examples of 'some hedges and related phenomena' include not only 
words which diminish the speaker's commitment to the proposition expressed but 
also those which intensify her commitment: examples of the former are somewhat, 
sort of, perhaps etc. and examples of the latter very, really, a true etc. It is obviously 
counter-intuitive to include expressions which intensify the speaker's commitment in 
the category of 'hedges', though they are arguably `related phenomena' in that all the 
examples may be used to express some degree of commitment or other. 
However, Lakoff (1972: 195) does not discuss hedging in terms of expression of 
speaker commitment to the communicated proposition. Rather, hedges are "words 
whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy". He states that the values true or 
false are a matter of degree, and hedges make natural language sentences more/less 
true or more/less false. The underlying idea is that concepts encoded by natural 
language have vague boundaries and therefore utterances will very often be neither 
true, nor false, but rather true/false to a certain extent, or true in certain respects and 
false in other respects (Lakoff 1972: 183). His analysis is based on a psychological 
experiment by Rosch (1971) which shows that people perceive category membership 
as a matter of degree rather than as an absolute. For example, people perceive robins 
and sparrows as central members of the category bird while chickens and ducks are 
perceived as peripheral members. Lakoff (1972: 185) presents the following degrees 
of truth which correspond to degree of membership in the category bird. 
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(7)a. A robin is a bird. 
b. A chicken is a bird. 
c. A penguin is a bird. 
d. A bat is a bird. 
e. A cow is a bird. 
(true) 
(less true than a. ) 
(less true than b) 
(false or at least very far from true) 
(absolutely false) (Lakoff 1972: 185) 
What the hedge sort of does is take values that are true or close to true (e. g. (7)a. ) 
and make them false (e. g. (8)a. ) while uniformly raising values in the low truth to 
mid truth range (e. g. (8)b-c. ), leaving the very low truth i. e. false range constant (e. g. 
(8)d-e. ). 
(8)a. A robin is sort of a bird. 
b. A chicken is sort of a bird. 
c. A penguin is sort of a bird. 
d. A bat is sort of a bird. 
e. A cow is sort of a bird. 
(False -- it is a bird, no question about it) 
(True, or very close to true) 
(True, or close to true) 
(Still pretty close to false) 
(False) (Lakoff 1972: 195) 
The effect of sort of seems to provide strong support for Lakoff s `fuzzy concept' 
approach, since, as he says, it is very difficult to see how these effects could be 
described in a two-valued system, where the proposition expressed is either true or 
false. 
He then gives some examples of other hedges which he considers as revealing 
much more than degrees of category membership. For example: 
(9) Esther Williams is a fish. (false) 
(10) Esther Williams is a regular fish. (seems to be true) 
(Lakoff 1972: 197) 
In Lakoff s views, the use of regular in (10) has the affect of asserting connotations 
of the word fish which make (10) true to some degree although (9) is clearly false. 
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He draws a further controversial conclusion from his observations about this 
example: "that semantics cannot be taken to be independent of pragmatics, but that 
the two are inextricably tied together" (1972: 198). I will re-examine Lakoff s 
examples later in this chapter and in Chapter 3I will argue that what Lakoff (1972) 
calls hedged utterances such as (10) can be explained without resorting to the notion 
of truth being a matter of degree and that they in no way undermine the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction. 
Concerning other hedges such as technically, strictly speaking, etc., Lakoff (1987: 
122-5), following Kay (1983), gives different analyses from his earlier version 
(Lakoff 1972). Lakoff (1987: 124) argues that technically and strictly speaking 
evoke different cognitive models of the world and that the truth values of such 
hedged utterances are assessed against these models rather than against the world 
itself. The former evokes a cognitive model of some domain of expertise within 
which words are given particular precise definitions, and the latter, a cognitive model 
of the world as it is, in which words fit by virtue of their inherent meanings. For 
example: 
(11) Technically, a dolphin is a mammal. 
(12) Strictly speaking, a dolphin is a mammal. (Lakoff 1987: 123) 
Lakoff (1987: 123-4) argues that these sentences have different linguistic 
meanings and conditions of use as the two hedges evoke different cognitive models. 
In fact both sentences have the same truth-conditions but for different reasons. It so 
happens that the domain of expertise at issue in (11) is the domain of scientific 
biology (within which the term mammal is strictly construed), which is concerned 
with how the world is and so meshes closely with the cognitive model evoked by 
strictly speaking. When the domain of expertise does not concern the nature of the 
world the truth-conditions diverge. For example: 
(13) Technically, Richard Nixon is a Quaker. 
(14) Strictll, speaking, Richard Nixon is a Quaker. (Lakoff 1987: 124) 
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Richard Nixon was a member of the Quaker church and this satisfied the technical 
criterion of being a Quaker (i. e. (13) is true). On the other hand, he was the president 
when the States was heavily involved in the Vietnam War, and this shows that he did 
not have strict Quaker pacifist values (i. e. (14) is false). 
Technically seems to satisfy our general understanding of `hedging' as it focuses 
on some defining criterion of the expression but withholds some of the implications 
associated with the expression generally: i. e. thereby communicating the speaker's 
weak commitment to them. For example, the speaker in (13) might communicate her 
doubt about Nixon's having the general characteristics associated with a Quaker. 
Strictly speaking in (14), on the other hand, seems to focus more on what ordinary 
people might consider the essential properties of being a Quaker, i. e. having certain 
values, behaving in a certain way, without apparently hedging in any way. 
Strictly speaking, however, might help to communicate a certain implicature 
which cancels what might otherwise be communicated. For example, (15) without 
the hedge might communicate that the speaker does not park there. Strictly speaking, 
however, helps to give rise to an implicature of a contrastive kind such as (16) which 
cancels the implicature that the speaker does not park there. In this sense, strictly 
speaking might be considered as functioning as a hedge as it withholds an 
implicature which otherwise might have been given rise to. 
(15) Strictly speaking, I shouldn't park here. 
(16) (But) In fact I do park here. 
Although the definition of hedging given by Lakoff (1972) is quite different from 
the characterisation I gave in Section 1.1, his work in (1972) and (1987) has 
presented some very interesting examples which any adequate account of hedging 
must account for. I will come back to Lakoff in 1.4.1. Let me now turn to `hedged 
performatives'. 
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1.2.2 Fraser (1975) 
Fraser (1975) discusses 'hedged performatives' which involve the use of modals or 
semimodals, and which modify the illocutionary forces of performative verbs by 
stressing the inevitability or desirability of the locution. For example: 
(17) I must advise you to remain quiet. 
(18) 1 wish to forbid you to leave. (Fraser 1975: 187-8) 
According to Fraser (1975: 188), (17) is a case of `strongly performative' in that 
it is "easily seen as counting as the act denoted by the performative verb in the 
sentence" while (18) is a case of `weakly performative' in that its performative use is 
not clear. His aim of this paper is to explain why certain sentences are strongly 
performative, and others, only weakly performative. 
Fraser sets up a number of principles to account for the fact that (17) seems to 
communicate the performative that I advise you to remain quiet while (19) is a very 
odd way to communicate the performative that I invite you to my party. Further, (20) 
communicates the performative that I invite you to my party while (18) is a very odd 
way to try to communicate the performative that I forbid you to leave. 
(19) I have to invite you to my party. 
(20) 1 wish to invite you to my party. 
So, for instance, according to him, an expression of desire by the speaker is 
tantamount to seeking the hearer's permission to perform an act but it is absurd to 
seek the hearer's permission to forbid him to do something, hence the oddity of (18). 
While this is interesting it lies outside my primary interest in hedging. What makes 
these cases of hedging in my sense is the speaker's avoidance of full commitment to 
or responsibility for performing the speech acts of advising, forbidding, inviting, etc. 
By expressing `obligation' the speaker implies that she has little choice in the 
matter, that if she had choice she might not perform that act, etc. By expressing her 
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`wish' to do something instead of doing it directly she implies that the hearer may 
have other wishes, that she would want to take account of, that she will perform the 
act only with the consent of the hearer, etc. 
In other cases there is an expression of ability to perform a speech act. For 
example: 
(2 1) 1 can promise you that I will not squeal. 
(22) 1 can swear that no one saw me enter that building. (Fraser 1975: 201) 
By expressing her `ability' to do something instead of doing it directly the speaker 
might imply that she does not want to perform the act with her full endorsement (e. g. 
(21)). On the other hand, she might intensify her commitment to the act by 
expressing her ability (e. g. (22)). 
Further, Fraser gives (23) in which might is used with a performative verb. 
(23) I might suggest that you ask again. 
(24) 1 suggest that you ask again. 
(Fraser 1975: 187) 
However, Fraser (1975) does not say any more than giving the example. In (23) it is 
clear that the speaker does not communicate the performative (24) i. e. she gives her 
weak commitment to the act of suggesting. Unlike (17), (20) and (22), I cannot think 
of any context in which the speaker of (23) is not hedging. Even if the subject is not 
the speaker, utterances with the use of may/might seem to convey the speaker's 
hedging as seen in (25)-(26): 
(25) He may/might come tonight. 
(26) It may/might be raining now. 
Lyons (1977: 799,805) discusses that the use of may and might is a case of 
subjective modalisation which is to express the speaker's reservations. Therefore, 
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may and might seem to be genuine cases of hedges. Let me now turn to Brown & 
Levinson (1978,1987). 
1.2.3 Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) 
Brown & Levinson (1978,1987), in their analysis of politeness, argue that 'face' is 
something which concerns human beings universally, i. e. across cultures. They 
suggest two types of `face'-preserving strategies: `positive' and. `negative' 
strategies. The former are roughly expressions of solidarity, and the latter are 
expressions of restraint (Brown & Levinson 1987: 2). They list hedging as one of 
various 'face'-preserving politeness strategies. For example, in order to avoid 
disagreement with the hearer (a positive politeness strategy which aims to establish 
solidarity) the speaker can make her own opinion safely vague by using hedges such 
as sort of, kind of,, in a way etc. as in (27): 
(27) 1 really sort of think/hope/wonder.... (Brown & Levinson 1978: 116) 
And in order not to coerce the hearer (a negative politeness strategy which aims to 
restrain imposition), the speaker might use hedging expressions (italicised below) 
which weaken illocutionary forces of e. g. commands. For example: 
(28) Close the window, if you can. (Brown & Levinson 1978: 162) 
Sort of in (27) explicitly conveys that the speaker is not quite committing herself 
to the proposition to be expressed. Therefore, sort of in (27) is a linguistic means to 
explicitly communicate the speaker's limited conviction in the proposition expressed. 
(28), on the other hand, conveys that the speaker considers it desirable for the speaker 
to close the window under the condition that the hearer is able to close it. Without if 
you can, however, (28) would convey the illocutionary force of ordering quite 
strongly, or at least more strongly than the 'hedged' command (28). Many of 
Fraser's hedged performatives have this negative politeness effect too. 
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In (28) the speaker's interests/desires and her recognition of the hearer's 
interests/desires interact and the speaker's want is not put forward as strongly as in 
the non-hedged version. So, it is argued that by adding if you can in (28), the force 
of ordering is weakened or hedged. This limited backing of the speaker to the force 
of ordering is not obviously a part of the Gricean notion of `what is said': what the 
speaker 'says' is that `the hearer is to close the window under the condition that the 
hearer is able to close it'. The speaker's limited conviction then seems a part of 
pragmatic meaning, which complies with the characterisation of `hedging' I will give 
in Section 1.3.4. 
Brown & Levinson (1987: 146) argue that in some languages particles encode the 
function of hedging i. e. avoiding commitment, and give the example of the Japanese 
particle ne. The particle ne is claimed by R. Lakoff (1972) to "suspend the sincerity 
condition on assertions, the preparatory condition of coerciveness on orders, and the 
essential condition of questions - operations that are syntactically done in English 
with tags or with expressions like I wonder. " In 1.4.3 I will present R. Lakoff 
(1972)'s account and point out the descriptive inadequacy of her analysis. Further in 
Chapter 4, I will give a full analysis of ne and present a Relevance-based analysis of 
this particle. 
In this section I have introduced Brown & Levinson (1978,1987)'s argument that 
hedging is `modification of illocutionary force', a notion which is also argued for by 
other linguists such as Fraser (1975) and Holmes (1984), and that its primary 
function is to achieve politeness. In 2.4.4 where I talk about posterior hedging, I 
will give more examples of if-clause hedges which suspend felicity conditions. 
However, I will not investigate hedges like if you can in this dissertation as they 
basically describe conditions whose interaction with a contextual assumption/a 
speech act brings about a softening of its force. In this dissertation, I will concentrate 
on hedges whose intrinsic linguistic meaning is more directly responsible for their 
hedging effects. Now I will turn to Prince et al (1982). 
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1.2.4 Prince, Frader and Bosk (1982) 
Prince et al (1982) analyse physicians' discourse and present a corpus-based analysis 
of hedges. They (1982: 93) argue that there are four different types of hedges: (I) 
'Approximators' which "affect the propositional content, either by (Ia) adapting a 
term to a non-prototypical situation, or by (lb) indicating that some term is a 
rounded-off representation of some figure"; and (II) 'Shields' which "affect the 
degree and type of speaker commitment that is inferred, by implicating that the 
speaker is uncertain because s/he speaks from knowledge or beliefs acquired via 
plausible reasoning (IIa) or that s/he has no direct knowledge but is attributing the 
belief to a particular other (IIb) ", i. e. `shields' have an evidential function. 
Examples of (I) 'approximators' and (II) 'shields' given by Prince et al (1982: 85- 
91) are (29)/(30) and (31)/(32) respectively: 
((Ia) a case of adapting): 
(29) His feet are sort of blue. 
((Ib) a case of rounding off): 
(30) 1 and 0 was about ten fifty over five fifty. 
((IIa) a case of plausible reasoning): 
(31) And I think we can probably just slow him down..... 
((IIb) a case of attributing): 
(32) According to Dr. Smith, there was a dramatic response. 
Unlike Lakoff (1972) etc., Prince et al (1982) do make a semantics/pragmatics 
distinction and turn to the Gricean framework with its saying/implicating distinction 
in analysing hedges. This makes for much deeper analyses but also gives rise to 
some problems. For example, they (1982: 85) argue that a shield type hedge I think 
does not affect the propositional content but `implicates' that the speaker is less than 
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fully committed to the truth of the proposition expressed. This is obviously counter- 
intuitive since I think in (31) for instance is linguistically encoded, i. e. explicitly 
given and is therefore surely a part of what the speaker `says', not a part of what the 
speaker conversationally 'implicates'. In 3.2.3 I will show that none of the different 
types of Gricean implicature fit to Prince et al's argument. I will consider further 
problems with the four cases of hedging expressions given by Prince et al (1982) in 
Section 1.4.4. 
This quick review of past work on hedges shows that linguists do not have an 
agreed definition of hedging phenomena; Lakoff (1972) analyses hedges as linguistic 
means to affect the truth-value of an utterance; Lakoff (1987), as encoding different 
cognitive models of the world (i. e. different world views) against which the utterance 
is interpreted; Fraser (1975), as devices for modifying an illocutionary force; Prince 
et al (1982), as affecting the propositional content as well as the speaker's 
propositional attitude. 
Brown & Levinson (1978,1987), on the other hand, analyse the phenomenon of 
hedging as a means of mediating social relationships by achieving politeness affects. 
However, I wonder if the general phenomenon of hedging is intrinsically social as 
Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) suggest, or otherwise intrinsically linguistic as 
Lakoff (1972) suggests. In the following section, I will re-examine and attempt to 
characterise the phenomenon of 'hedging'. 
1.3 Hedging -a linguistic, pragmatic, or social phenomenon? 
1.3.1 Hedging and Linguistic Expressions 
Often speakers do not give their assertions full backing and frequently use linguistic 
devices that indicate limited conviction in the propositions they express: for 
instance, certain psychological verbs such as I guess, I suppose, phrasal terms such as 
according to, or so I'm told, adjectival and adverbial modifiers such as sort of, kind 
of, in a way, perhaps, maybe, modals such as might, may, and various particles that 
indicate the sort of evidence the speaker has for her utterance. However, as I have 
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argued, they do not form a natural class and means of hedging in communication are 
not limited to linguistic expressions: i. e. they extend to intonation, tone of voice, 
gestures such as shrugging, etc. Hedging, then, is not intrinsically a linguistic 
phenomenon. So what (33) and (34) communicate might be more or less the same: 
(33) I guess this house was built in the eighteenth century. 
(34) This house was built in the eighteenth century. 
(uttered with a hesitant tone of voice and/or with a look of doubt on her face) 
In both of the utterances above, the speaker conveys her uncertainty, i. e. her 
limited conviction in the proposition that the house was built in the eighteenth 
century. However, the difference is that I guess might constitute a part of the 
Gricean what is said (I will however look at a different view about this (Urmson 
1966) in Chapter 3), while the speaker's attitude of uncertainty in (34) clearly does 
not. Even if the speaker's attitude is not linguistically encoded as in (34), the hearer 
guided by some pragmatic principle can infer it and might recover (35): 
(35) The speaker is not certain that the house was built in the eighteenth century. 
The hearer of the following (36) in which an attitudinal or psychological verb is not 
used might nevertheless recover (35) as well, due to the use of probably. 
(36) This house was probably built in the eighteenth century. 
To the extent that we can say anything precise about this rather impressionistic 
notion of hedging, it does seem that it is intrinsically related to the speaker's non- 
committed attitude to a proposition communicated. This attitude is sometimes 
linguistically encoded as in (33) and sometimes pragmatically inferred on the basis of 
a clue such as a speaker's facial expression of uncertainty as in (34). Prince et al 
(1982: 89) would argue that probably (= a shield) in (36) does not contribute to the 
proposition expressed. If so, probably in (36) might only be a clue, just like facial 
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expression, which helps the hearer of (36) to pragmatically infer (35). I will look 
into the use of the evidential adverb probably in Chapter 3. 
1.3.2 Hedging and Speaker Attitude 
It looks as if hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon since the uncommitted 
propositional attitude of a speaker is not always linguistically encoded (see (34)) and 
may have to be pragmatically inferred. Even in quite literal cases, some inference 
might be required to identify the degree of uncertainty expressed by I guess or maybe 
which may differ across contexts. I would like to argue that the speaker is 'hedging' 
when (37) is communicated. 
(37) The speaker has limited commitment to P, where P is any communicated 
proposition. 
This can be communicated linguistically as in (33) and (36) or non-linguistically 
as in (34). Of course, inference is necessary in every utterance interpretation process 
and is not limited to recovering the speaker's attitude. In Chapter 2, I will explain 
what pragmatic principle governs the recovery of the speaker's attitude, or, more 
generally, the hearer's interpretation processes including the recovery of the speaker's 
attitude. 
Certain linguistic means of hedging might be efficient and useful ways of 
communicating (37). However, a certain expression which operates as a hedge in 
one context, might not operate as a hedge in another. For instance, an attribution 
phrase, though analysed as a hedge (a shield) by Prince (1982: 91), might 
communicate (37) in one context but might not in another. Consider the following: 
(38)A: Is Kyoto a beautiful town? 
B: According to what people say, it is. 
(Travellers A and B are discussing where to visit next) 
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(39) I know, from this grey sky, it will rain today, and according to the weather 
forecast, it will. 
According to helps the hearer to infer that the speaker is communicating different 
degrees of the speaker's commitment to the proposition that Kyoto is a beautiful 
town, and the proposition that it will rain today. That is, the speaker of (38)B can 
communicate her limited conviction in the proposition that Kyoto is a beautiful town, 
by attributing it to someone else. The speaker will not be held personally responsible 
for misleading A even if Kyoto turns out to be an ugly town, since she has not 
asserted the proposition but indicated her limited conviction in it, by putting the 
responsibility in other people's hands. She can thus protect herself from accusations 
she might get should Kyoto fail to satisfy A's expectation. So, according to operates 
as a hedge in (38)B in the sense I defined (see (37)). The speaker of (39), on the 
other hand, expresses her full commitment to the proposition that it will rain today, 
and according to is used to further endorse her view by attributing it to the authority. 
In (39), according to is used to support and justify the speaker's commitment to the 
truth of her view and there is no hedging element in it in the sense I defined (see 
(37)). 
Examples (38)B and (39) further support the view that hedging is a pragmatic 
rather than linguistic phenomenon, since it is not certain linguistic expressions alone 
but contextual information together with linguistic clues that determine whether (37) 
is communicated or not. As seen in (38)B, the speaker can protect her own face by 
not committing herself to the proposition expressed. In such cases hedging has a 
social function. 
In the following section, let me see whether 'hedging' exists solely for social 
reasons, as Brown & Levinson seem to suggest. 
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1.3.3 Hedging and its Social Implications 
1.3.3.1 Hedging and Politeness 
Social factors such as politeness play an important role in verbal communication. 
As Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) argue, when utterances threaten the 'face' of the 
speaker, the hearer, or whoever is talked about, by hedging the speaker can convey to 
the hearer that she is concerned with the interests of that person. When an utterance 
threatens the speaker's own face e. g. having to admit her own failure etc., she can 
protect her face by hedging but she might sound insincere out of being a bad loser. 
When an utterance threatens the face of someone other than the speaker, on the other 
hand, by being polite the speaker can soften the threat and so she can protect herself 
from damaging her relationship with the hearer. 
As Brown & Levinson (1978: 13) argue, 'face' may well be a universal concept, 
and there might be a universally held assumption such as (40): 
(40) If an utterance U threatens someone's face other than the speaker, an 
'appropriately' hedged version of U can convey to the hearer that the speaker is 
concerned with his face, and is being polite. 
A 'face'-threatening utterance must be 'appropriately' hedged in a given context since 
too much or too little hedging can be impolite. That is, assumptions about 
appropriate levels of politeness in particular situations may well be contextual 
assumptions or, if not actually represented by the participants, they might be simply 
aspects of the cognitive environment which could be represented if relevant. And, of 
course, cultural aspects play an important role since the 'appropriate' amount of social 
hedging varies from culture to culture: e. g. hedging in a Japanese context might 
sound 'too much' for an English person while hedging in an English context might 
sound 'too little' for a Japanese. 
Now the social functions of hedging in being polite are not explicitly conveyed to 
the hearer but only implicitly conveyed: the assumption that the speaker is being 
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polite seems to be recovered as one of many weak implications or it may be only 
covertly communicated. In most contexts, the point of an utterance does not lie with 
this. This implication is derived by an utterance interacting with contextual 
information such as (40). 
In many contexts, the appropriate level of politeness seems to be too trivial a 
matter to be always consciously considered, since for humans engaging in 
communication with each other the concept of 'preservation of face' seems to be a 
constant background concern (Brown & Levinson 1987: 60-1). However, when 
politeness implications are not available at all, for example, if the speaker points out 
the hearer's mistakes without hedging, all sorts of impact can be predicted. That is, 
the absence of the appropriate levels of politeness will lead to the presence of an 
implication that the speaker is actually threatening rather than preserving `face', and 
as 
may have far more implications such that the speaker wishes to offend the hearer or 
doesn't care if he does. That is, the potential threat of `face', i. e. the absence of 
appropriate levels of politeness, often has far more impact on verbal communication 
than its presence. 
It might appear that the sole or primary function of hedging is to preserve 'face', or 
to be polite, in Brown & Levinson's technical sense (1978,1987). Although I will 
argue against this in 1.3.4, let me pursue this line of analysis a little by discussing a 
report on conversational practices in the Malagasy society in Madagascar, an island 
off east Africa. 
1.3.3.2 Hedging in Malagasy Contexts 
Keenan (1976) describes Malagasy speakers who deliberately make their 
conversational contributions uninformative, indefinite and obscure. For Malagasy 
speakers knowledge commitments should be made sparingly. It is usually the case 
that the more sincerely informative you are, the more commitments you have 
undertaken to defend your beliefs. However, for Malagasy speakers the less 
informative they are the better. everything else being equal. 
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There are two main reasons for this (Keenan 197: 70). One is that in a society 
such as Malagasy where everybody knows what everybody else is doing. new 
information is very scarce and highly sought after, so individuals are not willing to 
reveal it. The other is that an individual has the fear of committing himself explicitly 
to a particular piece of information as there is a cultural belief that malevolent forces 
might overhear and act on the information. Then the speaker would be held to blame 
for anything bad happening as a result. In a society such as the Malagasy society, 
'hedging' might have an important social function in reducing speakers' 
commitments. The adherence to a social norm of keeping explicit informational 
commitments to a minimum might constitute a contextual assumption. 
The hearer who shares this social norm would derive different implicatures from 
those a hearer in the English society would derive. For example, a Malagasy hearer 
of (41)B might derive (42) while a hearer in the English society would not only 
derive (42) but also derive that B in fact does not know where C lives (Grice 1975: 
51-2): 
(41)A: Where does C live? 
B: Somewhere in the south of France. (Grice 1975: 51) 
(A is planning with B an itinerary for a holiday in France. Both know that A wants 
to see his friend C, if to do so would not involve too great a prolongation of his 
journey: ) 
(42) C lives in the south of France. 
A hearer of (41)B in the Malagasy context would not infer that B in fact does not 
have any more specific knowledge as a hearer in the English society does, and might 
continue trying to find out where exactly C lives. And if B says for instance 'I guess, 
probably in Nice or somewhere', A would infer from this that C lives in Nice. 
In Malagasy contexts, the social norm of expressing low commitment seems to 
be conventionalised and 'hedging' might be a standard manifestation of this 
convention. Keenan (1976: 71), for example, reports that even if a precise date for 
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the turning of the ancestral bones has been set, the host household member would 
answer 'I am not certain' or 'In a bit' or 'Around September' when somebody asks him 
the date. The host family may suffer great loss of face if the event does not take 
place as specified, and this is the reason they keep hedging. 
It might appear from this that 'hedging' is a social phenomenon, but in the 
following section, I will argue against this view. 
1.3.4 Hedging -a pragmatic phenomenon 
Let us consider (43). Here, analysing 'hedging' as intrinsically social would be 
problematic. For example, if I am asked whether I will live in Tokyo for good, I 
might say: 
(43) 1 guess I will. 
A hearer would judge me as hedging since (43) communicates my limited conviction 
in the proposition that I will live in Tokyo. However, the hearer does not necessarily 
infer any social connotations, but he will only infer that I cannot give a definite 
positive answer for various reasons. This tentative answer may well be relevant 
enough for the hearer who did not have any idea where I would be living for good. 
It then follows that it is incorrect to say that hedging is intrinsically a social 
phenomenon. It might give rise to social implications hinging on considerations of 
`face' in many social contexts but there are cases in which the same hedging 
expressions do not give rise to such implications. So, by elimination, we can 
conclude that hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon. This is the right way to view 
hedging, since pragmatics can accommodate such social factors (e. g. the speaker's 
concern with politeness, a social norm of expressing less commitment as in the 
Malagasy example etc. ) as contextual assumptions and implications on particular 
occasions of utterance. The speaker's being polite or her conforming to a social norm 
of 'hedging' can be derived by the hearer as implications. 
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I have mentioned that hedging is closely related to the attitude a speaker has 
towards the proposition expressed and inferring the speaker's propositional attitude is 
in fact a pragmatic process: the speaker's attitude is seldom entirely encoded in an 
utterance and even if it is encoded as I suppose used in (44)T, the hearer might yet 
have to infer the speaker's intended attitude to the embedded proposition (and to the 
proposition expressed) and not necessarily take the 'supposing' attitude as having 
been communicated. In (44)T, the teacher does not believe or even suppose that the 
capital of UK is Paris. 
(A pupil to his teacher) 
(44)P: I suppose the capital of USA is Ottawa, am I right? 
T: I suppose the capital of UK is Paris, am I right? 
When a linguistic means of hedging is expressed as a part of an irony as in (44)T, 
the phrase e. g. I suppose in (44)T prima facie conveys to the hearer the assumption 
(37), as I guess in the non-ironical utterance (43) does. However, the whole of (44)T 
is ironical and the speaker does not want to give any backing to its explicit content as 
the speaker of (43) does. The explicit content of (44)T is not accepted by the speaker 
as a true assumption, and the speaker's attitude I suppose in (44)T is not to be taken 
literally by the hearer. So, naturally I do not want to say that (44)T conveys the 
assumption (37) or that the speaker of (44)T is hedging. 
Moreover, the point of the speaker's attitude expressed in an irony is that it is a 
disapproving one such as ridicule (Grice (1978), Sperber & Wilson (1986)). In (44)T 
this attitude is held towards the embedded proposition as well as towards the 
propositional form given by the utterance ( which includes I suppose). The speaker's 
implicit expression of attitude of ridicule takes within its scope the explicit 
expression of attitude of less commitment, i. e. I suppose in (44)T, so that no hedging 
is communicated. 
So, in (44)T I suppose, though it is linguistically encoded, is not endorsed any 
more than 'It's a lovely day' is endorsed in an ironical utterance of 'It's a lovely day'. 
A speaker's explicit expression of reduced commitment does not entail that the 
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speaker is in fact hedging. So, it is not the domain of linguistic semantics which 
recovers the speaker's attitude to a proposition or an embedded proposition, but of 
pragmatics which does this job of inferring the speaker's real attitude. The domain of 
linguistic semantics and that of pragmatics will be discussed in 2.3.1. 
In the following section, an attempt will be made to characterise the phenomenon 
of hedging. 
1.3.5 What is it to 'Hedge'? 
In (44)T the teacher obviously does not 'suppose' that the capital of UK is Paris. This 
can be compared with (4) (repeated below) in which the speaker might not 'suppose' 
the embedded proposition but in fact strongly believes it: 
(4) 1 suppose you could be mistaken. 
However, the difference is the following. (44)T is an irony and the explicit 
content of the utterance is not conveyed to the hearer as the speaker's belief. In (4), 
on the other hand, the explicit content that the speaker supposes that the hearer could 
be mistaken is conveyed to the hearer as the speaker's belief though the speaker is 
being polite and the point of the utterance is in fact the embedded proposition itself. 
So, in (44)T the speaker's supposing the embedded proposition is not conveyed to 
the hearer as the speaker's belief, i. e. not 'communicated' to the hearer in Relevance- 
theoretic terms (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 239), while in (4) it IS communicated and 
the speaker of (4) is hedging. That is, when the speaker's limited conviction is 
`communicated' in the technical sense of this term (i. e. the speaker overtly makes the 
information manifest to the hearer), the speaker can be considered to be hedging. 
The hearer of (4) might infer on the basis of his own assumptions that the speaker 
in fact strongly believes that he is mistaken but this does not fall within the speaker's 
communicative intention and so she cannot be held responsible for it. The speaker of 
(4) has not asserted that the hearer is mistaken but only said with reservations that it 
might be the case. The speaker can secure herself from damaging her relationship 
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with the hearer, and from later accusations perhaps if the hearer should turn out to be 
not mistaken. Thus, we can say that the speaker of (4) is hedging by communicating 
her limited conviction in the proposition that the hearer is mistaken. 
So, if the speaker communicates (37), whether sincerely (as in (43)) or not (as in 
(4)), we can say that the speaker is hedging: 
(45) Hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon by which the speaker communicates 
that the speaker has limited conviction in or commitment to a proposition 
communicated by her utterance. 
Here we need to explicate what is meant by `a proposition communicated'. In (4) 
the proposition concerned is only the embedded proposition that the hearer could be 
mistaken (though usually taken as the proposition expressed by the utterance). In 
Relevance terms, the propositional form of the utterance is the linguistically encoded 
logical form with reference assigned, ambiguity and vagueness resolved (see 3.2.4), 
and this notion would include I suppose in (4). Then `a proposition' is not or at least 
need not be, the propositional form of an utterance in Relevance terms. It can be any 
assumption which can be taken by the hearer as communicatively intended by the 
speaker as seen in (37). 
(45) is quite different from any analysis of hedges in the past and some of the 
expressions analysed as hedges in the past do not meet this characterisation. 
Furthermore, sometimes existing analyses leave problems unexplained. In the 
following section, I will point out the kinds of problems that these analyses might 
face. 
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1.4 Problems with Existing Analyses 
1.4.1 Lakoff (1972,1987) 
1.4.1.1 Lakoff (1972) 
Let us consider Lakoff s examples again: 
(46) Esther Williams is a fish. 
(47) Esther Williams is a regular fish. (Lakoff 1972: 197) 
Lakoff s work (1972) predates a lot of work in pragmatics, but even today he still 
seems to eschew a semantics/pragmatics distinction (Lakoff 1987: 139). Lakoff 
(1972: 197) has claimed that (46) is false since Esther Williams is a human being, 
while (47) would seem to be true since it says that she swims well and is at home in 
water. In the Gricean framework, what (47) says is actually not that she swims well 
in Grice's technical use of the term saying (as conventional content plus 
disambiguation and reference assignment). What (47) says i. e. the proposition 
expressed is that Esther Williams is a regular fish, and what it implicates is that 
Esther Williams swims well etc. Apparently, Lakoff (1972: 215) does not make any 
distinction between the explicit and implicit content of an utterance, and as a result 
he assigns the value true to the utterance as a whole. 
On a more careful analysis, we distinguish the propositional form of the utterance 
from the contextually derived implicatures; then the truth-conditions of the 
utterance are such that the propositional form is clearly false. It follows then that 
both (46) and (47) are false, and we can analyse them as metaphors. Sperber & 
Wilson (1986), for example, treat them as `loose talk' in which a literally false 
statement (e. g. `It is one o'clock' instead of `a minute past one') is used in order to 
communicate the intended meaning at less processing effort than would have been 
involved in spelling it out literally. That is, the literally false statements are the best 
possible way to communicate a range of implicatures which include that Esther 
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Williams swims well. In Section 3.3.2, however, I will present a new and rather 
different Relevance-based approach to the analysis of a regular X. one which 
captures Lakoff s intuitions but maintains a principled semantics/pragmatics 
distinction and explicit/implicit distinction. 
Lakoff (1972) does not account for the semantics of a regular but merely points 
out, in impressionistic terms, what effect it has on the overall interpretation. By 
resisting semantics/pragmatics and explicit/implicit communication distinctions, he 
deprives himself of any means of accounting for the very vigorous intuitions that 
people have about these two distinctions. For example, the point in an indirect 
answer to a question lies with the implicit import rather than the explicit content of 
the utterance, and undoubtedly we perceive the explicit/implicit distinction. People 
have clear intuitions that ambiguity and referential indeterminacy are resolved not 
linguistically but contextually, and that the interpretation of irony involves not only 
linguistic but also contextual knowledge. These show that the role of semantics and 
the role of pragmatics are clear and distinct. 
Further, he claims that a regular X would not be said of X, if X is true, as a 
regular picks out metaphorical properties (Lakoff 1972: 198). For example, a 
regular bachelor cannot be said of someone who is actually a bachelor. I will, 
however, give a counter-example to this in Section 3.3.2. 
A regular in (47) drives the hearer to focus on connotations of the word fish 
rather than to interpret the speaker as asserting a false proposition. In this sense, 
some might argue that the force of asserting the false proposition is modified, or 
rather weakened. However, the proposition given by (47) is a metaphor (generally 
given the value false) and the speaker does not expect the hearer to take its explicit 
content as the speaker's belief, i. e. does not want to 'communicate' the proposition 
expressed. That means, there is no force of asserting the proposition expressed by 
(47) and therefore there is no modification of the force of asserting (47). 
A regular in (47) directs the hearer away from the literal import of the utterance 
and therefore we might want to say that the speaker of (47) is hedging. However, she 
does not communicate the speaker's limited conviction in the proposition expressed: 
i. e. as for metaphorical cases generally she does not endorse it at all and therefore. 
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according to the characterisation of hedging given in (37), I would not want to say- 
that the speaker is hedging in (47). I will propose another analysis of a regular in 
3.3.3. Let me now turn to Lakoff s recent work. 
1.4.1.2 Lakoff (1987) 
Lakoff (1972: 199) argued that "technically picks out some definitional criterion, 
while strictly speaking requires both the definitional criterion and other important 
criteria as well. " Let me consider (9)-(10) again (repeated below): 
(9) Technically, Richard Nixon is a Quaker. (true) 
(10)Strictly speaking, Richard Nixon is a Quaker. (false) 
By some definitional criterion such as being a member of a Quaker church, Richard 
Nixon may be a Quaker, and hence (9) is true. On the other hand, he does not share 
general Quaker values such as pacifist values i. e. he does not meet other important 
criteria though he meets the definitional ones, and hence (10) is false. 
Lakoff (1987), on the other hand, gives quite a different analysis as seen in 1.2.1. 
Hedges such as technically and strictly speaking evoke different cognitive models of 
the world against which the truth-value of the hedged utterances is assessed. The 
idea is that (9) is assessed against a cognitive model of the world of experts in some 
domain while (10) is assessed against a cognitive model of the world as it is (Lakoff 
1987: 123 4). When the relevant area of expertise of these experts coincides with 
the nature of the world, the truth-conditions converge. Recall the examples: 
(48) Technically, a dolphin is a mammal. 
(49) Strictly speaking, a dolphin is a mammal. (Lakoff 1987: 123) 
Lakoff (1987) seems to capture our intuitions about the truth-value of utterances 
such as (9)-(10) and (48)-(49). However, as I argued in the last section, his account 
does not consider the important distinctions i. e. semantics/pragmatics and 
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explicit/implicit distinctions, which people intuitively have in interpreting utterances, 
and therefore it does not fall out of a theoretically motivated framework in 
linguistics. Further, his account of technically does not differentiate (50) from (51): 
(50) A fiddle is technically a violin. 
(51) Tom is technically a bachelor. 
The paraphrase of (50) would be that `violin' is a technical word for a fiddle, while 
that of (51), something like that Tom is a bachelor by definition. This might suggest 
that we need some other finer notion than the general concept of a cognitive model of 
expertise in order to capture the mention of a name for a concept in one case (i. e. 
(50)), and the definitional conceptual content in another (i. e. (51)). In Chapter 3, I 
will turn to a Relevance-based notion `representation by resemblance' which 
subsumes `mention' of words and non-descriptive representations, and show that this 
notion explains technically in (50) and (51) nicely. In Chapter 3, I will focus on the 
following Lakoffian hedges i. e. a regular, a typical and technically as they instantiate 
interesting distinctions within Relevance theory. 
1.4.2 Fraser (1975) 
As the title of his paper `Hedged Performatives' suggests, his work presents Speech 
act based analyses. Speech act theory originates in Austin (1962) who claims that 
language is used not only to describe the world, but also to perform acts such as 
making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, warning, 
begging etc. Speech act theorists have mainly been concerned with such descriptive 
issues as what types of speech act there are, and how they should be grouped 
together (Ifantidou 1994: 28). Searle (1979: 1-29) gives five major categories of 
speech act: i. e. assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations, 
while Fraser (1975: 190-3) has eight categories: i. e. asserting, evaluating, reflecting 
speaker attitude, stipulating, requesting, suggesting and committing. 
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The forces of performative verbs are classified under these categories: e. g. 
`promising' under commissives and committing, and `thanking', under expressives 
and reflecting speaker attitude respectively. However, the use of certain 
performatives does not guarantee that the illocutionary forces associated with them 
are communicated. As pointed out by Levinson (1983: 247) difficulties in 
explaining non-literal uses of expressions arise in most theories of Speech acts. For 
example, in (52) the use of performative verb promise does not communicate the 
speech act of promising. 
(52) "I promise to do the job!. " 
(ridiculing a politician's statement which the speaker has just heard on TV) 
This is not limited to irony. The most convincing case would be embedded uses of 
performative verbs. For example, in "He thinks I promised ... ", the speaker 
is not 
performing any act of promising, nor attributing any act to 'he': she is reporting 
thoughts, but not words (Wilson & Sperber (1990: 104)). 
Let us go back to his example (17) which he considers as a case of `strong 
performative'. 
(17) 1 must advise you to remain quiet. 
As Fraser (1975: 187) argues, the speaker of (17) is not literally advising the hearer 
to remain quiet, but literally stating the obligation to advise the hearer to remain 
quiet. The speaker gives her full backing to the proposition expressed by (17) and 
there is no reduced commitment of the speaker to it. 
However, by using the modal must, the speaker puts the responsibility for the act 
of advising in someone else's hands whoever is obliging her to give the advice. By 
attributing the responsibility to someone other than the speaker, she can dissociate 
herself from the proposition that she advises the hearer to remain quiet and 
communicate her reduced commitment to it, i. e. the reduced force of advising. Thus 
the speaker can weaken the illocutionary force of her explicit act of advising and in 
such a case (17) is a hedged performative. The reduced commitment of the 
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speaker can be pragmatically inferred by the hearer. Since the speaker's limited 
commitment is communicated to the hearer, we can argue that the speaker is hedging 
(see the characterisation of hedging (37)). 
Now advising someone to remain quiet is a face threatening act in Brown & 
Levinson's terms (1978: 66) and by attributing the responsibility to someone other 
than herself and thus communicating her limited commitment to the force of 
advising, the speaker can communicate her concern not to threaten the hearer's 'face'. 
In such a case the use of must may give rise to the social implication of politeness. 
What Fraser (1975) calls 'hedged' performative forces come from the very fact 
that by using modal or semi-modal verbs such as must and wish the speaker can 
dissociate herself from the force of the following performative verbs and express 
various attitudes to them, one of which being speaker's limited commitment. The 
hearer then pragmatically infers that the speaker might not have full commitment to 
what is communicated by performatives and arrives at an estimate of degree of 
commitment. For example, a policeman or lawyer might utter (17) to someone under 
arrest. In such a case he is not necessarily communicating the weakened force of his 
advice as shown in (17)': 
(17)' 1 must advise you to remain quiet. And I am seriously advising you to do so. 
The use of modals such as must does not always modify or hedge the illocutionary 
force communicated. This is in fact a general point about all so-called hedging 
devices. 
In this dissertation, I am not going to pursue any further Fraser's (1975) notion of 
'hedged performatives' but conclude that the use of modals/semi-modals such as must 
and wish to can result in the speaker's hedging in appropriate contexts by 
dissociating herself from the full force of her performative verb. Let us now turn to 
Brown & Levinson (1978,1987). 
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1.4.3 Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) 
Brown & Levinson (1978: 146) argue that in some languages hedging is 
semantically encoded in particles and they give the Japanese particle ne as an 
example. Assuming Searle's standard speech act analysis, they (1978: 147) argue, 
following R. Lakoff (1972), that "the Japanese particle ne suspends the sincerity 
condition on assertions, the preparatory condition of coerciveness on orders, and the 
essential condition on questions - operations that are syntactically done in English 
with tags or with expressions like 'I wonder"'. 
I will show that R. Lakoff (1972)'s analysis of the particle ne is not correct. She 
(1972: 919) states that by the particle ne "a normally obligatory rule of conversation 
is relaxed". The sincerity condition for an assertive is that the speaker believes what 
she says, and according to R. Lakoff (1972: 919), ne used in an assertion (53) 
softens the claim that the hearer should believe the propositional form of an 
utterance. 
(53) John is here ne. `John is here, isn't he? ' (R. Lakoff 1972: 919) 
(a declarative, but without the normal declarative demand for the hearer's belief) 
It is obviously too strong to say that a declarative force in general demands the 
hearer's belief. When I utter a declarative sentence such as 'Mary is very nice', I am 
stating my opinion on Mary and I am not demanding that the hearer should have the 
same opinion. Further, ne used in the assertions in (54) does not suspend the claim 
for the hearer's belief but quite on the contrary asks for the hearer's corroboration: 
(54)A: Kyoo wa samui desu ne. 'It's cold today, isn't it? ' 
today topic cold is 
B: Soo desu ne. 'It is, indeed. ' 
So is 
(A meets B on a street and it is freezingly cold) 
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By using the particle ne, A in (54) expresses that A assumes that B believes the 
truth of what A says, and seeks for B's agreement: A's utterance without the particle 
would be inappropriate in a context such as (54) in which it is fairly clear that the 
speaker and hearer both believe the proposition expressed. That means, contrary to 
R. Lakoff, the demand for the hearer's belief in what the speaker says is in fact not 
softened but assumed or strengthened in this context: without assuming that the 
hearer believes that it is cold today, the speaker A cannot seek for the hearer B's 
agreement. 
Likewise, in (54)B the speaker assumes that the hearer (=A), of course, believes 
that it is cold today (=what A has just said) and the hearer's belief about the coldness 
is already established at the time of uttering (54)B. In (54)B, ne is used to confirm 
that the speaker and the hearer share the same thought, contrary to R. Lakoffs 
claim. In (54)A-B, the speaker knows that the hearer believes that it is cold today, 
and there is no point in using ne if its function is to soften the claim for the hearer's 
believing it. 
For an order, R. Lakoff (1972: 919) argues that the normal imperative demand for 
the hearer's obedience is weakened by ne and she gives an example (55): 
(55) Come here ne. 'Come here, won't you? ' (R. Lakoff 1972: 919) 
(an order, but without normal imperative demand for the addressee's response) 
Ne used in an order, however, can result in the opposite effect in certain contexts. 
Let us see the following: 
(56) Katazukenasai ne. 
tidy up, I say. 
(A mother sees a messy room of her son, and it is obvious to the son that he has to 
tidy up. Mother says (56) to the son) 
Ne in (56) is used to help convey the speaker's insistence on the son's agreeing to 
tidy up rather than weakening the demand for the son's obedience. Especially when 
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the order carries an angry tone of voice, there is no way the appended particle ne 
weakens the imperative force. 
Lastly, for a question, according to R. Lakoff (1972: 919), ne is used to suspend 
the demand for the hearer's response: 
(57) Is John here ne? 'I wonder if John is here'. (R. Lakoff 1972: 919) 
(a question, without the normal interrogative demand for the addressee's response) 
Again, ne used in a question can have the opposite effect. For example, in (58) ne 
appended to the question does not weaken the demand for the hearer's response, but 
quite on the contrary, helps convey the speaker's insistence on the hearer's response 
compared with the one without ne: 
(58) John wa koko desu ka ne? 
topic here is Question particle 'Is John here? ' 
(A boss impatiently asking to his secretary) 
In this context, ne does not function the way R. Lakoff considers it to function: i. e. 
weakening effects. (58) without ne is a polite way of asking whether John is here 
due to the polite form copula (i. e. desu). The addition of ne, however, here does not 
make the utterance softer, i. e. does not withhold the questioning force. 
Of course, in some contexts the particle ne might be used so that the various 
demands mentioned above, i. e. various forces of utterances are weakened, and R. 
Lakoff(1972) analyses this Japanese particle ne as being responsible for this effect. 
However, as argued in 1.3.4, 'hedging' is a pragmatic phenomenon and a lexical item 
which operates as a hedge in one context might not operate this way in another. So, 
counter-examples (54), (56) and (58) are not at all unexpected since hedging or 
weakening the forces of assertion, order, question etc. is not due to certain lexical 
items alone such as the particle ne, but due to some contextual information as well. 
In the given counter-examples, this particle ne is not even signalling or giving a clue 
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for 'weakened forces' but seems to be communicating 'strengthened forces' (this 
effect to be discussed in 4.2.2.3). 
What does it mean that in one context, ne is used to weaken an illocutionary force 
of an utterance and in another to strengthen it? We can definitely say that neither of 
the operations is intrinsic to the particle. This particle seems sensitive to other 
factors such as contextual information, intonation, tone of voice etc. I will try to 
isolate the intrinsic meaning of this particle ne and explain its variable effects in 
utterance interpretation in Chapter 4. 
Further, Brown & Levinson (1978: 151-5) list Tzeltal particles operating as 
hedges. They include lah -a quotative particle 'it is said', me -a possibility marker 
usually translated as 'if and mak - dubitative particle 'perhaps' 'I guess' `I suppose' 
and so on. The quotative particle lah used in assertions might communicate the 
speaker's limited commitment to the utterance by putting the responsibility for the 
truth of the utterance in someone else's hands. However, hearsay expressions do not 
always operate as hedges as demonstrated in (59): 
(59) It is said that Kyoto is beautiful and in fact it is. 
The speaker of (59) does believe the truth of the proposition that Kyoto is beautiful. 
The hearsay phrase it is said is used to communicate what is said about Kyoto in 
general and there is no hedging element there. 
Interestingly, the Tzeltal quotative particle lah used in commands distances the 
speaker from a command by indicating (truly or as a pretence) that the command is 
somebody other than the speaker's. This way lah softens the imperative force of an 
utterance (Brown & Levinson 1978: 151 2). Likewise, the so-called quotative 
particle tte of Japanese can be used to soften the imperative force by indicating that 
the command is a third-party one. However, as is the case with hearsay expressions 
in English, tte does not always operate as a hedge and the same is probably true of 
lah. For example, in the context specified in (56), tte can be used instead of ne. and 
can convey Mother's insistence on her son's tidying up as demonstrated below: 
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(60) Katazukenasai. Katazukenasai-tte. 
Tidy up. Tidy up, I say. 
I will examine the intrinsic function of the Japanese quotative particle tte in Chapter 
4. 
According to Brown & Levinson (1978: 154), mak dubitative particle meaning 
`perhaps', `I guess' weakens an assertive force and "in some cases turns a statement 
into a question". This sounds as if questions could be placed along a continuum of 
the strength of the speaker's commitment to a proposition: of course, at the weak end 
of the continuum. Arguing along these lines, Kendal (1985), for instance, places the 
Japanese interrogative particle ka (see (58)) at the weak end of a commitment 
continuum. 
However, there is a crucial difference between the speaker's weakened 
commitment to the truth of a proposition and a proposition represented as a question. 
The difference is that the former, however weak it is, has the speaker's commitment 
to the truth of P while in the latter there is no endorsement of the speaker towards the 
truth of the proposition. That is, a questioner does not express any degree of 
commitment to the truth of the proposition at the time of asking. In fact, it has been 
argued by Sperber & Wilson (1986) and Wilson & Sperber (1988a) that 
interrogatives are, unlike declaratives, not descriptive representations at all (see 
4.4.4). 
So, I doubt very much that the dubitative particle mak sometimes turns a 
statement into a question. Of course, if the speaker expresses her uncertainty towards 
a proposition whereas the hearer is certain about its truth, the hearer's response might 
sound as if he was replying to a question as in (61). However, the hearer is not 
answering a question but confirming the truth, of the other's tentative statement. 
(61)A: You are sad, I guess? (Brown & Levinson 1978: 154) 
B: Yes, I am. I lost my wallet. 
I have said that a proposition represented as a question does not have any 
endorsement from the speaker. The propositional form expressed by a question does 
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not in fact describe a state of affairs at all. Rather it represents another representation 
(a thought). The thought so represented is a desirable i. e. relevant thought. 
Interrogatives are 'interpretive' representations, an account of which will be given in 
4.4 where I give a full analysis of the Japanese question particle ka. 
Lastly, Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) do not clarify what it means to 'modify 
illocutionary forces'. Let me try to clarify this notion. They might mean that an 
illocutionary force is modified by a hedge if the same utterance without the hedge 
has a different illocutionary force. Or they might mean that an illocutionary force of 
some strength is communicated, and then a hedging expression is used which 
modifies it. For example, in (28) (repeated below) the force of command is first 
communicated and then the hedging phrase if you can modifies the illocutionary 
force by reducing or softening it. This kind of `posterior hedging' is going to be 
discussed in Section 2.4.4 in which the alteration of the speaker's propositional 
attitude will be discussed. 
(28) Close the window, if you can. 
It seems that they mean the former as the hedging phrase if you can in (28) does 
convey a different strength of ordering from the one conveyed by the non-hedged 
version of (28). That is, if they meant the latter, the idea of hedging the illocutionary 
force of ordering in (28) would be problematic. Consider (28)': 
(28)' If you can, close the window. 
When if you can is uttered initially as in (28)', I doubt that the illocutionary force of 
the command is first communicated and then it is modified by if you can. Because if 
you can is already in the context against which the command 'close the window' is 
processed, it is unlikely that the hearer first infers the full force of command and 
then the hedged force, but rather that the hearer only infers the hedged force. The 
inference of the first step force is obviously a redundant process. 
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It seems better to define 'modifying illocutionary forces' in the first sense: i. e. a 
hedge modifies illocutionary force if the same utterance without the hedge would 
have a different illocutionary force (either different in kind, e. g. a request instead of 
an order, or different in strength). Otherwise, if you can in (28)' would not function 
as a hedge while in (28) it would. Of course, as seen in (28), there are cases in 
which a hedge modifies an illocutionary force which is first communicated to the 
hearer. By defining hedges this way, we can explain 'modifying illocutionary forces' 
both in (28) and (28)'. 
Brown & Levinson (1987: 146) gave data from Tzeltal, Japanese etc. and argued 
that in some languages hedges are encoded as particles. In this section, however, I 
have shown that hedging effects are not always present with those particles, 
confirming that we need fuller semantic and pragmatic analyses for the particles. In 
Chapter 41 will give detailed analyses of the Japanese particles ne, tte and ka based 
on the Relevance framework. In 
(1982)'s analysis. 
1.4.4 Prince, Frader & Bosk (1982) 
the next section, I will examine Prince et al 
Prince et al (1982: 85) analyse hedged utterances taken from physician - physician 
discourse in a clinic. They base their notion of hedges on Lakoff (1972): i. e. hedges 
make things more or less 'fuzzy', and at the same time they present a Gricean analysis 
of hedges. Some of the problems I will point out in this section are in fact due to the 
limitations of the prototype theory which Lakoff (1972) and Prince et al(1982) resort 
to, as well as to the Gricean framework. 
Prince et al (1982) first categorise hedges into 'approximators' and 'shields': the 
former affects the proposition expressed by an utterance while the latter the 
propositional attitude. Then, each type of hedge is further categorised into two: 
'approximators' into 'adaptor' and 'rounder' while 'shields' into 'plausibility' and 
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'attribution'. Let me in turn examine the four types of hedges given by Prince et al 
(1982: 93). 
1.4.4.1 Adaptors (a sub-case of approximator) 
Let me repeat the utterance (29): 
(29) His feet are sort of blue. (Prince et al 1982: 85) 
(29) 'His feet are blue. 
Prince et al (1982: 85) state that "sort of is the type of hedge that affects the 
propositional content but not the speaker commitment". However, (29) might 
convey to the hearer that the speaker is not totally committed to the proposition that 
the feet are blue. I wonder if there is a clear cut distinction between these two 
interpretations. If the speaker saw the feet being not quite blue and uttered (29), we 
can either interpret that the speaker is not quite committed to the blueness of the feet 
or that she is committed to the non-prototypical blueness of the feet. If the former, 
sort of would affect the speaker's commitment to the propositional content of an 
utterance, and the distinction between 'approximators' and 'shields' mentioned above 
may not be hard and fast. 
Further, Prince et al (1982: 86) argue that the speaker of the unhedged version 
(29)' "implicates full personal commitment to the truth of the proposition conveyed 
by simply asserting the proposition". Although their analysis is based on the Gricean 
framework, this is directly against what Grice himself says about the proposition 
communicating the speaker's belief. According to him (Grice 1978: 114), "it is not a 
natural use of language to describe one who has said that P as having, for example, 
"implied, " "indicated, " or "suggested" that he believes that P; the natural thing to say 
is that he has expressed (or at least purported to express) the belief that P. " 
Their argument is based on a psychological experiment by Rosch (1977) on how 
people perceive category membership. She tries to establish the internal structure of 
various noun categories in terms of central instances (prototypes) and peripheral 
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instances. According to Prince et al (1982: 85), statements involving peripheral 
rather than central instances seem to be considered to be more fuzzy and sort of 
explicitly indicates this. 
So with regard to `adaptors' Prince et al follow Lakoff closely and presumably 
inherit his views on multiple truth-values, degrees of truth, being necessary in 
assessing utterances with `adaptors' in them. They do not mention technically or a 
regular, presumably because they did not arise in their corpus. They would seem to 
qualify as adaptors too since they too alter class membership and therefore truth- 
value. I shall focus on the adaptors technically and a regular in Chapter 3 and make 
a suggestion about sort of my account will obviate the need for anything beyond the 
two classical values `true' and 'false'. 
Further, there is an example in which it is not clear whether sort of affects 
speaker's attitude or the propositional content of an utterance: 
(62) A: Do you think that Mary is happy? 
B: Sort of. 
In this example, sort of might affect the speaker's thinking (as a shield-type hedge) 
and communicate (64), or it might affect the proposition (63) (as an approximator- 
type hedge) and communicate (65). 
(63) Mary is happy. 
(64) I sort of think that Mary is happy. 
(65) 1 think that Mary is sort of happy. 
Actually it does not seem to matter which is the case: i. e. in both cases (62)B 
communicates that the speaker has limited commitment to the proposition that Mary 
is happy. So it seems that Prince et al's claim that sort of affects the speaker's 
propositional content is not always true. Let me now turn to 'Rounder3. 
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1.4.4.2 Rounders (a sub-case of approximator) 
Lakoff (1972: 196) includes words such as roughly and almost in his category of 
'some hedges and related phenomena'. Following Lakoff (1972), Prince et al (1982: 
88) call words like approximately, about, and something between X and Y which 
indicate a range, 'rounders', a sub-case of approximators. Prince et al (1982: 88) are 
correct in saying that these words do not affect the speaker's propositional attitude 
but its content, and that they encode a range: sometimes precise terms or numbers are 
not relevant or not known by the speaker and she gives merely approximate terms. 
They argue that the figure chosen is taken to be the prototypical diagnosis by the 
physicians while the hedge chosen indicates that "the actual situation is close to but 
not identical with the prototypical situation". So in (30) (repeated below) 'ten fifty 
over five fifty' indicates some prototypical or rather precise situation of this figure 
while about indicates some non-prototypical situation or a range: 
(30) 1 and 0 was about ten fifty over five fifty. 
It is certainly true that rounders contribute to the proposition expressed, however, I 
am not pursuing this type of hedges any more. As far as numbers or figures are 
concerned,. I doubt that we need notions such as prototype as we have notions such as 
`preciseness' and a `range' that make a contribution to the proposition expressed. 
Moreover, as (66) demonstrates, even a hedged term can indicate a prototypical 
instance of that term (a situation which is contextually determined), or as (67) 
demonstrates, a non-hedged term can indicate a range. 
(A friend the speaker has not seen for some years, asks her over a drink how much 
she is earning now. She replies: ) 
(66) 1 earn about 800 pounds a month. 
(adapted from Sperber & Wilson 1986: 233) 
(67) 1 earn 800 pounds a mouth. (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 233) 
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This approximate figure 'about 800 pounds' can lead to exactly the same 
conclusions about the speaker's status, standard of living, life style, etc. as the 
'unhedged' exact figure '800 pounds' can. The hearer can infer kinds of typical 
information on the speaker's life style associated with that amount of salary. Then, it 
does not matter whether the speaker says a hedged figure, or an unhedged figure in a 
context such as (66) in which the hearer would like to know about the speaker's life 
in general. Therefore, in the above mentioned context, the speaker could have said 
(67) - unhedged figure though this is strictly speaking false. 
Both in (66) -a hedged figure and (67) - an unhedged figure, information about 
the speaker's life style typically associated with the salary '800 pounds' is derived. 
That means, a hedged figure does not necessarily indicate some non-prototypical 
situation associated with that figure. In (66) the hedge about communicates a range 
as Prince et al (1982: 88) argues. And in (67) where there is no hedge used, a range 
is communicated as well: i. e. the figure which is not explicitly hedged, is indeed 
understood as loosely used. That is, the hearer in the given context knows that a pay 
slip salary figure is usually a complex one such as 787.89 pounds after tax deduction, 
and that the speaker of (67) does not earn exactly 800 pounds net per month. Then, 
'a range' can be communicated without using a rounder such as about. 
As the last and this section have shown, Prince et al's (1982) argument that 
approximators encode some non-prototypical situation, simply is not correct. The 
utterance of sort of X or about X requires contextual information for them to be 
interpreted fully: i. e. for sort of X some encyclopaedic information about X is 
required and for about X, the range the hedge about communicates cannot be fixed 
without contextual information. 
From our definition of hedging (37), approximators discussed here are not always 
hedges, although they can be as seen in (64). The attribution of hedging effects to the 
semantics of linguistic elements is simply wrong since, as the definition (45) goes, 
hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon. 
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1.4.4.3 Plausibility Hedges (a sub-case of shields) 
'Shields' are hedges which do not affect the propositional content of an utterance but 
"affect the degree and type of speaker commitment". As the term `shield' indicates, 
they protect the speaker from having to take full responsibility for the propositional 
content of her utterance. 'Plausibility hedges' such as I think and probably 
`implicate' that "the speaker is uncertain because s/he speaks from knowledge or 
beliefs acquired via plausible reasoning" (Prince et al 1982: 93). Let me consider 
(68): 
(68) And I think we can probably just slow him down.... 
(Prince et al 1982: 89) 
It might be true that these hedges I think and probably do not affect the 
proposition expressed by (68), since the point of the utterance seems to be that they 
can slow him down' and it is towards that which the speaker expresses limited 
commitment. If so, I think and probably in (68) are what Urmson (1966: 193,200) 
calls a parenthetical usage by which is meant that "they help the understanding and 
assessment of what is said rather than being a part of what is said" (Urmson 1966: 
212). I will look into Urmson (1966) in 3.2.2. 
However, the Gricean notion of 'what is said' is usually characterised as 
linguistically encoded content with referents assigned and any ambiguity resolved. It 
should therefore include the explicitly given I think and probably in (68). If Prince et 
al (1982) and Urmson (1966: 212) are correct, this looks like a problem for the 
Gricean notion of `what is said' and this notion needs more investigation. 
Prince et al (1982: 93) argue that these hedges `implicate' that the speaker is 
uncertain about a proposition. However, in Chapter 3I will show in detail how none 
of the Gricean categories of implicature (conventional, generalised conversational, 
particularised conversational) can account for the contribution made by the hedging 
expressions. The fact that the speaker of (68) is uncertain about a proposition is not 
actually implicated but explicitly uttered. I think and probably might well not be a 
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part of the proposition expressed by (68) if Prince et al (1982) are correct in 
considering the proposition as one that carries the point of the utterance (see 3.2.6). 
However, they are definitely a part of the explicit import of the utterance. 
Here we might need some other notions which explain that I think and probably 
are not a part of the propositional content but yet a part of the explicit import. That 
is, they are not a part of what is implicated because they are not implicitly but 
explicitly given. Relevance theory makes a distinction between the propositional 
form of an utterance (the outcome of linguistic decoding, reference assignment, 
disambiguation, fixation of indexicals and vagueness) and its explicatures (which 
may or may not include the propositional form). Explicatures are assumptions 
which are communicated (as opposed to merely expressed) by the speaker and are 
developments of the logical form encoded by an utterance (see Section 2.3). 
Given this distinction, we can explain why I think and probably which may or 
may not constitute a part of the proposition expressed, nevertheless constitute a part 
of some explicitly communicated assumption other than the Gricean 'what is said'. 
We will give Relevance-based analyses of explicit attitude expressions such as I 
suppose and probably in Chapter 3. 
1.4.4.4 Attribution Hedges(a sub-case of shields) 
Prince et al (1982: 89) include expressions such as according to, presumably, 
somebody said that... etc. in their category of attribution shields, and they argue that 
they "simply attribute the belief in question to someone other than the speaker, the 
speaker's own degree of commitment being only indirectly inferable". 
Sometimes the attributee is explicitly specified as in (69) and sometimes not, as 
in (70) and (71): 
(69) According to John Major, Britain's economy will improve. 
(70) They say that Britain's economy will improve. 
(71) Britain's economy will improve (uttered ironically). 
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(The speaker and the hearer are watching TV and have just heard John Major making 
a speech. The speaker does not support Tory's policy. ) 
In (70) the attributee is not specified but they say that explicitly conveys that the 
complement clause is not the speaker's thought. (71), on the other hand, does not 
have any explicit expression of the utterance being attributed to someone other than 
the speaker, but in the given context, the hearer can infer that the utterance is not the 
speaker's thought. Whether or not the attributee is given, or whether or not it is 
expressed that the belief in question is someone else's, all of the above utterances can 
communicate that the speaker does not believe what John Major said. 
According to Prince et al (1982: 85), shield type hedges do not affect the 
proposition expressed, but affect the relationship between it and the speaker, i. e. the 
speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed. This means that 
according to... does not contribute to the proposition expressed and the propositions 
expressed by (69) (repeated below) and (72) would be identical. If they were 
identical, i. e. synonymous, the conjunction (69) & (72), i. e. P&P, would be 
redundant at the explicit level. However, they are not. 
(69)According to John Major, Britain's economy will improve. 
(72)According to Tony Blair too, Britain's economy will improve. 
Further, Prince et al(1982) would consider it is said in the following as an 
attribution hedge and would argue that this hedge does not affect the truth-conditions 
of the first conjunct. Then, what the speaker is SAYING is that Kyoto is beautiful 
and in fact it is beautiful, which is obviously a redundant remark. However, (73) is 
not redundant since the first conjunct communicates what is said about Kyoto and the 
second, the speaker's belief 
(73)It is said that Kyoto is beautiful and in fact it is. 
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So, contrary to Prince et al (1982: 89)'s argument, it seems that attribution hedges do 
contribute to the truth-conditions of an utterance. I shall pursue this point further in 
Chapter 4 when I consider the hearsay particle tte. 
Let us now consider (74) and (75), examples given by Prince et al (1982: 91): 
(74) There was a dramatic response after medication. 
(75) According to me, there was a dramatic response after medication(? ). 
According to Prince et al (1982: 90), the hearer observing the maxim of quality 
(Grice 1975) infers that the speaker has adequate evidence for believing the 
proposition expressed to be true and (74) is in a way equivalent to 'the redundant' 
(75). However, for any echoic, especially ironical, utterance an unhedged version P 
is not always equivalent to 'according to me, P': i. e. the proposition given by an 
utterance is not always the speaker's thought (e. g. (71)). Also as (76) shows, 
'according to me, P' is not always redundant: 
(76) According to John, Jane, and many other people, I might be crazy, but 
according to ME, I am totally sane. 
Prince et al (1982: 289) argue that the use of expressions including according to... 
attribute an assumption/belief to someone other than the speaker and the speaker's 
own degree of commitment is indirectly inferable. 'According to ME' in (76), 
however, clearly indicates that what follows is attributed to the speaker, not to 
anybody else. Then, this expression does not fall in the category of hedges specified 
by Prince et al at the beginning of this section. According to specifies who the 
assumption/belief is attributed to but does not exclude the case of attributing to the 
speaker. 
I have argued that speakers communicate their doubt or limited conviction in a 
proposition by hedging. Though according to and they say that... are analysed as 
hedges by Prince et al (1982), they do not always diminish the speaker's 
commitment. For example, suppose that the speaker and the hearer are talking about 
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today's weather, and that they are talking about how to improve their violin skills 
respectively: 
(77) According to the weather forecast, it will be sunny today. 
(78) They say that practice makes perfect. 
The speaker of (77) communicates her strong commitment by attributing the 
information to the expert, so does the speaker of (78) by quoting a popular proverb. 
So, according to my characterisation of hedging given in (37), they are not hedges in 
the context specified above. What they do is to convey explicitly that the 
complement clause is attributed to someone other than the speaker. 
Lastly, Prince et al (1982: 91) argue that attribution shields "implicate that the 
speaker is speaking from knowledge or beliefs acquired via hearsay, in the broadest 
sense of the term". However, as the conjunction `(69) & (72)' is not a redundant 
remark and therefore shows that according to... IS a part of the Gricean notion of 
'what is said', their claim is incorrect. The speaker of (69) does not implicate that 
she is speaking from knowledge or belief acquired via hearsay, but SAYS so. 
To conclude, plausibility shields such as I think and probably might not 
contribute to the proposition expressed by an utterance, but attribution shields such 
as according to and it is said definitely do. So, Prince et al (1982)'s classification of 
hedges seems not so fast and clear: their argument that adaptors and rounders 
(approximators) affect the propositional content while plausibility and attribution 
hedges (shields) do not needs further consideration. 
In Section 1.4, I have pointed out some problems and shortcomings observed in 
the past work on hedges. As I mentioned, some of the problems arise from the 
limitations of the frameworks (i. e. speech act theory, prototype theory, Gricean 
pragmatics) within which the past studies are done. 
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1.5 Conclusions 
Discussions of hedging often arise in the context of sociolinguistically oriented work 
on politeness phenomena in language use. For example, I have discussed in 1.3.3.1 
that pointing out someone's mistake is a `face'-threatening act but by hedging the 
speaker can weaken her assertion, thereby preserving the `face' of that person and 
giving rise to 'politeness' in Brown & Levinson's term (1978,1987). 
I have mentioned the case of the Malagasy society in which `hedging' seems to be 
the norm that people conform to. In this society in which everybody knows what 
everybody else is doing, any piece of new information is extremely important and 
therefore by hedging people try not to reveal it in definite terms. Also it would be a 
great loss of face if what the speaker said turned out to be not taking place. For this 
reason the speaker keeps hedging even if she is quite sure of the truth of the 
information she is giving. In a society such as this, the less commitment the speaker 
gives, the better, everything else being equal. However, although the hedging effect 
does often play a crucial role in the modulation of social relations through discourse, 
I argued that this is neither its sole nor its intrinsic function. 
I have tried to give a characterisation of what linguists informally call `hedging' 
in communication, i. e. of the way in which speakers may moderate the assertive force 
of their utterances. Hedges include various linguistic devices such as I suppose/guess 
and probably in English and particles such as ne (= isn't it) and tte (= I hear) in 
Japanese. However, the hedging effect may be achieved by features of the ostensive 
stimulus other than encoded linguistic content; it may be communicated by an 
uncertain tone of voice or by such non-linguistic means as facial expression and 
shoulder shrugging, etc. (e. g. (34)). I therefore argued that the hedging effect is not 
intrinsically linguistic but is a broader pragmatic phenomenon communicating the 
speaker's less than complete conviction, as characterised in (37). 
In this chapter I have presented studies on hedges in the past and shown that so 
far linguists have used the term to mean various functions: e. g. Lakoff (1972) 
defines hedges as making an utterance more or less true; Lakoff (1987), as evoking 
various cognitive models of the world in which an utterance is interpreted; Fraser 
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(1975) and Brown & Levinson (1978 1987), as modifying the illocutionary force of 
an utterance; Prince et al (1982), as e. g. implicating the speaker's weakened 
commitment. They all present interesting linguistic data but existing frameworks and 
distinctions such as the Gricean `what is said/implicated' cannot explain them 
satisfactorily. 
In several places, I have in passing mentioned the Relevance theoretic approach of 
Sperber and Wilson and the important notions of the `semantics/pragmatics' and 
`explicit/implicit' distinctions for explaining some of the so-called hedging 
phenomena. In the next chapter I will introduce Relevance theory since I believe that 
it enables a better analysis of what are informally labelled 'hedges'. 
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Chapter 2: Relevance Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
Relevance theory is a general cognitive theory in that its basic claims concern human 
information processing in general, and within this basic framework, there is a more 
specific pragmatic theory which has its own particular principle, called 'the principle of 
relevance' (see Section 2.2.2). 
Wilson & Sperber (1986) point out that humans pay attention to some phenomena 
rather than others: they represent these phenomena to themselves in one way rather 
than another; they process these representations in one context rather than another. 
What determines these choices is some standard governing human cognition called 
'relevance'. They suggest that humans tend to pay attention to the most relevant 
phenomena available; they tend to construct the most relevant possible representations 
of these phenomena, and to process them in a context that maximises their relevance. 
Sperber & Wilson (1986) claim that relevance, and the maximisation of relevance, is 
the key to human cognition. In the next section, let us see how they explain this notion. 
2.2 On the Notion 'Relevance' 
According to Sperber & Wilson (1986), information is relevant to a human if it 
interacts in certain ways with his existing assumptions about the world. They present 
three types of interaction described in the following situations. First, I arrive home 
with the thought (1)a. and discover via visual perception the information (1)b. 
(1)a. If Mary is at home, I will suggest that we should go to see a play. 
b. Mary is at home. 
In this case, I can deduce the following implication (1)c. using both old and newly 
acquired information (i. e. (1)a-b. ) as joint premises in a deductive inference process. 
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(1)c. is not deducible from either the existing assumption (1)a. or the newly acquired 
information (1)b. alone, but from the union of the two. 
(1)c. I will suggest that we should go to see a play. 
Second, I arrive home with the thought (2)a. and hear Mary singing and discover, 
via auditory perception this time, the information (2)b. 
(2)a. Mary may be at home. 
b. Mary is at home. 
In this case, the newly available information (2)b. raises the strength of the existing old 
information (2)a. from weak to certain. There might be a case in which newly available 
information lowers the strength of the existing old information (2)a. For example, 
when I am thinking Mary must be home by now, somebody tells me that he has just 
seen her shopping and I start to think she is not likely to be at home. This weakening is 
not discussed in Sperber & Wilson (1986). However, the newly available information 
is changing the status of the existing old information as in the case just given above and 
I feel this should be included here. In 4.5.3 I will give a possible example of 
'weakening' observed in utterance-final use of kedo. 
Lastly, I arrive home with the thought (3)a. and discover (3)b. 
(3)a. Mary might be/is at home. 
b. Mary is not at home. 
In this case, the newly available information (3)b. erases the existing old information 
and replaces it. 
When a newly acquired piece of information interacts with a person's assumptions 
in any of the ways mentioned above, Sperber & Wilson (1986) say that it is 'relevant' 
both in their technical sense and in an intuitive sense. Intuitively, for example, we 
know that noticing that the hall needs cleaning, is not relevant in any of the above 
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situations. Technically, this is because it does not interact in any of these three ways 
with the contextual assumptions given in (1)-(3)a. 
The three types of interaction above show how a piece of information can be 
relevant, specifying what kind of effects the information can achieve i. e. derivation of a 
contextual implication, strengthening an existing assumption and eliminating (and 
perhaps weakening) an existing assumption. However, this is not a sufficient 
characterisation as, first, 'relevance' is a matter of degree, and second, there is another 
factor we have to consider, i. e. effort required for achieving the effects. It is to these 
that I now turn. 
2.2.1 Processing Effort and Contextual Effects 
Information is relevant if it interacts with existing assumptions in the ways given in the 
last section. So there are basically three ways in which a newly presented piece of 
information can be relevant: it may lead to a contextual implication, it may strengthen 
an existing assumption, or it may eliminate an existing assumption and replace it with 
the newly available piece of information. Sperber & Wilson (1986) call these 
interactions, 'contextual effects' and say that information is relevant when it has one of 
these contextual effects. Having contextual effects is a necessary condition for 
relevance, and the more contextual effects a newly presented piece of information has, 
the more relevant it is. However, it is not the only factor involved. 
Contextual effects are achieved by certain mental processes i. e. processing efforts, 
and this is the second factor which is considered for assessing the degree of relevance. 
Intuitively, the information that Mary is not at home is more relevant than the 
information that Mary is not at home and the hall needs cleaning in the second and 
third cases described in the last section. This is because the latter conjoined 
information requires more processing effort than the former, although both yield just 
the same range of contextual effects. So 'relevance' is, on the one hand, a classificatory 
notion in that we can talk about a newly acquired piece of information being relevant or 
not. And on the other, it is a comparative notion in that we can talk about a newly 
acquired piece of information being more or less relevant. 
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Let me clarify this point. Suppose I am on my way home with the thought that 
Mary is probably at home, and if so, I will suggest that we should go out for supper. 
And then I meet Mary's colleague who says that Mary has to stay late in the office. 
This utterance is highly relevant as it eliminates my thought that Mary is probably at 
home. Now suppose that the colleague says that Mary has to stay late in the office and 
I see children crossing the road behind the colleague. This conjoined information 
achieves the same contextual effect i. e. the elimination of my thought that Mary is 
probably at home. However, intuitively we know that this conjoined information is 
less relevant in the given context than the former case. 
The reason is: only the information that Mary is not at home is used to eliminate 
and replace the existing assumption, i. e. to achieve contextual effects; and processing 
the information that children are crossing the road will not yield any immediate effect 
in this context but will require some effort (it may, of course, have effects in another 
context I have available). That is, when achieving the same amount of contextual 
effects, a newly acquired piece of information is more relevant the less the effort that 
was required to derive the effects. So the following comparative definition of relevance 
is suggested: 
(4) Relevance 
a. Other things being equal, the greater the contextual effects, the greater the 
relevance. 
b. Other things being equal, the smaller the processing effort, the greater the 
relevance. 
In the last section, we have seen that relevance is a relation between a newly 
available piece of information and the context in which it is processed and it is a 
function of effects and effort. Suppose that (1)b. is processed in the following context 
(5)a-b: 
(5)a. If Mary is at home, I will offer to take her to a restaurant. 
b. If I offer to take her to a restaurant, she will be pleased with me. 
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(1)b processed in the context (5)a-b gives two contextual implications, while (1)b 
processed in the context of (1)a. has only one contextual implication (1)c. Now on the 
contextual effect side i. e. the first condition in (4)a., (1)b processed in context (5) is 
more relevant than it is in (1) as it has more contextual effects. However, on the 
processing effort side i. e. the second condition in (4)b., this is not necessarily the case. 
It might be the case that the contextual assumptions are very easily accessible and 
accessing (5)a-b requires the hearer just the same effort as accessing (1)a. Suppose, 
however, that Mary always works till late and is seldom home when I come home, and 
I do not plan anything for the evening. Then, accessing the context (5)a-b requires 
more effort than accessing the context (1)a. When I go home, I discover to my surprise 
that Mary is at home. The former context gives two contextual implications that I will 
take her to a restaurant, and that she will be pleased with me, while the latter gives only 
one, that I will suggest that we should go to see a play. On the contextual effects side, 
the former case will be more relevant, as it gives two contextual implications. 
However, according to the processing effort factor, it is not the case, as accessing two 
contextual assumptions that are not easily accessible requires more effort than 
accessing one contextual assumption that is not easily accessible. So the context (5)a- 
b. yields more effects with MORE effort than (1)a. and again, neither, then, is predicted 
as more relevant than the other. 
An individual, whose aim is to maximise relevance, should pay attention to the 
phenomena which seem likely to give rise to the greatest possible contextual effects in 
return for the available processing effort. In turning our attention to some phenomenon 
in the world we may have the hope that it will be relevant. For a certain subset of 
attention-demanding phenomena we can have a warranted expectation of relevance. I 
now turn to this point. 
2.2.2 Principle of Relevance 
Some phenomena are relevant to an individual and are worth processing mentally, and 
others are not relevant at all and therefore are not worth processing at a conceptual 
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level. When a phenomenon is designed to achieve contextual effects i. e. when it is 
produced by an agent with the intention of informing an audience of something, it is 
called a stimulus. Some stimuli are used to make an informative intention mutually 
manifest and they are called 'ostensive stimuli'. They are characterised as, first, 
attracting the audience's attention, and second, focusing it on the communicator's 
intentions. 
There is a substantial difference between the way an individual approaches an 
ostensive stimulus directed at him and the way he attends to other stimuli. For 
example, your friend winking at you has the informative intention of informing you of 
something and the communicative intention of informing you of this intention. This 
ostensive stimulus yields contextual effects that the same act of her winking at 
someone else, or her involuntary or deliberate (but nonostensive) twitch do not achieve. 
In twitching involuntarily, your friend would have no informative intentions at all. 
And by twitching deliberately, she might have the informative intention of letting you 
know how exhausted she is or making you wonder what is wrong with her eye, etc. but 
does not have the communicative intention of informing you of these intentions, i. e. 
does not make her informative intention mutually manifest. Winking is an ostensive 
stimulus but it is only the winking at you (not at someone else) that demands your 
attention and guarantees some level of relevance to you. 
Or your friend raising a hand at you in a restaurant has the informative intention of 
letting you know that she is also at the restaurant and has the communicative intention 
of informing you of this intention. This ostensive stimulus yields contextual effects that 
the same act of her raising a hand at a waitress, or her deliberately raising a hand to 
stretch muscles and/or to let you see her new bracelet do not. While the addressee of an 
ostensive stimulus has fairly precise expectations of relevance, the addressee of other 
stimuli can only have hopes of relevance, which are sometimes totally unwarranted and 
sometimes turn out to be justified (she may, for example, be particularly interested in 
involuntary twitches and have a rich context available in which to process any new 
instance). 
Now humans pay attention only to phenomena they think will be relevant and the 
success of an act of ostensive communication requires the addressee's attention. That 
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is, an act of ostensive communication automatically communicates some guarantee of 
relevance: i. e. the stimulus directed at the addressee is relevant enough to be worth his 
attention. This can be characterised as, on the contextual effect side, guaranteeing an 
adequate range of contextual effects, i. e. as being worth the addressee's attention, and 
on the processing effort side, guaranteeing that the addressee is put to no unnecessary 
processing effort in deriving those effects. This is called `the presumption of optimal 
relevance' and its definition goes: 
(6)Presumption of optimal relevance 
(a) The set of assumptions I which the communicator intends to make manifest to the 
addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to process the 
ostensive stimulus. 
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have used 
to communicate I. 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986: 158) 
The communicator should therefore try to make sure that the intended context is one 
the addressee can access easily, so that she guarantees that when processed in this 
context, the information she is communicating yields an adequate range of contextual 
effects for the smallest possible processing effort. When an ostensive stimulus 
achieves an adequate range of contextual effects to be worth the addressee's attention 
and puts the addressee to no unjustifiable processing effort, Sperber & Wilson say that 
it is 'optimally relevant'. 
Relevance theory covers all incoming information, which makes this theory a 
general cognitive theory. However, within this general framework, there is a more 
specific principle called 'the principle of relevance' which applies just to ostensive 
stimuli, of which utterances are a central case, and so forms the basis of a pragmatic 
theory. The definition of this principle goes: 
(7) Principle of Relevance 
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Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own 
'optimal relevance'. 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986: 158) 
An adequate pragmatic theory should deal with how the hearer derives from an 
utterance all the information that is ostensively communicated (i. e. the intended 
interpretation). That is, an explanatory pragmatic theory is expected to account for how 
the hearer selects context, recognises which proposition the speaker intended to 
explicitly express, derives intended implications, i. e. implicatures, of the utterance, and 
decides what attitude the speaker intended to communicate to the proposition expressed 
and to the implicatures. The recovery of all these sorts of information is the 
interpretation of an utterance which was intended by the speaker. 
According to the principle of relevance, every utterance carries a guarantee of its 
optimal relevance. An utterance, on a given interpretation, is optimally relevant iff: (a). 
it achieves enough effects to be worth the hearer's attention; (b). it puts the hearer to no 
gratuitous effort in achieving those effects. Note that some processing effort is required 
to achieve any contextual effect, and the effort needed for utterance interpretation 
depends on, first, the linguistic complexity of an utterance, second, the accessibility of 
the context, and third, the inferential effort needed to achieve the contextual effect in 
the accessed context. 
Now every utterance has a variety of possible interpretations which are compatible 
with the information given by the linguistically encoded stimuli. And there might be 
several possible interpretations which could give rise to an adequate range of contextual 
effects. For example, the utterance (8) has possible interpretations such as (9) and (10): 
(8) Mary handed over the key and Ken opened the safe. 
(9) Mary handed over the key & (then) Ken opened the safe (with that key). 
(10) Mary handed over the key & (simultaneously) Ken opened the safe (with a 
wrench). 
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Obviously in a normal context, the interpretation (10) has more contextual effects. as 
unexpectedly Ken opened the safe with a wrench despite the key handed to him. 
However, the hearer is likely to derive the interpretation (9), because this is far more 
accessible in a normal context. 
According to the second condition of optimal relevance, which guarantees that the 
hearer is put to no gratuitous effort, the speaker must have made the intended 
interpretation as easy as possible for the hearer to recover. If the speaker of (8) 
intended to communicate the second interpretation (10), she ought to have actually 
uttered the sentence ' Mary handed over the key but Ken opened the safe with a 
wrench', so the hearer first accesses this interpretation. That is, the speaker should 
have avoided producing an utterance which has a satisfactory and immediately 
accessible interpretation (e. g. (9)) which is not the intended one. 
An implication of this is that the hearer does not go through inferring and discarding 
wrong interpretations until he gets the right one. That is, the first interpretation which 
satisfies the principle of relevance in a way that a rational speaker could have foreseen 
is the one the hearer should choose as the intended one. And the most important 
implication which follows from this is that an utterance does not actually have to be 
optimally relevant in order to meet the pragmatic criterion. An utterance indeed creates 
a presumption of optimal relevance but this does not mean that it will necessarily BE 
optimally relevant to the hearer. The actual pragmatic criterion used by a hearer is not 
one that assumes optimal relevance is inevitably achieved but one that accepts an 
interpretation which is consistent with the principle of relevance, a notion which I shall 
go on to discuss now. 
2.2.3 The Pragmatic Criterion of Consistency with the Principle of Relevance 
Let us suppose the following situation. Knowing that the hearer plans to go hiking the 
following day, the speaker tells him that it will be a fine day which he happens already 
to have heard on the radio. The information given would, then, have no contextual 
effects and would be irrelevant to him. However, the utterance will be interpreted 
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without difficulty if the hearer can see how the speaker could rationally have expected 
it to be relevant. In this case, it is easy to see the implications this utterance was 
intended to have, such as the hearer will have a lovely day out in the mountains etc. 
Or suppose that both my baby and my supervisor are called Rachel, and a fellow 
student tells me that Rachel is ill. The first referent to come to my mind will be my 
baby and on this reference assignment the utterance is highly relevant to me. However, 
it cannot be the one the speaker intended because she does not know me or my family. 
That is, the speaker could not have intended the `baby Rachel' interpretation though 
this is the first one accessed and it is highly relevant to me. The first example is 
accidentally irrelevant while the second is unintendedly relevant. So the actual 
pragmatic criterion of utterance interpretation is a criterion of consistency with the 
principle of relevance: 
(11)Criterion of Consistency with the Principle of Relevance 
An utterance, on a given interpretation, is consistent with the principle of relevance if 
and only if the speaker might rationally have expected it to be optimally relevant to the 
hearer on that interpretation. (Wilson 1992: 176) 
Then, the point mentioned in the last section, that hearers do not have to access and 
compare a variety of interpretations in order to arrive at the correct one, can be 
rephrased: that is, the first interpretation tested and found consistent with the principle 
of relevance is the only interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. This 
means that there is, at most, a single interpretation which satisfies this pragmatic 
criterion. 
Now let me go back to the recovery of the propositional content of (8). The most 
accessible referents are assigned to Mary, the key, Ken and the safe, and (8) is further 
enriched into the propositional form in (9) rather than (10). The hearer has an accessible 
context in which the propositional form (9) would be optimally relevant to him in a 
way the speaker could manifestly have foreseen. Then the speaker of (8) must have 
intended to communicate (9) rather than (10) since this is the first, and therefore the 
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only, interpretation which meets the pragmatic criterion of consistency with the 
principle of relevance. 
What I have shown just now is that the pragmatic criterion is at work at the level of 
explicit content, i. e. the identification of the proposition expressed, which pragmatists 
before Relevance theory such as Grice (1975), tended to overlook: i. e. they apply 
pragmatic principles only to the recovery of the implicit content of an utterance, i. e. at 
the level of deriving implicatures. In 2.3.2, I will present Grice's treatment of the 
temporal connotation of and as a generalised conversational implicature and show that 
his analysis is inadequate and the connotation is in fact a part of the explicit 
propositional content. In the next section, I will introduce the Relevance-based view on 
the explicit and implicit import of an utterance and discuss in more detail how 
pragmatic principles are at work at the level of identifying the proposition expressed as 
well as at the level of implicatures. 
2.3 The Proposition Expressed, Explicatures and Implicatures 
It is often considered that the distinction between the explicit and implicit import of an 
utterance corresponds to the distinction between the proposition expressed and 
implicatures the utterance gives rise to. The former is often labelled as sentence- 
meaning which falls under the domain of semantics in traditional truth-conditional 
terms, while the latter, as utterance-(sentence in context) meaning which falls under the 
domain of pragmatics in traditional terms. The semantics/pragmatics distinction is 
drawn differently in Relevance theory and is discussed in 2.3.1. In Relevance theory, 
the explicit/implicit distinction is the distinction between what is communicated 
explicitly (i. e. explicatures, a notion to be clarified below) and what is communicated 
implicitly (implicatures), not between the proposition expressed alone and implicatures. 
The Relevance theory view of how the proposition expressed is recovered is different 
from other linguists' views as it involves pragmatic processes. The propositional form 
of an utterance is the outcome of linguistic decoding with reference assignment, 
disambiguation, and enrichment, such as recovering the temporal connotation observed 
in (8), which are governed by the pragmatic criterion of consistency with the principle 
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of relevance. The proposition expressed, however, is not always communicated, and is 
sometimes embedded in higher-level descriptions of propositional attitudes or speech- 
acts. 
For example, a mother, talking of her little girl Mary who is very nice to her baby 
boy, says (12) on one occasion, and (13) on the other. 
(12) Mary is an angel. 
(13) Mary is very nice. 
Since the mother obviously does not believe that (12) is literally true (having wings, 
etc. ), the speaker does not intend to make (12) manifest to the hearer, i. e. to make it 
available to the hearer as an assumption to be represented as true. That is, the speaker 
does not intend to 'communicate' the proposition given by (12). What is communicated 
explicitly by (12) in the given context is: 
(14) The speaker has said that Mary Smith is an angel. 
The speaker of (13), on the other hand, believes the truth of the proposition 
expressed in the given context, and she does communicate not only (15) but also (16) 
from which the hearer may infer (17): 
(15) The speaker has said that Mary Smith is very nice. 
(16) The speaker believes that Mary Smith is very nice. 
(17) Mary Smith is very nice. 
So in Relevance theory the explicitly communicated content of (12) is (14) while that 
of (13) is (15)-(17), a difference that the traditional view of explicit content as being the 
proposition expressed does not capture. Now what governs the recovery of these 
explicit assumptions is the pragmatic criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance. For example, in the given context, the speaker's endorsement of the 
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proposition expressed as seen in (16) is easily accessible in the literal assertion (13 ), 
while in the metaphor (12) this is not the case. 
An utterance is considered to have only one identifiable propositional form (= the 
truth-conditional content), but it can have many explicit assumptions as given in (14)- 
(17). They are called `explicatures' and are characterised as assumptions (a) which are 
explicitly conveyed, and (b) which the speaker intends to make manifest to the hearer. 
For example, explicatures such as (14)-(16) are developed from the logical form 
encoded by the utterance, by embedding it in propositional attitude/speech act 
descriptions and are known as `higher-level explicatures'. Sperber & Wilson (1986: 
182) define explicitness as in (18): 
(18) Explicitness 
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a 
development of a logical form encoded by U. 
The propositional form that Mary Smith is an angel, will interact with contextual 
assumptions such as (19)-(20) and give rise to contextual effects, i. e. implicatures such 
as (21) and (22) respectively, which are (part of) the implicit import of the utterance: 
(19) An angel is very nice. 
(20) An angel is very gentle. 
(21) Mary Smith is very nice. 
(22) Mary Smith is very gentle. 
Assuming that the assignment of Mary Smith to 'Mary' gives rise to an interpretation 
which has an adequate range of contextual effects which the speaker could have 
foreseen, the utterance (12) will satisfy the criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance. 
Now the hearer of (12) could have accessed contextual assumptions such as (23) and 
(24). However, they are much less accessible in a situation of attributing properties to a 
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human being (Mary), or even if they are accessed, they are then immediately discarded 
as inconsistent with highly salient and strongly held assumptions about Mary. 
(23) An angel has wings. 
(24) An angel is not a material being. 
Not only (21) and (22) but also the contextual assumptions (19) and (20) accessed 
by the hearer to derive those implications are aspects of the implicit import of the 
utterance (12), i. e. implicatures. This is because the speaker intends to make (19) and 
(20) manifest to the hearer as true assumptions: otherwise, the speaker could not have 
expected the hearer to derive the intended implicatures (21) and (22). So the speaker is 
implicitly communicating (19) and (20) as well. 
Relevance theory assumes that reference assignment, disambiguation, concept 
enrichment as in the and example in (9) (repeated below) are rather standard processes 
required for the recovery of the propositional form of an utterance. 
(9) Mary handed over the key & (then) Ken opened the safe (with that key). 
These processes are, of course, governed by the same pragmatic criterion as the one 
used to derive implicatures, i. e. consistency with the principle of relevance. If so, we 
have to cast doubt on the traditional saying/implicating distinction (sometimes equated 
with semantics/ pragmatics distinction) in which pragmatic principles are supposed to 
be applied only at the level of recovering the implicit content of an utterance, e. g. at the 
level of deriving implicatures. For example, Grice's co-operative principle and his 
maxims are at work only at this level. 
In Section 2.3.2,1 will demonstrate by embedding the utterance in an if-clause that 
the enrichment of the relation between the conjuncts in (9) falls under the scope of that 
operator and so is part of the proposition expressed rather than an implicature. I will 
point out a problem with the Gricean distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is 
implicated' which he sometimes seems to equate with the semantics-pragmatics 
distinction (and some neo-Griceans certainly do). In the following section, I will 
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discuss problems with traditional views of semantics and pragmatics. I will then 
present the semantics/pragmatics distinction we work with in Relevance theory and a 
further semantic distinction, between the encoding of concepts and the encoding of 
procedures. 
2.3.1 Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction 
The common traditional approach to semantics assumes that it involves assigning truth- 
conditions to the sentences of natural language. Pragmatics is, in this traditional spirit, 
seen as the study of all non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning, or, according to 
Gazdar (1979: 2), pragmatics is "meaning minus truth-conditions". Thus, the truth- 
conditional view of linguistic semantics is maintained in spite of obvious counter- 
examples we will consider below. 
If natural-language sentences had truth-conditions, then we would have to be able to 
specify the conditions under which the following sentences are true: 
(25) She went to a bank today. 
(26) That was cheap. 
We cannot assign truth conditions to (25)-(26) unless more information is given. In 
(25), we do not know who she is, whether she went to a financial institution, or to a 
river bank, and we have to identify the time of utterance. In (26), we have to know 
what is referred to by that, and what sense of cheap was intended, low in price or mean 
etc. Pragmatic processes governed by the criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance have to be applied in order for us to be able to identify the propositional form 
of an utterance and to assign truth-conditions to it. Truth-conditions cannot be assigned 
to natural language sentences such as (25)-(26). They can only be assigned to the 
propositions recovered via pragmatic processes. 
Some attempts have been made to deal with deictic expressions (e. g. today, I, here) 
within a truth-conditional semantics for natural language sentences. We might set up 
some rule that decodes today into 'the day of the utterance', I into 'the speaker', here 
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into 'the place of the utterance' and so on. However, even sophisticated rules cannot 
handle e. g. that in (26), the identification of which is impossible without having 
contextual information and an adequate pragmatic principle. Grice, for example, 
recognised a role for context at the level of what is said as he considers reference 
assignment, disambiguation and fixation of indexicals as processes required for the 
identification of the proposition expressed. However, he does not propose any 
pragmatic principle which is necessary for the recovery of the proposition expressed: 
i. e. his maxims are at work only at the level of what is implicated. 
Further, including actual reference assignment, necessary to get determinate truth- 
conditions leads to the conflation of linguistically determined meaning and contextually 
determined meaning, the conflation of semantic and pragmatic meaning. The truth- 
conditional view of linguistic meaning cannot thus be maintained, as simply, natural 
language sentences standardly do not have truth-conditions. Their logical forms, the 
outcome of linguistic decoding, are semantically incomplete. 
Additionally, this view of semantics cannot capture the difference of interpretation 
derived from certain differences in word order i. e. difference in linguistic meaning. For 
example, the difference between (27) and (28) cannot be defined truth-conditionally, 
i. e. they have the same truth-conditions, but, equally, it is not a matter of context. 
(27) It was Mary who hit Ken. 
(28) It was Ken whom Mary hit. 
It is our linguistic knowledge, not non-linguistic knowledge, that gives rise to different 
interpretations for (27) and (28). However, semantic meaning in terms of truth- 
conditions cannot capture this, and has to resort to pragmatics to define the difference, 
which is surely inappropriate or at least not the whole story since the difference is a 
formal one. 
The same argument can be put forward for the difference between English 
conjunctions and and but. Truth-conditionally they are usually considered to have the 
same meaning, logical connective '&'. For example, Grice (1975) treats but as giving 
rise to a conventional implicature of contrastive meaning on top of having the truth- 
71 
conditional meaning '&'. Grice uses the term 'implicature' which is a pragmatic notion. 
However, it is our linguistic knowledge of the word but, not non-linguistic knowledge 
that tells us something about this contrastive meaning. In Relevance theory, 
Blakemore (1987) suggests a semantic treatment of this contrastive meaning (see 
4.5.2). More generally, there is a wide range of lexical items and linguistic structures 
whose semantics is non-truth-conditional. 
In Relevance theory we assume that both semantics and pragmatics have to be part 
of a psychological theory of utterance interpretation, within which the distinction 
between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge has to be made. A principled and 
psychologically grounded distinction between these kinds of knowledge has to underlie 
the semantics/pragmatics distinction. 
Linguistic knowledge, i. e. knowledge of grammar, is an autonomous system which is 
engaged in decoding processes, not affected by other cognitive systems. According to 
Fodor (1983), the language faculty is an input system, similar to other senses such as 
vision, audition, etc. and it feeds information into the central system where inferential 
processes integrate information from a range of sources. Input systems are modular in 
that each of them has its own method of representation and computation, and can only 
process information which has a suitable format for that particular input system. 
Non-linguistic knowledge is located in the central cognitive system, as opposed to 
input systems. The central cognitive system integrates all the information it receives 
from the input systems together with information retrieved from memory. The central 
system is thus non-modular, i. e. global and unencapsulated, and performs inferences 
and derives further information such as contextual implications. 
So the semantics/pragmatics distinction as employed in Relevance theory is the 
following. Semantics is the study of the meaningful content actually encoded in 
linguistic forms. Pragmatics, on the other hand, is the study of those cognitive 
processes and representations involved in interpreting utterances in context. The hearer 
infers the intended interpretation based on the linguistic meaning he automatically 
decodes and the wider contextual information he accesses, constrained by the 
relevance-based pragmatic criterion. Both semantics and pragmatics are part of a 
psychological theory of utterance interpretation, and the distinction between them is 
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based on the different cognitive processes responsible for them: automatic decoding 
and central inferencing. 
Now the information linguistic data encodes is of two different kinds: i. e. 
`conceptual' and `procedural', and an adequate semantics for natural language has to 
accommodate this distinction. According to Blakemore (1987: 144), `conceptual' 
semantics explains the way linguistic items contribute to the logical form 
representation of an utterance and so, ultimately, to the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance while `procedural' semantics concerns the way they constrain the hearer's 
pragmatic inference i. e. computations. That is, in the Relevance framework, 
information encoded by linguistic elements is either procedural or conceptual, and if it 
is conceptual, it constitutes a part of a conceptual representation while if procedural, it 
does not encode a conceptual representation but encodes a set of clues for constructing 
one (Wilson & Sperber 1993: 3,22). 
For example, the word dog encodes the concept DOG and contributes to the logical 
form representation of an utterance in which it occurs while the discourse connective 
but encodes information which constrains the hearer's accessing of contextual 
assumptions, so that the but-introduced proposition establishes the relation of 
contradiction (Blakemore 1987,1989 Rouchota 1990) (a more detailed analysis of this 
semantic constraint of but is given in 4.5.2). This conceptual/procedural distinction 
will be discussed with relevant linguistic data in Chapter 4. 
In the following section, I will point out some problems with the Gricean 
explicit/implicit distinction, i. e. the notions of 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' and 
discuss in more detail how we identify the proposition expressed by an utterance. 
2.3.2 The Identification of the Proposition Expressed -a comparison of Grice and 
Relevance theory 
Grice (1975: 44) defines 'what is said' as the truth-conditional content of an utterance, 
arrived at by the conventional linguistic meaning, reference assignment and 
disambiguation, while 'what is implicated' is the pragmatic meaning of an utterance 
which is derived on the basis of his co-operative principle and maxims of conversation. 
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His notion of `what is said' then might appear to be identical with the Relevance-based 
propositional form of an utterance. However, there is a crucial difference as 
demonstrated in his treatment of the temporal connotation that arises for many and- 
conjunctions (Grice 1981: 186). 
He does not talk about how the truth-evaluable proposition is recovered, i. e. what 
kind of criterion (if any) governs processes such as reference-assignment, 
disambiguation, and fixation of indexicals. As I demonstrated in the last section, they 
are pragmatic processes governed by the criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance. The important point here is that Grice confined the use of pragmatic 
principles to the derivation of implicatures, the level of what is implicated. 
Let me now turn to how these notions are applied to the analysis of and- 
conjunctions. Grice analyses the semantic meaning of and as equivalent to the truth- 
conditional content '&'. According to him, additional meanings such as '& then' in (29) 
and '& as a result' in (30) are derived pragmatically, i. e. based on his conversational 
maxims and labelled as generalised conversational implicatures. 
(29) Ken took out the key and (then) opened the door. 
(30) Ken hit Mary and (as a result) she cried. 
Generalised conversational implicatures are derived by saying that P across most 
contexts (it requires particular assumptions to block them), in contrast with 
particularised conversational implicatures that are derived by saying that P on a 
particular occasion (Grice 1975: 56). 
In (29) the hearer infers the temporal connotation based on the submaxim 'be 
orderly' of the general maxim of manner. According to Grice (1981: 186), if one is 
talking about events, then the most orderly manner in which to relate them would be an 
order corresponding to the order in which they took place. So the two events conjoined 
by the logical connective '&' irrespective of the order of these events are the semantic 
meaning of (29). And the temporal connotation is the pragmatic meaning derived 
based on the manner maxim. Grice does not give an account of the causal connotation 
examples. However, the explanation would be that a co-operative speaker would not 
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have mentioned the events in (30) in that order if she did not intend this causal meaning 
to be derived pragmatically. The maxim `Be relevant' may be called upon here. This 
account is, however, far from being a substantial explanation, as this maxim was never 
developed in Grice's system. 
A more satisfactory account of the temporal and causal connotations is given by 
Carston (1988: 170-1) in the framework of Relevance theory. The criterion of 
consistency with the principle of relevance would predict that the derivation of the 
single assumption `P & then Q' or `P & as a result Q' is more economical than the two 
assumptions `P & Q' `P & then Q' or `P & Q' `P & as a result Q'. And whatever 
contextual effects `P & Q' gives rise to so will `P & then Q' or `P & as a result Q', with 
the potential for more as there are some contextual effects which can only be derived 
from the conjunction with the temporal or causal connotations. If an adequate range of 
effects can be derived solely from the single assumption `P & then Q' or `P & as a 
result Q', why should the hearer derive the two assumptions, which is obviously 
against the cost factor of optimal relevance. 
If `P & then Q' or `P & as a result Q' were implicatures as Grice argues, all the 
contextual implications of the utterance would follow from these implicatures rather 
than from the proposition expressed, the conjunction `P & Q'. In Relevance theory, 
contextual implications are defined as following from the union of the proposition 
expressed and contextual assumptions, but not from either alone (Sperber & Wilson 
1986: 107-8). This means that in fact this theory precludes the implicature analyses of 
the temporal/causal connotations of and such as given by Grice (1981). 
Now Grice's notion of 'what is said', the truth-conditional content, does face some 
problems, as his account predicts the following (31) and (32) to be contradictory at the 
level of what is said although they are intuitively felt to be entirely consistent. 
(31) If Ken hit Mary and Mary cried, I will report him. 
(32) If Mary cried and Ken hit Mary, I will not report him. 
The truth-conditional content of the antecedents of (31) and (32) would be identical, 
according to Grice, as temporal and causal connotations are captured at the level of 
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'what is implicated' and do not fall under the scope of if. That is, Grice's analysis would 
predict (31) and (32) to be contradictory, as the identical proposition leads to, on one 
occasion, the conclusion that the speaker would report, and on the other, the negation of 
that conclusion. 
However, what is actually happening here is that the temporal and causal 
connotations do fall under the scope of if-clause. On this new account, the antecedent 
clauses in (31) and (32) are truth-conditionally distinct and the different consequents 
observed in these utterances will not be a problem. This satisfies our intuition that we 
can accept (31) and (32) at the same time as seen in the conjunction `(31) but (32)'. 
The propositions given by the antecedent clauses would be (33) and (34) respectively: 
(3 3) Ken hit Mary at t& as a result Mary cried at t+n 
(34) Mary cried at t& as a result Ken hit Mary at t+n. 
(t is some more or less specific time prior to the time of utterance, and t+n is some 
more or less specific time, later than t) 
(adapted from Carston 1988: 161) 
Thus temporal and causal connotations are captured at the level of what is said. And 
Grice's conception of what is said as the outcome of linguistic decoding, reference 
assignment, disambiguation, and fixation of indexicals has to be reconsidered. That is, 
the gap between the sense of a sentence i. e. the outcome of linguistic decoding and the 
truth-evaluable proposition cannot be filled by reference assignment, disambiguation, 
and fixation of indexicals only. We have to derive, for example, the temporal/causal 
connotations for (29)/(30) and this is a pragmatic process required to recover the 
proposition expressed. This pragmatic process is called 'enrichment' and Carston 
(1988: 167) gives a more detailed account and examples of this process. 
Lastly, to give appropriate credit to Grice, his analysis of and as giving rise to 
generalised conversational implicatures started in the right spirit which is the avoidance 
of lexical ambiguity analyses. There surely are many more meanings such as 
simultaneous happenings etc., which multiple ambiguity analyses cannot exhaust. A 
range of subtly different interpretations of the word and must be the outcome of general 
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knowledge of the sorts of temporal and cause-consequence relations that states of 
affairs can enter into. 
In this section I have shown how the propositional form of an utterance is identified, 
and pointed out that the Gricean distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is 
implicated' cannot be maintained. This is attributed to the failure to distinguish two 
different levels of semantics, one, semantics of linguistic decoding based solely on our 
linguistic knowledge, and the other, semantics of propositional content based on the 
outcome of linguistic decoding and pragmatic processes using our non-linguistic 
knowledge. 
Relevance theory calls the former, 'linguistic semantics' and the latter, 'real 
semantics'. Linguistic semantics is a crucial component in recovering the truth- 
conditional content which is the domain of `real semantics'. So pragmatic principles 
govern not only the derivation of implicatures as Grice recognises, but also the 
recovery of the propositional form of an utterance, what Grice calls 'what is said'. 
So far, I have talked about the identification of the propositional content, the 
accessing of intended contextual assumptions and the derivation of intended contextual 
implications (i. e. implicatures). I have argued that all of these are governed by a single 
pragmatic criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance. There is yet another 
important element we have not considered. That is the recovery of the speaker's 
propositional attitude. This is the issue we now turn to. 
2.4 Propositional Attitudes in Relevance Theory 
As I have argued so far, utterances are semantically under-determined as to their 
truth-conditional content, and so is the attitude expressed to that propositional 
content. There are some syntactic means (e. g. the mood of the main clause verb) for 
indicating the propositional attitude the speaker expresses to the proposition. 
However, there are many more numerous and varied lexical means: for example I 
believe that P, I wish that P, I desire that P, I regret that P, sentence adverbials 
such as probably, certainly, fortunately, regrettably, particles such as oh etc. An 
assumption P can be embedded under a main clause expressing the speaker's 
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propositional attitude and it is this higher-level representation which underlies the 
expression of weak commitment (i. e. hedging). 
Wilson (1994a) distinguishes between two kinds of attitudes; one is `descriptive* 
which is an attitude to states of affairs, and the other, `interpretive', which is to 
propositions, assumptions or thoughts. For example, the propositional attitude of the 
speaker's believing can be expressed to a state of affairs expressed by the utterance 
(35) and if the speaker is not so sure about it, the weakened attitude of the speaker's 
belief can be expressed as in (35)': 
(35) I believe that Tokyo is the capital of Japan. 
(35)' 1 suppose that Tokyo is the capital of Japan. 
Or it can be expressed to a thought or utterance, i. e. propositions as in (36). 
(36) 1 believe whatever you tell me. (Wilson 1994a). 
The former attitudes in (35)-(35)' are `descriptive' and the latter attitude in (36) is 
'interpretive'. Let me first look at `descriptive' attitudes. 
2.4.1 Descriptive Attitudes 
A state of affairs can be thought about by the speaker in at least four different ways. 
It can be thought as `actual' i. e. as existing in the actual world, as `possible' i. e. as 
capable of existing in some possible world, as `potential' i. e. as compatible with what 
we know about this world, or as `desirable' from somebody's point of view. These 
four attitudes are all descriptive attitudes when they are expressed to a certain state of 
affairs, and they are attitudes required for analysing the semantics of English (Wilson 
1994a). 
As mentioned, the speaker thinks of (37) as representing an actual state of affairs, 
as existing in the actual world. Or the speaker is mistaken and might utter (37)'. In 
such a case, (37)' represents a possible state of affairs which is false in the actual 
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world but is true in some possible world. By contrast, a Japanese speaker who knows 
about the talk of the transfer can think of (38) as representing a potential state of 
affairs, though it does not exist in the actual world, or as a future state of affairs in 
the actual world. Wilson (1994a) claims that declarative utterances are in some sense 
`descriptions' of actual or possible states of affairs. 
(37) Tokyo is the capital of Japan. 
(37)'Osaka is the capital of Japan. 
(38) Sendai will be the capital of Japan. 
(the government has been talking about transferring the capital to a less crowded city 
Sendai) 
Imperatives such as (39) and (40) are, on the other hand, claimed to represent 
potential and desirable states of affairs. 
(39) Go straight and turn right. 
(40) Bring me a cup of tea. 
(when instructing how to get to the station) 
Both (39) and (40) describe states of affairs which are compatible with what we 
know about this world i. e. potential; that the hearer will go straight and turn right, 
and that the hearer will bring the speaker a cup of tea. These potential states of affairs 
are desirable from the view-point of the hearer and the speaker respectively. This 
analysis does not face the counter-examples that the speech-act analysis would do. 
Imperatives are usually analysed by speech-act theorists as directives which are an 
attempt to get the hearer to do something. (40) complies with this analysis as the 
speaker is trying to get the hearer to bring her a cup of tea. However, the speaker of 
(39) is not trying to get the hearer to perform the action described by (39). She is just 
indicating that the described action will be desirable for the hearer, i. e. will help the 
hearer to find the station. 
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(37)-(40) represent states of affairs which can be true or false in the actual. 
possible, or potential worlds, and/or are desirable from someone's point of view. In 
Relevance it is argued that the propositional form of declarative utterances represents 
a thought of the speaker which is a description of an actual or possible state of affairs 
(e. g. (37) and (37)') and the propositional form of imperatives represents a potential 
and desirable state of affairs (e. g. (39) and (40)). In the next section, I will look into 
attitudes expressed not to states of affairs, but to representations which do not 
describe definite states of affairs. 
2.4.2 Interpretive Attitudes 
Let us consider: 
(41) How expensive is it to have a nanny? 
(42) How expensive it is to have a nanny! 
Both (41) and (42) represent the incomplete logical form (43): 
(43) It is ----- expensive to have a nanny. 
Incomplete logical forms such as (43) do not describe any definite state of affairs to 
which the speaker could express an attitude. Interpretive attitudes are attitudes 
expressed not to a state of affairs but to a belief, utterance, assumption or other item 
of information such as (43) (Wilson 1994a). The speaker of interrogatives such as 
(41) is thinking of a certain item of information (i. e. the answer) as `desirable' from 
her point of view, i. e. as relevant, giving rise to contextual effects such as leading her 
to decide whether to have a nanny. 
The speech act analysis of interrogatives as directing the hearer to provide 
information would face problems when it comes to rhetorical questions, surprise 
questions, exam questions, guess questions etc. as the speaker is not trying to get the 
hearer to provide information that she does not already have (detailed discussion: 
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Wilson & Sperber 1988a). According to Relevance theory, an interrogative encodes 
the abstract information that its logical form interpretively represents a thought such 
as (43) whose completion would be desirable, i. e. relevant to someone if it is true 
(e. g. relevant to the speaker in the case of genuine questions, and to the hearer in the 
case of rhetorical questions etc. ) 
Now the speaker of exclamatives such as (42) is thinking of the completion of 
information such as (43) as `desirable' to herself i. e. as relevant, giving rise to 
contextual effects such as leading her to decide not to have a nanny. In Relevance 
theory, both wh-interrogatives and wh-exclamatives represent an incomplete logical 
form, the completion of which is desirable (i. e. relevant) to someone. However, the 
difference between them is that exclamatives encode two extra assumptions: that the 
speaker already has the relevant (completion of the) logical form in mind, and that 
the (completion of the) logical form is relevant to the speaker (Clark & Lindsey 
1990: 39). So the speaker of (42) has in mind that it is quite expensive to have a 
nanny, and this piece of information is relevant to herself in the way mentioned 
above. Wilson (1994a) argues that interrogatives are the interpretive counterpart of 
imperatives in that the speaker of the latter is thinking of a certain state of affairs as 
desirable, while the speaker of the former considers a certain piece of information 
desirable. 
Interpretive attitudes are also expressed to propositions (i. e. thoughts or 
utterances) attributed to someone else or the speaker in the past. For example, a 
speaker of (38) who does not believe in the capability of the Japanese government to 
actually transfer the capital, does not think of (38) as a potential state of affairs. The 
speaker is not thinking of (38) in this context as existing in a potential world. The 
speaker is dissociating herself from the proposition expressed and expressing scorn 
towards it. For example, consider (44): 
(44)A: What did the government say about the solution to the over-crowded capital? 
B: Sendai will be the capital of Japan. 
(44)B has at least the following two interpretations (45)a-b: 
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(45)a. Sendai will be the capital of Japan, I believe. 
b. Sendai will be the capital of Japan, the government said. 
(44)B with the interpretation (45)a. would be an ordinary assertion, i. e. the 
speaker is thinking of (44)B as a potential state of affairs. (44)B with the 
interpretation (45)b, on the other hand, might be a reported speech or an irony. With 
the interpretation (45)b, the utterance (44)B represents a complete logical form, i. e. a 
propositional form, which `resembles' the government announcement. It might not 
be an identical reproduction of the original, i. e. the government might have said (46)- 
(47): 
(46) Sendai will be the capital city. 
(47) We will transfer the capital to Sendai. 
(44)B closely `resembles' (46) and (47) in content, and the same relation of 
`resemblance' can be established between (43) given by the interrogative (41)/ the 
exclamative (42) and what (43) represents (i. e. the completed form). In the following 
section, I will say more about representation by resemblance as this is a crucial 
notion in Relevance theory. 
2.4.3 Interpretive Attitude and the Notion `Resemblance' 
According to Sperber & Wilson (1986), the propositional form of an utterance may 
or may not be identical with the propositional form of the thought it represents; the 
relation between them is best captured in terms of the notion 'resemblance'. This 
relation, Sperber & Wilson (1986) call `interpretive' and they argue that an utterance 
is an `interpretive' expression of a thought of the speaker. 
The thought of the speaker which is represented by an utterance can represent 
some state of affairs to which the speaker can express descriptive attitudes such as 
that she is thinking of it as actual, possible, potential and/or desirable. Or it can 
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represent some other representation with a propositional form in virtue of a 
resemblance' between those two propositional forms. This is where `interpretive 
attitudes' come in. 
If I utter (37) (repeated below), the proposition given by this utterance is an 
`interpretation' of a thought of the speaker in the sense that the propositional form of 
the utterance is intended to resemble the propositional form of the thought 
communicated to a greater or lesser degree, and it represents a state of affairs to 
which the speaker expresses the attitude of belief. 
(37) Tokyo is the capital of Japan. 
However, the propositional form of some utterances can be an interpretation of a 
thought of the speaker which itself represents some other representation with a 
similar propositional form. That is, as mentioned, when (38) (repeated below) is 
uttered in order to communicate (45)b. (repeated below), it represents the 
propositional form of the utterance which was the government's original 
announcement, say (46) or (47) (repeated below), and it is to this similar 
propositional form the speaker expresses an `interpretive' attitude. 
(38) Sendai will be the capital of Japan. 
(45)b. Sendai will be the capital of Japan, the government said. 
(46) Sendai will be the capital city. 
(47) We will transfer the capital to Sendai. 
That is, the propositional form given by (44)B `resembles' that of (46) or (47) to 
which the speaker's interpretive attitude is expressed. Sperber & Wilson (1986) 
gives a technical definition of `interpretive resemblance' such that a propositional 
form resembles another propositional form if they share analytic and/or contextual 
implications. `Resemblance', clearly, is a matter of degree. (44)B has closer 
resemblance to (46) than (47) as (44)B shares more analytic and contextual 
implications with (46) than with (47). Obviously, they share many analytic and 
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contextual implications, among which are the analytic implication (48) and the 
contextual implication (49), which is derived as a result of the interaction with a 
contextual assumption such as (50): 
(48) There is a city called Sendai. 
(49) People in Sendai area will have more job opportunities. 
(50) If the capital of Japan is transferred to Sendai, people in Sendai area will have 
more job opportunities. 
As mentioned, the same relationship of `resemblance' can be established between the 
logical form (43) given by interrogative/exclamative (41)/(42) (repeated below) and a 
thought they represent. 
(41) How expensive is it to have a nanny? 
(42) How expensive it is to have a nanny! 
(43) It is ----- expensive to have a nanny. 
The logical form (43) given by the interrogative/exclamative (41)/(42) does not 
describe any definite state of affairs, but represents a relevant thought such as (51) 
which is a relevant completion of (43). 
(51) It is very expensive to have a nanny. 
We can argue that (43) resembles (51) as they share at least an analytic 
implication such that there is some expense involved in having a nanny and a 
contextual implication such as (52) which is derived via interacting with the 
contextual assumption (53). 
(52) The speaker is not a millionaire. 
(53) If the speaker talks about the expense of having a nanny, she is not a 
millionaire. 
84 
In contrast with `descriptive' attitudes expressed to states of affairs, `interpretive' 
attitudes can be characterised as attitudes expressed to representations which have a 
relation of `resemblance' to the propositional form expressed by an utterance. 
In (35)'(repeated below) I have shown that the speaker's weak endorsement of a 
proposition can be expressed in descriptive attitudes: i. e. the speaker's hedging is 
expressed to a proposition communicated by a declarative sentence here. 
(35)' 1 suppose that Tokyo is the capital of Japan. 
In an imperative sentence, the speaker's limited conviction towards the potentiality or 
desirability of the state of affairs can be communicated if we use e. g. the phrase if you 
can or if you like which gives the hearer a choice of opting out of performing the action 
described ( e. g. (28) in Chapter 1 given below). 
(28) Close the window, if you can. 
The addition of the phrases does not change the status of what an imperative syntax 
encodes i. e. the imperative syntax encodes a potential state of affairs which is desirable 
from the view point of the speaker or the hearer, but it interacts with this in determining 
the final force of the utterance. 
On the other hand, the speaker's hedging i. e. the weak endorsement cannot be 
communicated in interrogatives or exclamatives by phrases such as I suppose and 
probably. 
(41)' How expensive is it to have a nanny, I suppose/probably? 
This is precisely because the attitude encoded by an interrogative is that of desire while 
I suppose and probably communicate that of (weak) belief: two incompatible types of 
attidude, therefore (41)'is anomalous. In interrogatives, the speaker is requesting the 
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hearer to complete an incomplete form encoded by the utterance and the taking back of 
this speaker's request can only be done by describing conditions as seen in (41)": 
(41)" How expensive is it to have a nanny? Answer, if you want to/if you can. 
Nor can exclamatives be weakened by using the hedges just mentioned as 
demonstrated by (42)': 
(42)'How expensive it is to have a nanny, I suppose/probably! * 
The attitude encoded by an exclamative is also that of desire which is incompatible 
with the attitude of (weak) belief communicated by I suppose or probably. Recall 
exclamatives communicate that the speaker has the relevant completion of the 
incomplete logical form in her mind, and they communicate the speaker's strong 
expression of various attitudes which include approving and disapproving ones. 
Therefore, the expression of reservation or weakened commitment is incompatible with 
the expressiveness of this syntactic sentence type. 
There is an interesting difference between interrogatives and exclamatives. That is, 
we can embed interrogatives in different attitudes as shown in (54)a-c, but not 
exclamatives as shown in (55). I have to note that in these embedded cases, there is no 
interrogative syntax (i. e. inversion) which encodes the attitude of desire. In the case of 
exclamatives, we have to go for the equivalent declarative (56). The reason seems to 
be that the speaker already has in mind the relevant completion of the incomplete 
logical form encoded by an exclamative and the expression of this would make the 
utterance declarative as shown in (51) (repeated below). 
(54)a. I must know how expensive it is to have a nanny. 
(the answer being highly desirable/relevant to the speaker) 
b. I wonder how expensive it is to have a nanny. 
(the answer being moderately desirable/relevant to the speaker) 
c. I have some interest in how expensive it is to have a nanny. 
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(the answer is desirable/relevant to some small degree) 
(suggested by Robyn Carston) 
(55) I believe how expensive it is to have a nanny! * 
(56) I believe it is very expensive to have a nanny. 
(51) It is very expensive to have a nanny. 
As I argued in 1.2.3, the addition of hedging phrases like the one in (41)" (if you 
want to/if you can) have the effect of softening the illocutionary force already 
communicated. In this thesis, I am primarily interested in linguistic elements whose 
intrinsic linguistic meaning interacts directly with other propositional attitude 
information to determine a moderate level of commitment. However, this type of 
`posterior hedging' is quite common and has its own properties. This is the issue I now 
turn to. 
2.4.4 Modification of the Propositional Attitude - posterior hedging 
By posterior hedging I mean that first an illocutionary force of some strength is 
communicated and then a hedging expression is used to soften it. This is a very 
common way to communicate the speaker's hedging; Brown & Levinson (1987: 162), 
for example, list the following adverbial-clause hedges in English which they claim are 
encoded in some other languages as particles. 
(57) That's just how it is, in fact/in a way/in a sense/as it were/in all probat 4/I 
should be surprised/it seems to me/don't you agree. 
If-clauses are another common means of posterior hedging. Heringer (1972) 
discusses ho they suspend felicity conditions on imperatives such that the hearer can 
perform the action described. 
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(58) Tidy up, if you can/if it's messy/if it's not already tidied up/if you want/*if I 
want you to (OK if S might later ask H to do it). 
(adapted from Brown & Levinson (1987: 162) 
If-clauses can also suspend the speaker's assumptions that she has the right to ask the 
hearer to do the action and that the hearer will not mind doing it. 
(59) Would you close the window, if I may ask you/if you'll forgive my asking/if you 
want to help me/if you don't mind? 
(Brown & Levinson 1987: 163) 
Other than adverbial phrases and if-clauses, posterior hedging may be expressed by 
attitudinal verbs (e. g. (60)), adverbs (e. g. (61)), and the description of evidential status 
(e. g. (62)) (all of which function as parenthetical comments): 
(60) Your house is very old, I suppose/I guess/I believe. 
(61) I will be in time, maybe/possibly. 
(62) This house dates from 18th century, or so the surveyor says. 
The common property of all of the above examples is a slight garden-path or repair 
effect especially if there is a pause between the main clause and the appended 
expression (Robyn Carston: personal communication). The existence of so-called 
garden-path utterances is well exemplified in the following example taken from 
Sperber & Wilson (1986: 184): 
(63) 1 saw that gasoline can explode. (pause) And a brand new gasoline can it was too. 
At the end of processing the first utterance, the hearer would most likely have 
recovered the interpretation (64)a. but the second utterance would force the 
reinterpretation as (64)b. 
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(64)a. I saw that it is possible for gasoline to explode. 
b. I saw that can of gasoline explode. 
Although the effect in the hedging cases does not result in altering the propositional 
content, it does lead to alteration to the speaker's propositional attitude (e. g. (57) (60)- 
(61)) that the hearer has been encouraged to derive on the basis of the `unhedged' part 
of the utterance. The garden path effect could result in jokes, teasing, etc. and might 
well be intended by the speaker or it might be a repair as the speaker realises that her 
expression of attitude has been too strong. 
It might be interesting to mention cases of the logical extreme of this sort of garden- 
pathing concerning the speaker's propositional attitude. They are cases of what Horn 
(1992) calls `retro-NOT' and ironic postposed `I don't think'. For example: 
(65) You're are my favourite person. Not! 
(66) He's a good neighbour, I don't think. 
The attitude expressed by the main clause utterance is one of endorsement, which is 
then completely reversed by the following expression Not and I don 't think. Of course, 
this is no longer hedging, since it involves complete retraction of the attitude apparently 
expressed. 
Lastly cases such as (60) and (62) present a further interesting feature. These 
hedging expressions may constitute a separate elliptical utterance which corrects or 
comments on what the first utterance communicates (i. e. propositional content, 
propositional attitude or contextual assumptions). Posterior hedging presents 
interesting data for two utterance or two speech-act analyses of parenthetical phrases 
(Blakemore 1991, Ifantidou 1992). In Chapter 3, I will consider parenthetical cases 
such as (60) in some detail. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced Relevance theory which has a lot of implications for a 
pragmatic theory of utterance interpretation. Since an utterance is an ostensive 
stimulus, its interpretation (and so its processing) is governed by the criterion of 
consistency with the principle of relevance which falls out of Relevance theory, a 
theory of cognition generally and of ostensive communication in particular. 
I have introduced the Relevance account of explicatures which are explicitly 
communicated assumptions, an account which covers the explicit content of figurative 
utterances such as metaphor since it includes the speaker's expression of propositional 
attitude. This notion is contrasted with implicatures though the recovery of both types 
of assumptions (i. e. explicatures and implicatures) is governed by the same pragmatic 
criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance. 
Relevance theory sheds new light on the conventional view of semantics. 
Traditional semanticists have assigned too much work to the domain of linguistic 
semantics: e. g. recovering the proposition expressed without pragmatic processes by 
setting up a programme to deal with a limited range of linguistic data, i. e. fixing 
indexicals such as I and here. It is not surprising that the actual recovery process of the 
proposition expressed has never been explicated in semantics, because it simply is not 
possible. In this chapter, I have argued that pragmatic processes are at work, not only 
in deriving implicatures, but also in accessing contexts, recovering the proposition 
expressed by an utterance, and identifying the speaker's attitudes. 
I have shown that the pragmatic criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance governs the process of recovering the propositional form of an utterance. 
That is, the speaker expects the contextually recovered propositional form to be 
optimally relevant (or, at least, to seem to be) to the hearer on that interpretation: i. e. 
on that interpretation the utterance achieves enough effects with no gratuitous effort 
required in their derivation. This was observed in, for example, `enrichment' processes 
involved in the derivation of temporal and causal connotations associated with the 
conjunction and in arriving at the truth-conditional content of conjunctive utterances. 
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In this chapter I have also introduced the Relevance view of propositional attitudes 
of the speaker. In the Relevance framework, propositional attitudes are of two kinds: 
one is `descriptive' which is an attitude to actual, possible, potential or desirable states 
of affairs; the other is `interpretive', which is an attitude to propositions, assumptions 
or thoughts. I have said that the propositional attitude of belief can be hedged as seen 
in (35)' (repeated below) in which the speaker's weak endorsement is expressed to a 
descriptive representation. 
(35)' 1 suppose that Tokyo is the capital of Japan. 
On the other hand, I have said that the speaker's hedging can be expressed in 
imperatives and interrogatives with the use of phrases such as if you can and if you 
want to answer which modify the so-called imperative and interrogative forces. 
However, I mentioned that exclamative utterances in which the speaker expresses a 
certain attitude quite strongly cannot be hedged. 
There are other important concepts of Relevance theory not discussed yet in this 
dissertation. They include attributive use, and the loosening/narrowing of concepts etc. 
I shall introduce them in due course when I need these notions for explaining linguistic 
data. In Chapter 1, I have discussed problems with Gricean analyses that take English 
hedges I think and probably to fall under `what is implicated' (Section 1.4.4). In 
Chapter 3, I will give analyses of these hedging expressions, which Urmson (1966) 
calls parentheticals. I will further show that while the Gricean framework cannot 
explain these expressions fully Relevance theory can. 
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Chapter 3: Hedged Utterances in English 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I have characterised hedging as a pragmatic phenomenon by which the 
speaker communicates that she has limited conviction or commitment to a 
proposition she is communicating. So this phenomenon is not culture-specific as in 
any culture we can hedge linguistically or non-linguistically when we do not want to 
give unqualified support to our statements. For example in English, instead of saying 
(1), we could say (2), and so could we in Japanese as in (3) and (4). 
(1) I will leave tomorrow. 
(2) Perhaps if everything is fine, I may leave tomorrow. 
(3) Asu tachimasu. 
tomorrow leave `I will leave tomorrow. ' 
(4) Shishoo ga nakere-ba tabun asu tachimasu. 
trouble sub. -marker no-if perhaps tomorrow leave 
`Perhaps if everything is fine, I may leave tomorrow. ' 
It is true that this non-committal aspect of hedging is often associated with politeness 
but it is not always so as I argued in 1.3.3.1. Politeness given rise to by hedges, 
however, will not be my main concern in this section. 
As observed in the examples in Chapter 1, hedges cross cut parts of speech such 
as adjectives, adverbs etc. and hence do not seem to form any natural syntactic or 
semantic class. Therefore, there has not been any unitary definition of hedges agreed 
upon by all linguists. In this chapter, I will further show that some but not all 
expressions of attitude, have a hedging function. Hedging is a pragmatic 
phenomenon and as I argued in 1.4.4.4 there is no particular class of linguistic 
expressions which always communicate that the speaker is hedging. I have 
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suggested in Chapter 1 that when the following is communicated to the hearer, we 
can say that the speaker is hedging. 
(37)(Chapl) The speaker has limited commitment to P, where P is any 
communicated assumption. 
So the pragmatic phenomenon of hedging affects the speaker's propositional 
attitude recovered in accordance with the principle of relevance. This is often but not 
always realised by non-figurative expressions of explicit attitudes such as I suppose 
and probably, which I will give a full pragmatic analysis of, pointing out the 
inadequacy of Gricean implicature analyses in detail in Section 3.2. The speaker's 
limited commitment to P is communicated explicitly and in Relevance theory an 
explicitly communicated assumption in which the speaker's propositional attitude 
can be expressed is a higher-level explicature. I will pursue the analysis of I suppose 
and probably in terms of higher-level explicature in 3.2.4. I will then see whether all 
uses of these terms communicating (37) do in fact contribute to higher-level 
explicature in 3.2.6. 
Lakoffian hedges (Kay (1983), Lakoff (1972,1987), Prince et al (1982)) also 
include linguistic expressions which affect the proposition expressed by an utterance 
rather than the propositional attitude. The examples are e. g. a regular, a typical, 
technically, loosely speaking, strictly speaking, in a metaphorical sense etc. Kay 
(1983) analyses hedges as making a metalinguistic comment, Lakoff (1972), as 
making the proposition expressed less true or more true, Lakoff (1987), as evoking a 
relevant cognitive model in which the hedged utterance will be true, and Prince et al 
take a Lakoffian (1972) line. However, the examples of Lakoffian hedges just given 
above do not seem to help the hearer to recover (37)(Chapl), and may well prove to 
have nothing to do with the pragmatic phenomenon of hedging as given in (45) 
(Chap 1). 
93 
(45) Hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon by which the speaker communicates 
that the speaker has limited conviction or commitment to a communicated 
proposition. 
I will look into this in Section 3.3, and argue that these linguistic expressions are not 
hedges in the sense I defined in Chapter 1, but rather they are expressions which 
combine with another term in the utterance so as to modify its truth-conditional 
content in a particular way. Let me now turn to expressions of explicit attitude such 
as I suppose and probably. 
3.2 Expressions of Explicit Attitude 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Attitudinal phrases such as I suppose and probably are often considered to fall 
outside of the truth-conditional content of the utterances that contain them and so to 
be non-truth-conditional aspects of the meaning (Urmson 1966, Greenbaum 1969, 
etc. ). But as yet no satisfactory non-truth-conditional account has been given of the 
role of these expressions. The Gricean notion of `what is implicated' proves 
inadequate in explaining the use of such expressions as pointed out in 1.4.4; this is 
discussed in detail in 3.2.3. Speech-act accounts are shown to be inadequate by 
Ifantidou (1993) and Ifantidou-Trouki (1993). I would like to show that the 
distinctions made within Relevance theory do enable a convincing account of these 
expressions. 
First, I will present Urmson's (1966) argument that attitudinal phrases or adverbs 
such as I suppose/guess/regret and probably/supposedly/unfortunately do not always 
function descriptively (truth-conditionally), i. e. do not always describe the 
psychological state of the speaker (Urmson 1966: 194-5). I will introduce Urmson's 
argument in the next section. 
Second, I will show that the Gricean notion of `what is implicated' cannot explain 
the use of hedging devices such as I think and probably contrary to the suggestion of 
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Prince et al (1983). I will then discuss in detail the Relevance-theoretic notions of 
the propositional form of an utterance (i. e. the proposition expressed) and higher- 
level explicature, introduced in Chapter 2. The distinction between these notions, 
which will be explained in this section, gives us the necessary concepts for an 
analysis of these phrases. Let me now introduce Urmson's (1966) account of 
parenthetical verbs. 
3.2.2 Parenthetical Uses 
Let us consider the following examples: 
(5) I suppose that your house is very old. 
(6) Your house is, I suppose, very old. 
(7) Your house is very old, I suppose. (Urmson 1966: 193) 
The term parenthetical usually refers to a syntactic manifestation such that a piece 
of information e. g. I suppose is slipped into another as observed in (6) and (7). I will 
call these `true parenthetical s'. However, Urmson (1966) considered parenthetical 
verbs as those not contributing to the proposition expressed by the utterance , 
but 
signalling or indicating how the proposition is interpreted. 
Urmson (1966: 193) argues that "in some contexts it will be virtually indifferent, 
on all but stylistic grounds, whether the verb occurs at the beginning, middle, or end 
of the indicative clause with which it is conjoined". He argues that in all of (5)-(7), 1 
suppose does not contribute to the proposition expressed by the utterance (its truth- 
conditional content). Rather, he argues that I suppose in (5) - (7) signals the way the 
proposition (indicative clause) should be interpreted: the signal concerns what 
degree of belief in the proposition is being claimed by the speaker, the degree being 
in this case a weak one (Urmson 1966: 199). 
As Urmson (1966: 199) argues, the evidential situation of the statement expressed 
may be made explicit by the use of I suppose or I guess or it may be left to the hearer 
to infer from the context how much credence the speaker is giving to the statement. 
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So a parenthetical verb is one of several means of communicating how much support 
the statement should be interpreted as having. Now Urmson (1966) would argue that 
(5)-(7) and the following (8) make the same statement, say the same thing. 
(8) Your house is very old. 
When (8) is uttered with an uncertain tone of voice, the effect of the utterance 
may be very similar to that of (5)-(7). That is, in (8) the speaker's uncertainty is 
expressed by means of intonation and it does not affect the truth-conditional content 
of (8). In (5)-(7) the speaker's uncertainty does not affect the truth-conditional 
content either, according to Urmson (1966), even though I suppose is explicitly 
given. This seems correct as far as true parentheticals (i. e. (6) and (7)) are concerned 
(see Section 3.2.5). I will, however, give a different analysis for (5) in 3.2.5. 
As for attitudinal adverbs such as certainly, probably, and possibly, Urmson 
(1966: 200) argues that they, like parenthetical verbs, signal or indicate how the 
whole statement to which they are attached is to be understood: i. e. they show how 
reliable the statement is rather than being a part of the statement. Greenbaum (1969: 
202) also claims that attitudinal adverbs such as probably and supposedly "express an 
opinion on the notion of the truth-value of what is being said" and suggests that these 
adverbs fall outside of what is said, i. e. are non-truth-conditional. 
Now Urmson (1966) and Greenbaum (1969) made their claims for the non-truth- 
conditionality of these attitudinal expressions before Grice (1975) introduced the 
notion `what is implicated' to capture the non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning. 
Afterwards, linguists like Prince et al (1983) analysed the non-truth-conditional 
aspect of non-committal attitude conveyed by I think and probably etc. as Gricean 
implicature. I will argue against the implicature analyses of these expressions in the 
following section. 
The so-called parenthetical use of I suppose in (5) can be contrasted with (9)B 
where the explicitly given attitude of the speaker can be considered as describing the 
state of affairs of the speaker's psychological state, i. e. contributing to the 
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proposition expressed 
different states of affairs. 
Urmson (1966) would analyse (5) and (9)B as describing 
(9)A: I suppose that this house is quite new. 
B: Well, I suppose that it is very old. 
(adapted from Urmson 1966: 194) 
Although Urmson (1966) does not explicitly say that I suppose in (9)B constitutes 
a part of the proposition expressed, he says that I suppose is not being used purely 
parenthetically in (9)B, thus pointing out the difference between it and (5). This 
indicates that they should be given distinct analyses. Although (9)B is identical to 
(5) on the surface, B's attitude I suppose in (9)B is not used parenthetically in 
Urmson's sense, that is, it describes the state of B's supposing that the house is very 
old. When I suppose is used this way, it seems that the speaker is not communicating 
her weak endorsement of P and so I would not want to say that the speaker is hedging 
here. 
The difference Urmson (1966) points out can in fact be attributed to where the 
main relevance lies. I suppose in (9)B is uttered in clear contrast with what A 
supposes. The point of the utterance lies with this contrast between what A supposes 
and what B supposes rather than the information that the hearer's house is very old, 
and might give the main bulk of contextual effects. On the other hand, in (5) the 
main relevance lies with the embedded proposition and the speaker's weak 
endorsement is expressed to it. I will come back to this in 3.2.6. 
In the next section, I will pursue possibilities of Gricean analyses of explicitly 
given attitudes. 
3.2.3 Gricean Analyses 
The saying/implicating distinction is fundamental to Gricean pragmatics. Grice 
(1975: 44), on closer examination, gives two characterisations of what is said, which 
do not always make identical predictions. On the one, it is the truth-conditional 
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content of an utterance, the proposition expressed so that, in line with Urmson's 
intuitions, I suppose is not part of what is said by utterances (5)-(7). On the other, it 
is the outcome of linguistic decoding, reference assignment and disambiguation so 
that what is said in the case of (5) and (9)B (and perhaps even (6) and (7)) would 
include the attitudinal phrase I suppose. In Section 3.2.5, I will resolve this apparent 
conflict within the Gricean account by moving to the more articulated pragmatics of 
Relevance theory and by employing certain tests for truth-conditionality developed 
within that theory. 
Let me now turn to Gricean `what is implicated'. A typical Gricean analysis 
would be to say that (5) `implicates' that the speaker is not totally committed to the 
truth of the proposition that the hearer's house is old. This is obviously counter- 
intuitive since I suppose is actually uttered in (5) and there is nothing implicit about 
it. Let us nevertheless pursue this implicature analysis a little. In fact, this is how 
Prince et al (1982) analyse explicitly given attitudes such as I think and probably as I 
mentioned in 1.2.4. 
(10) I think his feet were blue. . (Prince et al 1982: 85) 
(11) His feet were blue 
They claim that (10) conveys the same proposition as (11) and that I think in (10) 
does not affect the proposition expressed but implicates that the speaker is less than 
fully committed to its truth. Prince et al (1982) do not say what kind of implicature 
the use of I think in (10) gives rise to. So let me consider the kinds of implicature 
Grice (1975) discusses. Since the implicature of the speaker's limited conviction in 
the proposition expressed is not confined to a particular situation of utterance, we 
may safely say that this implicature is not a particularised conversational implicature. 
Then it is either a generalised conversational implicature or a conventional 
implicature. 
The crucial difference between conversational and conventional implicatures is 
that the former are calculated on the basis of Gricean maxims while the latter are not. 
Now, which maxim could be involved in giving rise to the implicature of the speaker 
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being less than fully committed to the proposition? Regardless of which maxim we 
take as being observed or flouted, we still get the same implicature, so we can safely 
assume it is not a conversational implicature of any sort. There simply is no process 
of calculation or inference involved. This leaves us with only one option: that the 
implicature is a conventional implicature. 
According to Grice (1975: 44), "in some cases the conventional meaning of the 
words used will determine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is 
said". Conventional implicatures are not derived inferentially via maxims but are 
merely attached by convention to particular words or expressions. For example, 
therefore conventionally means, though does not SAY, that "a certain consequence 
holds" and it would be linked with a certain sort of secondary speech act whose 
performance is dependent upon two primary (central) speech acts, performed by the 
utterances therefore relates. (Grice 1989: 121-122). 
However, conventional implicature seems to be a problematic category. Grice 
(1961,1975,1989) gives only a few examples, but, moreover and therefore, though 
various people have given other candidates for this category: e. g. even, too, yet, 
discourse connectives such as so and after all, certain syntactic structures like 
clefting and particular intonational patterns. Levinson (1983: 128-9) even includes 
socially deictic items such as tu and vous in French and argues that vous used to a 
singular addressee conventionally implicates that he is socially distant from, or 
socially superior to, the speaker. 
All that this range of cases have in common is that they do not seem to be part of 
what is said, nor to be derived via Gricean maxims. That is, conventional implicature 
is simply a label for aspects of utterance meaning that do not fit into the positively 
defined theoretical classes. Any such negatively defined category is highly unlikely 
to form a natural class. 
Blakemore (1987 1989) has given an alternative analysis of one group of cases, 
the so-called discourse connectives including the examples given by Grice (1961. 
1975), i. e. but and therefore. She argues that the main function of these words is to 
indicate how the proposition they introduce is to be interpreted as relevant by' 
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constraining the hearer's choice of context for its interpretation, i. e. by constraining 
the kind of implicatures the hearer would derive. 
She argues that connectives such as but and therefore have the function of 
prescribing how the propositional form they introduce is to be processed rather than 
describing any aspect of the world: i. e. they have a procedural rather than conceptual 
semantics, a distinction which was discussed briefly in 2.3.1. Phrases like I think, I 
suppose and probably, on the other hand, clearly map onto concepts, i. e. they encode 
conceptual content which plays a constituent role in larger conceptual representations 
and so they do not have procedural meaning. Two distinct semantic properties i. e. 
procedural and conceptual are associated with therefore, but and I think/suppose 
respectively, all of which are supposed to give rise to conventional implicatures. 
Again, the ragbag nature of the category of conventional implicature is evident. 
Without any developed explanation of what it means to say that I think/suppose 
gives a conventional implicature of low speaker conviction, it amounts to no more 
than saying that it does not fall into the two better understood categories of what is 
said and what is conversationally implicated. We must try to give a more positive 
explanation of the role of these explicitly given attitudes. My general conclusion 
then is that Prince et al's implicature analysis of the speaker's expression of limited 
conviction is inadequate. 
Thus, I think/suppose, probably etc. cannot be properly explained in terms of any 
of the Gricean notions of `what is implicated'. It seems that they fall in the level of 
explicit content of an utterance. As was argued in 2.3, the Relevance-based notions 
of the propositional form of an utterance and higher-level explicature amount to the 
explicit content of an utterance in ordinary assertions. They will give us the 
distinctions necessary for an explanation of attitudinal expressions such as I 
think/suppose and probably. Let us look at these notions again. 
3.2.4 The Propositional Form of an Utterance and Explicature 
Sperber & Wilson (1986: 86) claim that linguistic decoding assigns a logical form to 
a linguistic stimulus. The logical form assigned by linguistic decoding is usually 
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semantically incomplete, i. e. not fully propositional, since reference, the time of 
utterance etc. are not identified, and ambiguities and vaguenesses remain. A 
semantically complete logical form, on the other hand, is fully propositional i. e. is 
capable of being true or false, and it is called a propositional form. 
As I argued in 2.3.2, an incomplete logical form encoded by an utterance is 
enriched so as to be semantically complete, i. e. to be fully propositional, and this 
fully propositional form, Relevance theory assumes, is the truth-conditional content 
of an utterance, i. e. the proposition expressed. For example, it is only after reference 
assignment and disambiguation, etc. that the incomplete logical form encoded by 
(12) can be developed into a fully propositional form something like (13) which is 
the truth-conditional content of (12): 
(12) She was mean. 
(13) Mary 1 was mean (as not being generous) at t. 
(1 = identified as a particular individual t= some identifiable time span) 
An utterance is considered to have only one identifiable propositional form (=the 
truth-conditional content), but it can have many explicitly communicated 
assumptions. For example, the utterance (12) has one identifiable propositional form 
(i. e. the proposition expressed) (13) but may communicate assumptions such as the 
following (14) and (15). That is, we are assuming that it is manifest to the speaker 
and the hearer that the speaker really believes the truth of (13) and the assumption 
(15) is communicated to the hearer. 
(14) The speaker has said that Mary 1 was mean at t. 
(15) The speaker believes that Mary 1 was mean at t. 
Sperber & Wilson (1986: 181) point out that the speaker who communicates (15) 
does not automatically communicate (13). For example, suppose it is mutually 
manifest that the hearer believes that Mary is a warm, generous person and has no 
reason to believe the speaker's utterance (12) more than his own opinion. Then the 
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speaker could not have intended her utterance to be a relevant one by making 
manifest to the hearer that Mary was mean, but only by making manifest that she 
believes that Mary was mean. 
Let us, however, suppose that the hearer has decided that the speaker intended to 
communicate both that the speaker believes that Mary was mean and that Mary was 
mean. In other words it is mutually manifest that the speaker intended the hearer to 
infer (13) from (15). Then the utterance (12) is an ordinary assertion and the 
propositional form (13) is communicated to the hearer as a true assumption. 
Sperber & Wilson (1986: 182) define explicatures as communicated assumptions 
which are developments of a logical form encoded by an utterance. Wilson & 
Sperber (1990) argue that the explicatures of an utterance include the proposition 
expressed by the utterance, and higher-level descriptions called `higher-level 
explicatures'. The former is obtained by enriching the logical form to the point 
where it has truth-conditions, and the latter, obtained by optionally embedding this 
proposition under a speech-act verb or a propositional attitude verb. For example, 
(13) and (14)-(15) are cases in point respectively. 
In the last section, I argued against treating the speaker's low endorsement in 
terms of Gricean implicatures. It seems as though linguistic expressions of the 
speaker's attitude should be explained at the explicit level, perhaps in terms of 
higher-level explicature where the speaker's propositional attitude is expressed. For 
example, if the speaker utters (12) with a parenthetical use of I suppose or probably, 
the hearer would recover a modified version of the higher-level explicature in (15) 
such as the following (15)': 
(15)' The speaker weakly believes that Mary was mean. 
In Chapter 1I characterised hedging as a pragmatic phenomenon by which the 
speaker communicates that she has limited commitment to P. So the following 
characterisation of hedging expressions can be given: 
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(16) Hedges are expressions which contribute to a higher-level explicature which 
communicates the speaker's limited commitment to the proposition 
expressed by an utterance. 
Now if the terms in question are non-truth-conditional i. e. do not contribute to the 
proposition expressed, as argued by Urmson (1966), Greenbaum (1969), Prince et al 
(1983) etc. they would contribute to the higher-level explicature and the definition in 
(16) would be all right. However, if they are truth-conditional, they would contribute 
to the proposition expressed, i. e. not to a higher-level explicature but to the base- 
level explicature of an utterance (or conceivably to both). In the following section, I 
will apply a standard test for distinguishing truth-conditional and non-truth- 
conditional meaning as a check on the intuitions of Urmson, etc. I will follow the 
procedure developed by Ifantidou (1993) and Ifantidou-Trouki (1993), and some 
developments of it suggested by Carston (personal communication). 
3.2.5 Testing for Truth-conditionality 
The truth-conditional tests have their origin in some examples used by Cohen (1971) 
to argue against Grice's implicature analysis of certain inferred elements of utterance 
meaning. For example, Grice argued that the temporal and cause-consequence 
connotations of and in (17) are generalised conversational implicatures which are 
derived by observing the conversational maxims. The sequential ordering, for 
instance, is derived via the submaxim of manner, enjoining orderliness: 
(17) The old king died of a heart attack and a republic was declared. 
Cohen (1971) has argued that the following (18) should be contradictory at the 
explicit level (Grice's `what is said') if the semantics of and is solely truth-functional 
and those connotations are implicatures. That is, schematically, (18) would be `if P 
then Q but if P then not Q'. However, as he points out, it is not contradictory which 
shows that the temporal and causal connotations fall within the scope of the if-clause. 
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That is, they contribute to truth-conditional content and so, in Cohen's view, must be 
part of the semantics of and. 
(18) If the old king died of a heart attack and a republic was declared Sam will be 
happy, but if a republic was declared and the old king died of a heart attack 
Sam will be unhappy. 
(adapted from Cohen in Carston (1988: 172)) 
This procedure of embedding a given case within the scope of a logical operator such 
as if has subsequently been used within Relevance theory in order to distinguish 
pragmatically derived truth-conditional content from conversational implicatures 
(Wilson 1992, Carston 1988 etc. ). For example, the above-mentioned 
temporal/causal connotations are treated as part of the proposition expressed, i. e. part 
of the truth-conditional content of an utterance (Carston 1988) though, crucially, they 
are cases of pragmatic enrichment rather than semantic encoding. The tests are, 
however, used by Ifantidou (1993) and Ifantidou-Trouki differently: i. e. they are 
used to show whether a certain linguistic item i. e. encoded content, does or does not 
contribute to the proposition expressed. The idea is to embed into a conditional the 
sentence which includes the expression to be tested, and to see if this expression falls 
within the scope of the if-clause. For example, let us see but in (19): 
(19) If your house is very old but mine isn't, we cannot swap. 
Now the question is under what conditions is the speaker of (19) claiming that we 
cannot swap? Is she saying that if (20)a-b are true we cannot swap, or is she saying 
that if (21)a-c are true we cannot swap? That is, does the contrastive connotation 
(21)c contribute to the truth-conditions of (19) or does it fall outside the scope of 
if... then... ? 
(20)a Your house is very old. 
b. My house is not very old. 
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(21)a. Your house is very old. 
b. My house is not very old. 
c. There is a contrast between the fact that your house is very old and the fact 
that my house isn't. 
Clearly (21)c does not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance in (19). The 
contrast meaning encoded by the linguistic item but is therefore non-truth- 
conditional. 
Along the same line, we can see whether or not the main clause parenthetical I 
suppose contributes to the proposition expressed. The question is whether the truth- 
conditions of (5) (repeated below) are equivalent to (22) or (23). As I said, the 
intuitions of Urmson (1966), Prince et al (1983) etc. seem to favour (22). 
(5) 1 suppose that your house is very old. 
(22) Your house is very old. 
(23) 1 suppose that your house is very old. 
Now let me apply the test and embed (5) under if-clause and see if I suppose falls 
within the scope of the 'if-clause. 
(24) If I suppose that your house is very old, then I will send a surveyor for 
verification. 
Now the question is whether the antecedent of this conditional has the same truth 
conditions as (22) or (23). It seems that it has the same truth conditions as (23) rather 
than (22). That is, if there were no doubt at all about the vintage of the house, the 
speaker would not have to seek the verification of an expert. This may be even 
clearer when I suppose is contrasted with another attitudinal expression of a similar 
kind. Consider the following (25). 
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(25) If I suppose your house is very old I will send a surveyor for verification but 
if I am certain that it is very old I'll buy it without further verification. 
It looks as if the two different attitudinal expressions contribute to the truth- 
conditional content of the antecedents here and that it is their particular contributions 
which account for the consistency of the two conditionals despite their contradictory 
consequents. 
Finally, Carston (personal communication) suggests that the following should 
settle the matter for those who remain unconvinced by these appeals to intuition. 
Consider (26)-(29): 
(26) If I suppose that your house is very old, then your house is very old. 
(27) If your house is very old, your house is very old. 
(28) Either your house is very old or I suppose your house is very old. 
(29) Either your house is very old or your house is very old. 
The above pair (26) and (27) make it clear that there is a truth-conditional distinction. 
That is, (27) is a necessary truth while (26) certainly is not and may well be false. As 
for the disjunctions, (28) is not truth-conditionally synonymous with (29) as the 
former expresses genuine alternatives (i. e. P or Q) while the latter does not (i. e. P or 
P). The test therefore shows that the main-clause parenthetical I suppose in (5) does 
contribute to the proposition expressed contrary to Urmson (1966). 
Now let us look at the case of probably. Again the question is whether the truth- 
conditions of (30) are equivalent to (22) (repeated below) or to (31): 
(30) Your house is probably very old. 
(22) Your house is very old. 
(31) It is probable that your house is very old. 
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As we know, the intuitions of many scholars seem to favour (22) (e. g. Urmson 
(1966) Greenbaum (1969), Prince et al (1983) Chafe (1986)). The truth- 
conditionality tests provide a useful means of checking and sharpening such 
intuitions. Let me now embed (30) under the conditional if.. then... and see whether 
or not probably falls under the scope of the antecedent: 
(32) If your house is probably very old, I will send a surveyor for verification. 
Intuitively, the antecedent of this conditional has the same truth-conditions as (31) 
rather than (22). That is, if there were no doubt at all about the vintage of the house 
the speaker would not have to seek the verification of an expert. Note that probably 
here is interpreted as `only probably' rather than `at least probably', so a pragmatic 
process of enrichment (i. e. conceptual narrowing: see 3.3.4) has also contributed to 
the truth-conditional content. This may be even clearer when it is contrasted with 
another sentence adverbial: 
(33) If your house is probably very old I will send a surveyor for verification, but 
if it is certainly very old I will buy it without further verification. 
In (33) the two different sentence adverbials contribute to the truth-conditional 
content of the antecedents and it is their particular contributions which account for 
the consistency of the two conditionals despite their contradictory consequents. 
Finally let me again apply the tests suggested by Carston in order to better capture 
the truth-conditional difference. 
(34) If your house is probably very old, then your house is very old. 
(27) If your house is very old, then your house is very old. 
(35) Either your house is probably very old, or your house is very old. 
(29) Either your house is very old, or your house is very old. 
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Again the question is whether or not (34) and (35) are truth-conditionally equivalent 
to (27) and (29) respectively. The answer is obvious: they are not truth- 
conditionally equivalent. (27) is a necessary truth while (34) is definitely not: in fact 
it may be false. And (35) expresses genuine alternatives while (29) does not: i. e. in 
(35) the speaker is not saying `P or P' but `P or probably P'. From the conditional 
and disjunction tests, the proposition expressed would be (31) rather than (22). This 
means that probably does contribute to the proposition expressed contrary to Urmson 
(1966) and Greenbaum (1969). 
Unlike these evidential adverbials such as certainly and probably that we 
observed in (33), attitudinal sentence adverbials such as unfortunately and sadly do 
not contribute to the truth-conditional content, i. e. the proposition expressed, but 
rather to a higher-level explicature (Ifantidou-Trouki (1993)). For example, (36) 
shows that the truth-condition of the antecedent is (37) rather than (38): 
(36) If your house is, unfortunately, very new, then I won't buy it. 
(37) Your house is very new. 
(38) It is unfortunate that your house is very new. 
That is, the speaker won't buy the house under the circumstance that it is very 
new, rather than in the circumstance where it is unfortunate that it is very new. That 
is, the proposition expressed would be (37) and Ifantidou-Trouki argues that 
unfortunately contributes to a higher-level explicature such as (38) rather than to the 
proposition expressed. This would predict that both (39) and (40) (also with 
antecedent and consequent reversed) would be necessary truths and that both (41) 
and (42) are non-genuine alternatives respectively. 
(39) If your house is, unfortunately, very new, then your house is very new. 
(40) If your house is very new, then your house is very new. 
(41) Either your house is unfortunately very new or your house is very new. 
(42) Either your house is very new or your house is very new. 
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And indeed (39) sounds like a necessary truth and (41) does not present genuine 
alternatives. (39) and (41) are thus in contrast with (34) and (35) in which probably 
does contribute to the truth-conditional content of the if-clause and the disjunction. 
Now what about the true parenthetical uses of I suppose or I think observed in (6) 
and (7) (repeated below)? Do the parentheticals fall within the scope of the if-clause 
and the disjunction? Let us consider the following: 
(6) Your house is, I suppose, very old. 
(7) Your house is very old, I suppose. 
(43)a. If your house is, I suppose, very old, I will send a surveyor for verification. 
b. If your house is very old, I suppose, I will send a surveyor for verification. 
(44)a. If your house is, I suppose, very old, then your house is very old. 
b. If your house is very old, I suppose, then your house is very old. 
(45)a. Either your house is very old, or your house is, I suppose, very old. 
b. Either your house is very old, or your house is very old, I suppose. 
(43)-(45)a-b all sound very odd, which shows that these parentheticals are very 
difficult to run the truth-conditional test on. This might be because, as Ifantidou 
(1993: 199) tentatively suggests, true parentheticals constitute two utterances: i. e. we 
are trying to embed two utterances into one utterance of if... then... and either... or.... 
That is, (6) and (7) would encode two speech acts (46) and (47). 
(46) Your house is very old. 
(47) 1 suppose your house is very old. 
It would follow from this that it might be erroneous to talk of THE truth- 
conditions of (6) and (7) since in fact each of them has two sets of truth-conditions. 
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It may well be that the strong intuitions people have about these cases are really 
intuitions about relevance, i. e. intuitions about the sub-part of the utterance (or about 
the one of the two speech acts) which carries the main relevance, making the major 
contribution to overall relevance by giving rise to the main bulk of the contextual 
effects. From this perspective, the main-clause parenthetical would contribute to the 
proposition expressed while the true parentheticals would contribute to that one of 
the two propositions expressed which does not carry main relevance but which `fine- 
tunes' a higher-level explicature of the first in Ifantidou's terms (1994). That is, the 
function of the second utterance is to weaken the expression of speaker's belief that 
comes with the first utterance, i. e. to modify a higher-level explicature as exemplified 
in (15)'repeated here: 
(15)' The speaker weakly believes that Mary was mean. 
Wilson & Sperber (1993: 23) indeed express doubt about the long-established 
assumption that every utterance encodes a single logical form, expresses a single 
proposition and has a single set of truth-conditions. However, the new perspective 
has not yet been fully established and employed in Relevance theory and in this 
dissertation I follow the existing assumption that every utterance has one identifiable 
truth-conditional content, i. e. the truth-conditional content of an utterance and 
assume that the true parenthetical utterances (6) and (7) constit4e one utterance. 
On this basis, Ifantidou (1993: 199) runs the truth-conditionality test and claims 
that when interpretable at all the embedded true parentheticals take the whole 
sentence in their scope i. e. in her view (43)-(45) would be equivalent to (48)-(50) 
below. The true parenthetical I suppose in (6) and (7) does not therefore fall within 
the scope of the if-clause and either... or... 
(48) 1 suppose that if your house is very old then I will send a surveyor for 
verification. 
(49) I suppose that if your house is very old, then your house is very old. 
(50) 1 suppose that either your house is very old or your house is very old. 
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From this result, one could conclude that (48)-(50) are the truth conditions of (43)- 
(45) respectively, or one could argue that what is being asserted is only the embedded 
conditional and I suppose is merely commenting on this assertion (Ifantidou 1994: 
165). That is, the result does not show whether or not the term in question falls 
under the proposition expressed. 
Ifantidou (1994: 165), then, employs different connectives i. e. factive connectives 
such as although and because instead of If .. then... and either... or.... 
Then, the term 
in question does not fall outside of the whole utterance as seen in (48)-(50), but falls 
within the scope of the connectives. Let us embed (6)-(7) under because and 
consider (5 1)a-b. and see whether my sending for a surveyor follows from the reason 
(46) or from the reason (47). 
(51)a. Because your house is, I suppose, very old, I will send a surveyor for 
verification. 
b. Because your house is very old, I suppose, I will send a surveyor for 
verification. 
(46) Your house is very old. 
(47) 1 suppose that your house is very old. 
Our intuition is fairly clear that the consequence follows from (46), and this shows 
that I suppose in (6)/(7) does not fall within the proposition expressed 
Then parenthetical I suppose in (6)-(7) is non-truth-conditional, and its function 
is, as in (15)' to contribute to the recovery of a modified version of the speaker's 
belief communicated to the proposition that the hearer's house is very old as 
expressed in (52). 
(52) The speaker weakly believes that the hearer's house is very old. 
I have argued that attitudinal expressions such as I suppose may modify a higher- 
level explicature. Similarly, Ifantidou (1994) argues that parentheticals such as I 
think `fine-tune' a higher-level explicature in such a way that they weaken the 
speaker's commitment to the proposition expressed. However, in (51)a-b. the weak 
commitment is not expressed to the proposition expressed which is schematically 
`Because P, Q' but it is expressed to `P' which is a logical implication of `Because P, 
Q'. Therefore, the parenthetical in (51)a-b is not modifying or `fine-tuning' a higher- 
level explicature which is a development of the proposition expressed. We have 
to add the cases such as (51)a-b to the characterisation of hedging given in (16): 
(16)' Hedges are expressions which contribute to a higher-level explicature which 
communicates the speaker's limited commitment to the proposition expressed, or 
which weaken the speaker's commitment to a proposition P which is entailed by the 
proposition expressed. 
It has to be noted here that the parenthetical I suppose in (6)-(7) (repeated below) 
has its own truth conditional content although it does not contribute to the truth- 
conditions of the utterance. 
(6) Your house is, I suppose, very old. 
(7) Your house is very old, I suppose. 
This is shown in the fact that a parenthetical utterance of I suppose can be challenged 
by a different attitudinal expression such as you know as in `That's not true. YOU 
KNOW the house is very old! ' I suppose in (6)-(7) does not contribute to the 
proposition expressed and is claimed to be non-truth-conditional. However, it has its 
own conceptual content and contributes to a higher-level explicature, which is a 
conceptual representation with its own truth-conditions. It is obvious that its 
contribution is conceptual rather than procedural since when used in a main clause it 
contributes the concept SUPPOSE to the proposition expressed (truth-conditional 
content). 
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In the existing (single utterance) framework, I suppose in the true parenthetical 
uses (6) and (7) contributes to the construction of a higher-level explicature. I 
suppose in the main-clause counterpart, on the other hand, contributes to the 
proposition expressed. Now in (6) and (7) the speaker's weak endorsement is 
communicated as a higher-level explicature such as (52) (repeated below), which 
complies with the revised characterisation of hedging given in (16)'. 
(52) The speaker weakly believes that the hearer's house is very old. 
However, in (5) it is communicated to a proposition which is not entailed by the 
proposition expressed, and this does not comply with the characterisation (16)'. That 
means we need to further amend (16)'. This is the matter I now turn to. 
3.2.6 The Hedging Function in Relevance-theoretic Terms 
As we have argued in 3.2.5, the true parenthetical I suppose does contribute to the 
higher-level explicature which communicates the speaker's limited commitment to P. 
On the other hand, I argued that the main clause counterpart I suppose contributes to 
the proposition expressed. In ordinary assertions, the proposition expressed by an 
utterance is an explicature which is communicated to the hearer. So in the case of the 
main-clause use of I suppose and the evidential sentence adverb probably, the 
speaker's limited commitment is communicated as part of the basic explicature of an 
utterance. 
This is where the notion `main relevance' comes in. In the true parentheticals (6) 
and (7) the speaker's weak endorsement is expressed towards the proposition that 
carries the main relevance, i. e. the proposition expressed would give rise to the main 
bulk of contextual effects. In the main-clause parenthetical (5) as well, the speaker's 
weak endorsement is expressed to the proposition that carries the main relevance, i. e. 
here the embedded proposition would give rise to the main bulk of contextual effects. 
That means, we have to further amend the characterisation of hedging (16)' (repeated 
below) as the definition (16)' cannot capture the speaker's hedging in (5). 
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(16)' Hedges are expressions which contribute to a higher-level explicature which 
communicates the speaker's limited commitment to the proposition expressed or 
which weaken the speaker's commitment to a proposition P which is entailed by the 
proposition expressed. 
Instead of (16)', 1 would now like to suggest the following: 
(16)" Hedges are expressions which communicate the speaker's limited 
commitment to the proposition that carries the main relevance or which weaken the 
speaker's commitment to a proposition P which is entailed by the proposition 
expressed. 
This new definition correctly predicts that I suppose in (9)B (repeated below) is not a 
hedge as the main relevance lies with the proposition which represents the speaker's 
attitude I suppose. 
(9)A: I suppose that this house is quite new. 
B: Well, I suppose that it is very old. 
It is this that has contextual effects, e. g. the implicature that what the speaker 
supposes is in direct contrast with what the hearer supposes i. e. that they are in 
opposing states of mind, with all the further implications that that might have. This 
satisfies our intuition that the speaker of (9)B is not hedging. 
Let us now consider further examples to test this definition. 
(53) 1 suppose/think he is a ballet dancer. 
(referring to a man who has tripped over in a pub) 
(54) 1 suppose/think she is an angel. 
(said of a small child who is very nice to her little brother) 
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(53)-(54) are figurative utterances and it seems that the speaker's limited 
commitment is not communicated in these utterances. In the ironical utterances (53) 
the speaker's limited commitment to the proposition that he is a ballet dancer is 
represented. However, since the utterance is a case of irony, it is an echoic rather 
than a descriptive representation. In the Relevance-based analysis of irony, the main 
relevance lies with the disapproving attitude expressed by the speaker to the 
attributed proposition that the speaker supposes that he is a ballet dancer. The 
contextual effects are derived from the higher-level explicature which expresses a 
disapproving or scornful attitude to the whole proposition. That is, the speaker 
dissociates herself from the proposition expressed: i. e. she dissociates herself from I 
suppose/think that P. Thus, in this example the speaker's weak endorsement is not 
communicated to the hearer as part of the explicature of an utterance. So the 
definition (16)" holds and we can happily say that the speaker of (53) is not hedging. 
What about (54)? Is the speaker's weak endorsement to the proposition that she is 
an angel communicated? That is, do we want to say that the speaker of (54) is 
hedging? If the speaker of (54) were hedging, we should be able to use true 
parentheticals in order to communicate the speaker's weak endorsement as seen in 
(6) and (7). Let us see the true parenthetical versions of (54)a-b. 
(54)a. She is, I suppose/think, an angel. (? ) 
b. She is an angel, I suppose/think. (? ) 
(suggested by Robyn Carston) 
(54)a-b. sound odd, which might suggest that in (54) the speaker is not 
communicating her weak endorsement but rather she is communicating her 
psychological state of supposing/thinking that she is an angel. That is, contrary to 
Urmson's parenthetical examples (5)-(7), I suppose/think in (54) communicates the 
speaker's mental state of supposing/thinking that she is an angel. Intuitively, this 
sounds right as we have reservations about saying that the speaker of (54) is hedging. 
So the definition (16)" does not apply here, either. 
(54) may be comparable to (9)B (repeated below) where I suppose is accented. 
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(9)A: I suppose that this house is quite new. 
B: Well, I suppose it is very old. 
Both (9)A and (9)B include I suppose in the proposition expressed and it is 
communicated as part of the explicature of an utterance. That is, the notion 
`explicature' would not capture the difference between I suppose in (9)A and that in 
(9)B, or between the case where attitudinal expressions communicate the speaker's 
limited conviction and the one where they do not as in (54). Again, the notion `main 
relevance' is very important, as both in (9)B and (54) the main relevance lies with the 
proposition which includes the attitudinal expression I suppose. 
In the last section, I mentioned that Urmson's (and other's) intuitions about truth- 
conditional content may really be intuitions about that part of an utterance where the 
main relevance lies. In an unaccented version such as (9)A it would only be a sub- 
part i. e. the embedded proposition, while in (9)B, it would be the whole proposition 
including I suppose. However, I showed in the last section that the main-clause use 
of I suppose falls in the truth-conditional content of an utterance regardless of 
whether it is accented or not. As I argued in Itani (1990), the difference between 
(9)A and (9)B must therefore be captured in terms of where the main relevance lies 
i. e. from which proposition the main bulk of the contextual effects is derived, rather 
than whether the expressions in question are truth-conditional or not. 
For example, in (9)A the main relevance lies with the embedded proposition that 
the house is quite new and might give rise to an implicature such that the speaker 
would consider buying it, etc. In (9)B, on the other hand, the main relevance lies 
with B's supposing that it is very old, implicating that B's opinion is the opposite of 
A's, that the conclusions she might draw would be very different from A's. 
I suppose in (9)B is accented while that in (5) and (9)A is unaccented. Grice 
(1989: 140-1) says that accented I think that P implicates that the speaker claims 
justification for not having made the stronger claim that she knows that P. In 
Relevance terms, the accented verb of the speaker's propositional attitude carries the 
main relevance and gives rise to implicatures. Whether accented or not, there will be 
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some contexts in which the speaker's propositional attitude is what matters most i. e. 
where the main relevance lies, and the use of I suppose/think does not communicate 
the speaker's hedging. For example, suppose the speaker has for many years been 
uncertain whether or not she will permanently live in England, but everyone else has 
long been of the view that she will Then finally one day she comes to a firm 
conclusion and says (55): 
(55) 1 think/believe I will live in England. 
(55) is not a case of hedging as what is important is the speaker's attitude, that she 
has now come to have this belief. In Relevance-theoretic terms, what hedging comes 
down to is the communication of the speaker's less than wholehearted 
endorsement/backing for that proposition expressed by the utterance which carries 
the main relevance, which Urmson (1966) or Prince et al (1982) consider as THE 
proposition expressed. 
The main relevance bearing proposition may be THE proposition expressed by the 
utterance in which case the attitude of weak endorsement is captured by a higher- 
level explicature as shown in the true parenthetical utterances in (6) and (7). On the 
other hand, when the proposition expressed by the utterance, i. e. the truth-conditional 
content is attitudinal itself, the main-relevance bearing proposition may be the one 
embedded in that attitude as suggested by Itani (1990). In such a case, the attitude of 
weak endorsement is captured by the proposition expressed i. e. the lower-level 
explicature of the utterance. 
I have shown in (9)B and (53)-(55) that the mere use of expressions of weaker 
attitude such as I suppose/think does not communicate the speaker's hedging, which 
comports with my argument in Chapter 1 that hedging is not a linguistic phenomenon 
but a pragmatic one. Now the question is whether or not the speaker's limited 
endorsement is only contributed to explicatures or may extend to implicatures. In the 
metaphor (54) the speaker is strongly implicating that she is very kind by using the 
`angel' metaphor. The speaker's uncertainty which might in other contexts be given 
rise to by I suppose/think does not seem to be communicated: i. e. it seems that it is 
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communicated neither to the implicature of her kindness, nor to the proposition that 
she is an angel. 
In Relevance-theory (1986), one analysis of metaphor is that the contextual effects 
are derived from the proposition which is used loosely i. e. not literally. The 
proposition expressed would be false, yet giving rise to the intended interpretation 
with less cost than would have been required to spell out the effects literally. The 
metaphor "She is an angel" would be false but it yields the intended interpretation 
without incurring unjustifiable efforts for that effect. 
The other analysis would be that the word, but not the whole proposition is used 
loosely. That is, the word angel communicates a concept ANGEL' which is a 
loosening of the concept ANGEL in that it can also be used to refer to individuals 
who are not literally angels but who have angelic features (Wilson 1993-4; see 
Section 3.3.3). In this analysis, the metaphor "She is an angel" is true as the 
individual referred to by `She' now belongs to the set of individuals referred to by the 
new concept ANGEL'. 
I suppose/think can be used in (54) and here the speaker is not communicating her 
weak endorsement of the proposition that she is an angel, but is communicating her 
psychological state of supposing/thinking so. The reason why I suppose/think cannot 
be used as a hedge in the metaphor (54) seems to lie in the following. If we take the 
first analysis of metaphor, the speaker gives no endorsement to the false proposition 
that she is an angel, so the communication of her weak endorsement to it seems 
contradictory. And if we take the second analysis of metaphor, the speaker is 
strongly asserting that she is very kind etc., so the communication of her weak 
endorsement in here is contradictory as well. 
Is it not at all possible to communicate the speaker's weak endorsement to 
implicatures? What about the following example (56)? Surely (56) communicates 
(57) in which I suppose m od ý-fi Qs the implicature that he took the money. The 
utterance (56) gives rise to an implicature that he took the money, and the main 
relevance lies in this implicature and the speaker's limited commitment is expressed 
to it. So the speaker's weak endorsement is expressed in both (56) and (57). 
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(56) I suppose/think he is a thief. 
(The speaker is speculating who took the money) 
(57) The speaker supposes/thinks he took the money. 
Now some might say that I suppose/think in (56) describes the speaker's 
psychological state of speculation i. e. her supposing/thinking carries the main 
relevance in (56). In such an interpretation, the whole proposition expressed, not its 
sub-part is where the main relevance lies, and the speaker is not hedging as I argued 
for (54). 
Let us consider other examples in which the speaker's weak endorsement is 
clearly expressed to an implicature as well as to that sub-part of the basic explicature, 
which carries the main relevance. 
(58)A: What time is it now? 
B: I think the milkman has just come. 
(Milkman comes at six o'clock every morning) 
(59)A: Will he come to my party tonight? 
B: I suppose he likes a crowd. 
(A always has a big party) 
(60)A: Is his house old? 
B: The roof is probably falling in. 
In their respective contexts, (58)-(60)B do not give direct answers to A's question 
but they implicate answers to A, and the attitudinal expressions express the speaker's 
weak commitment to the respective implicature as well as to the explicit import 
where the main relevance, arguably, lies. In (58)A the speaker communicates her 
weak commitment to the embedded proposition where the main relevance lies, i. e. to 
the proposition that the milkman has just come. At the same time, she communicates 
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the implicature that it is six o'clock, not with her full endorsement but with her 
limited endorsement. 
In (59), the speaker's weak commitment expressed to the embedded proposition 
carries over to the implicature that he will come to the party. In (60)B as well, the 
speaker's weak endorsement is expressed to the implicature that it is very old as well 
as to the proposition expressed which carries the main relevance, i. e. that the roof is 
falling in. Now it seems as though the speaker's weak endorsement expressed by the 
terms in question carries over to the implicature and it might appear that I have to 
amend the characterisation of hedging. 
However, as Sperber & Wilson (1986: 109-110) argue, an implication inherits a 
strength at least as high as that of the conjunction of the premises from which it was 
derived. That is, the strength the implicature i. e. answer to A in (58)-(60) inherits iS 
at least as high as that of the respective proposition to which the speaker's weak 
endorsement is expressed. We can then argue that the weak endorsement to 
implicatures results from the weakness of the main-relevance carrying proposition in 
(58)-(60) which gives rise to the implicatures. 
That is, the strength of the main-relevance bearing proposition on which the 
inferential processes depend was weak, so the output of the implicature therefore 
became weak as well. So the contribution of the terms in question to conveying the 
speaker's weak endorsement is manifested at the explicit level. My characterisation 
of hedging thus remains the communication of the speaker's weak endorsement to 
the main-relevance bearing proposition; implicatures may be hedged in that they 
inherit the strength of the explicit proposition from which they are derived. 
3.2.7 Conclusion 
In this section I have introduced Urmson's discussion of true parentheticals and their 
main-clause counterparts, and argued against his claim that the main-clause 
counterparts behave the same way as true parentheticals, i. e. that they do not describe 
a state of affairs (enter into the proposition expressed), but indicate how the 
proposition is to be interpreted. The truth-conditionality test showed that the main- 
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clause counterparts do contribute to the truth-conditional content (i. e. the proposition 
expressed). 
Urmson (1966) argued that evidential sentence adverbs such as probably and 
possibly likewise indicate how the proposition is to be interpreted. It is to be 
interpreted as having the speaker's limited commitment. Again, the truth- 
conditionality test showed that they fall within the scope of if-clause and either... or... 
and I argued that they contribute to the proposition expressed. 
Prince et al (1983) analysed attitudinal expressions such as I think and probably as 
hedges and argued that they `implicate' that the speaker has limited commitment to 
the truth of the proposition (see Section 1.4.4.3). Again, I showed by the truth- 
conditionality test that they constitute a part of the proposition, and are therefore 
truth-conditional (part of what is said, in Gricean terms). Nevertheless I pursued 
possible implicature analyses in 3.2.3 and showed that any Gricean category of 
implicature proves inadequate to treat these attitudinal expressions. This satisfies our 
intuition that explicitly expressed attitudes are not treated at the level of `what is 
implicated'. 
True parentheticals such as I suppose in (6) and (7) are claimed to fall outside of 
the if-clause and either... or... and take the whole of if ... then... and either ... or ... 
in 
their scope as shown in (48)-(50). They are, in contrast with the main-clause 
counterparts, non-truth-conditional, i. e. not part of the proposition expressed, and yet 
contribute to an explicit aspect of the utterance called `higher-level explicature'. 
They indicate what kind of higher-level explicatures are intended by the speaker. 
Although they are not truth-conditional in the sense that they do not contribute to 
the proposition expressed, they map onto concepts and have truth-conditions in their 
own right: i. e. their truth can be challenged as in `That's not true, you know it'. 
When we talk about THE truth-conditional content, we assume that every utterance 
encodes a single logical form, expresses a single proposition and has a single set of 
truth-conditions, and therefore any assumption to which these true parentheticals 
contribute is analysed as a non-truth-conditional aspect of utterance meaning. 
Wilson & Sperber (1993: 23) express doubt about this long established assumption 
and true parentheticals such as (6) and (7) might be evidence that supports this. That 
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is, (6) and (7) might express two utterances as I mentioned, having more than one 
proposition expressed and the terms in question might contribute to one of the two 
utterances. 
Now the true parentheticals in (6)-(7) weaken the associated assertions and this 
can be predicted by the pragmatic criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance. According to Sperber & Wilson, every utterance creates an expectation in 
the hearer that the utterance is optimally relevant. An utterance is optimally relevant 
if and only if it achieves adequate contextual effects with no unjustifiable processing 
effort required in achieving these effects. 
Extra information such as parentheticals slipped in the main clause would incur 
extra effort on the part of the hearer. The Relevance notion of optimal relevance, 
however, guarantees that the utterance was the easiest possible one for the intended 
interpretation. It follows from this that this extra information slipped in contributes 
to&higher-level explicature. That is, the contextual effect of I suppose in (6)-(7) 
would be to weaken the speaker's belief in the proposition expressed, which is 
reflected in the higher-level explicature. Or if the parentheticals such as I know or 
I'm certain are used, the effect would be to strengthen speaker commitment to the 
proposition expressed, which is also reflected in the higher-level explicature. That is, 
the contextual effect of the parenthetical attitudinal phrases would be to change the 
status of the speaker's belief in the proposition expressed. 
In Section 3.2.4 1 defined hedging in terms of Relevance theory and claimed that a 
hedge is an expression which contributes to the higher-level explicature where the 
speaker's propositional attitude of her limited commitment is expressed. However, 
in 3.2.6 I amended the definition (16) as in some hedged utterances such as (5), the 
speaker's weak endorsement is communicated not as part of a higher-level 
explicature but as part of the base-level explicature of an utterance. The crucial 
notion here was `the main relevance of an utterance'. 
That is, I showed that the mere use of certain expressions of the speaker's weak 
attitude such as 1 think/suppose does not automatically lead to the speaker's hedging. 
Sometimes it communicates the speaker's psychological state of thinking/supposing 
as seen in (9)B and (55) and the expressions are part of the proposition which carries 
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the main relevance of an utterance. An interesting point to note is that the terms in 
question cannot be used to communicate the speaker's hedging when the proposition 
expressed is not communicated to the hearer. This is demonstrated in ironical 
utterances such as (44)T(Chap 1), (53) and metaphors such as (54). So it seems 
correct that the speaker's hedging is manifest at the explicit level of an utterance, i. e. 
at the level of the proposition expressed or its sub-part as shown in the revised 
definition of hedging (16)" (repeated below): 
(16)" Hedges are expressions which communicate the speaker's limited 
commitment to the proposition that carries the main relevance or which weaken the 
speaker's commitment to a proposition P which is entailed by the proposition 
expressed. 
In Chapter 1,1 introduced hedges and their analyses in the past. I argued against 
Lakoff (1972 1987) and Prince et al (1982) who resort to `proto-type' and claim that 
some hedges such as a regular, a typical, technically make the utterance more or less 
fuzzy, or conveyamore or less proto-typical instance of the term they modify. Kay 
(1983), on the other hand, argues that hedges such as those just mentioned make 
meta-linguistic comments on elements of the utterance. In the next section, an 
attempt will be made to explain Lakoffian hedges in terms of Relevance-based 
analyses and to see whether or not the speaker is actually hedging in those utterances. 
3.3 Reanalysis of Lakoffian Hedges 
3.3.1 Introduction 
As I argued in Chapter 1, expressions listed under `some hedges and related 
phenomena' by Lakoff (1972) include not only those which weaken the speaker' s 
commitment to a proposition but also those which intensify her commitment, 
including a wide range of expressions cutting across parts of speech. They include 
for example sort of, very, really, a true, a regular, a typical , technically, 
looseli' 
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speaking, strictly speaking, etc. According to Lakoff (1972: 195), hedges are "words 
whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy". For example, (61) and (63) are 
literally false but the use of sort of and a regular would make them less false, i. e. 
more true, as in (62) and (64): 
(61) A bat is a bird. (false) (Lakoff 1972: 185) 
(62) A bat is sort of a bird. (seems to be true) 
(63) Esther Williams is a fish. (false) 
(64) Esther Williams is a regular fish. (seems to be true) (Lakoff 1972: 197) 
Lakoff (1972: 198) argues that sort of and a regular pick up connotations or 
associated properties of the noun they modify as observed in (62) and (64). In 
contrast with this, he gives examples of adverbials which pick up the literal meaning 
or definitional property of the linguistic expression they modify. For example, in 
(65) and (66), technically and strictly speaking focus on the literal meaning i. e. 
defining criteria of a whale rather than its connotations. 
(65) A whale is technically a mammal. 
(66) Strictly speaking, a whale is a mammal. (Lakoff 1972: 198) 
However, the semantics of these adverbials are different as demonstrated below, as 
the use of these hedges make the contradictory remark (i. e. R. Nixon being and not 
being a Quaker) sound non-contradictory in (67): 
(67) Richard Nixon was technically a Quaker but, strictly speaking, he was not. 
(adapted from Lakoff 1972: 198) 
The wide range of the phenomena Lakoff (1972) calls hedges has inspired many 
linguists to look into them more closely (Kay (1983), Prince et al, (1983), Brown & 
Levinson (1978 1987) etc. ) as I presented in Chapter 1. In this Chapter, however, I 
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will consider in detail just a regular, a typical and technically because of the 
interesting differences in their treatment within Relevance theory. I will also 
consider whether or not the terms in question function as hedges, i. e. whether the 
speaker uses them to communicate her weak endorsement of a proposition. In the 
following section, I will present three categories of adjectives suggested by Robyn 
Carston (personal communication) the investigation of which will help us with 
understanding the particular features of the adjectives regular and typical. 
3.3.2 Three Categories of Adjectives 
First, I would like to discuss adjectives which encode independent concepts. They 
encode independent concepts in that the concept encoded by adjectives of this type 
can contribute to a predicate on its own. Examples are rich, old, small, poor, stupid, 
etc. and they can constitute a predicate without having a following noun. For 
example, (68)-(69)a. can be paraphrased by the synonymous (68)-(69)b or (68)-(69)c. 
(68)a. Tom is a rich bachelor. 
b. Tom is rich and he is a bachelor. 
c. Tom is a bachelor and he is rich. 
(69)a. Tom is a tall bachelor. 
b. Tom is tall and he is a bachelor. 
c. Tom is a bachelor and he is tall. 
Although these adjectives are independent, some standard of `richness' or `tallness' 
has to be fixed in context: i. e. having a yacht might indicate richness in one context, 
but might not in another; being 5 feet 10" might be tall in one context but might not 
be tall enough in another. Rich is independent in the sense that it can constitute a 
predicate on its own. Of course, in some sentences, the fixation of the standard can 
be affected by the following word(s) it modifies. For example, in (70) Tom's wealth 
would be something humble, compared with that of, for example, a rich lawyer. 
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(70)a. Tom is a rich student. 
b. Tom is a student and he is rich by the standards of students. 
Second, there are adjectives that encode a concept which is dependent on the noun 
it modifies. The concept an adjective of this type encodes is dependent in that it 
cannot make a contribution to a predicate on its own. 
(71)a. Tom is a good thief/musician/cook. 
b. Tom is good and he is a thief/musician/cook. (? ) 
c. Tom is a thief/musician/cook and he is a good one (= thief/musician/cook) 
(68)-(69)b were synonymous with (68)-(69)a. However, (71)b. is not synonymous 
with (71)a. This is because the adjective good in (71)b. requires some more 
specification in order to determine what he is good at i. e. in (71)a. good modifies the 
way Tom steals/plays a musical instrument/cooks and his being good at the 
respective deed is communicated. (71)c. is synonymous with (71)a. but only by 
virtue of the anaphor one which takes the predicate noun of the first conjunct as its 
antecedent. The important difference between rich and good is that a rich X may 
apply to someone who is rich (according to some standard) and who is X, while a 
good X may apply only to someone who is good at being a X. A typical X, included 
by Lakoff in his list of hedges, patterns like a good X; it encodes a concept which is 
dependent on the noun it modifies. Consider: 
(72)a. Tom is a typical bachelor. 
b. Tom is typical and he is a bachelor (? ). 
c. Tom is a bachelor and he is a typical one (= bachelor). 
Finally, there seems to be a small class of adjectives that encode some indication 
for forming a new concept out of the lexical concept encoded by the noun they 
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modify. So the noun cannot be replaced with the pronoun one as is possible in (72)c. 
The hedge regular is such a case: 
(73)a. Tom is a regular bachelor. 
b. Tom is regular and he is a bachelor (? ). 
c. Tom is a bachelor and he is a regular one (? ). 
Please note that this understanding of regular (= having the usual characteristics of) 
is to be distinguished from the one that is synonymous with `habitual' or 
`customary'. Of course, in this non-hedging use, it falls into the second class of 
adjectives: 
(73)'a. Tom is a regular contributor to seminars. 
b. Tom is regular and he is a contributor to seminars. (? ) 
c. Tom is a contributor to seminars and he is a regular one. 
With regular (in its so-called hedging use) neither (73)b. nor (73)c. is synonymous 
with (73)a. 
In both (72)a. and (73)a. the hearer would focus on some stereotypical properties 
such as Tom's having a care free life, living alone, being promiscuous etc. rather than 
the defining properties of an unmarried adult male. That is, the hearer would focus 
on some encyclopaedic information of the concept BACHELOR rather than its 
logical or definitional content. Sort of behaves similarly in some of its uses: i. e. it 
focuses on some encyclopaedic information of the concept encoded by the following 
word. For example, in (62) (repeated below) it focuses on some stereotypical 
properties of the concept BIRD such as being able to fly etc. However, I am fully 
aware of the complication that sort of also modifies attitudinal verbs as in `I sort of 
think... ' (see (27) (Chap 1)). 
(62) A bat is sort of a bird. 
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The crucial difference is that a typical X entails X while a regular X does not. So 
(72)a. entails that Tom is a bachelor while (73)a. does not: Tom may or may not be a 
bachelor. This can be shown in the following conjunctions. In (74) Tom's not being 
a bachelor contradicts what a typical bachelor entails, i. e. his bachelorhood. In (75) 
Tom's being a bachelor is true while in (76) it is false. However, in both examples 
the proposition that Tom is a regular bachelor can be conjoined. 
(74) Tom has just got married but he is still a typical bachelor*. 
(75) Tom is a bachelor and in fact he is a regular bachelor. 
(76) Tom has just got married but he is still a regular bachelor. 
According to Lakoff (1972: 198), (73)a. could not be said of someone who 
actually is a bachelor and a regular bachelor presupposes the negation of the literal 
meaning of a bachelor i. e. the negation of Tom's being categorically a bachelor in 
(73)a. However, in (75), (73)a. is conjoined with the proposition that Tom is a 
bachelor and I showed in (75)-(76) that a regular bachelor can be said of someone 
who is or is not a bachelor. The reason why one might not say a regular bachelor 
about someone who is a bachelor seems to be that one would say a typical bachelor 
instead as this entails that he is a bachelor. Let us now look more closely at the use 
of a regular and attempt a Relevance-theoretic analysis. 
3.3.3 A Regular - concept loosening 
In Relevance theory, each concept constitutes a conceptual address which acts as a 
heading in memory at which lexical, logical and encyclopaedic information is stored 
(Wilson 1993-4). In this framework, what a word encodes is just a conceptual 
address, and there is a gap between it and what the word communicates on a given 
occasion of utterance. In order to fill this gap, certain inferential processes take place 
in a bid to satisfy the expectation of optimal relevance. It seems a regular and sort of 
explicitly indicate what kind of inferencing should take place for the word they 
modify to be interpreted as relevant. Let us consider (73)a. again (repeated as (77)): 
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(77) Tom is a regular bachelor. 
The speaker of (77) is not crucially communicating that Tom is an unmarried adult 
male: indeed, this may not be communicated at all. What is communicated crucially 
here is that Tom has certain stereotypical properties of bachelors, such as leading a 
care free life etc. The implication that Tom is an unmarried adult male, is of low 
relevance in (77) and its truth or falsity is not important as seen in the acceptable 
conjunction of propositions as I argued in (76) (repeated below): 
(76) Tom has just got married but he is still a regular bachelor. 
This is because the information encoded by a regular directs the hearer to derive 
stereotypical properties associated with bachelorhood, e. g. leading a care-free life, no 
commitment to a relationship, childless etc. We can compare (76) with (78) in which 
there is no such information encoded by the adjective rich. 
(78) Tom has just got married but he is still a rich bachelor*. 
(78) is obviously contradictory: Tom cannot be married and a bachelor at the 
same time. In this utterance, Tom's richness and his membership of the bachelor 
category are two distinct properties within the proposition expressed and this 
contradicts the category of being married expressed in the first clause. As I argued in 
the last section, a regular does not encode an independent concept but encodes 
information which directs the hearer to interpret the word bachelor loosely or 
metaphorically, i. e. away from the defining criterion of his bachelorhood and 
focusing on accessible encyclopaedic information of the concept BACHELOR. 
What is happening here is that a regular bachelor encodes a new concept 
BACHELOR' which maintains the stereotypic encyclopaedic properties of 
BACHELOR but has dropped the definitional property [+ unmarried]. 
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Wilson (1993-4) talks about the `loose use' of concepts, and my claim is that the 
term in question is explicitly indicating this, i. e. a regular indicates that the word that 
it modifies is to be interpreted loosely. One of the examples she gives is the verb 
blossomed used with the subject Our friendship. The word blossom encodes a 
concept BLOSSOM which has logical and encyclopaedic information. The literal 
use of this concept would lead the hearer to access the following logical and 
contextual implications such that their friendship belonged to the plant species and 
sprouted flowers, and that it grew from a small beginning into something beautiful, 
respectively. 
Obviously, the logical implication above is not intended by the speaker and we 
can observe the discrepancy between the concept encoded and the concept 
communicated in this use. The concept communicated here is a weaker one which 
shares some but not all of the logical and encyclopaedic information of BLOSSOM, 
and does not lead to the unwanted logical implications such as mentioned above. 
Here a concept is loosely used so as to refer to some states of affairs which do not fall 
within the range of the lexically encoded concept. `Concept loosening' is a word- 
level equivalent of utterance-level `loose talk' (for detailed analysis on `loose talk' 
see Wilson & Sperber 1985-6). 
I would like to argue that a regular explicitly indicates that the concept encoded 
by the word it modifies is to be loosened and in such a way that certain stereotypical 
properties associated with the lexical concept are the crucial properties of the new 
concept. That is, A REGULAR X forms a new concept X' by dropping the 
logical/definitional properties of X and taking a sub-set of encyclopaedic properties 
of X. X' is an ad hoc concept which is formed during on-line interpretation, and is 
not likely to be stored in long-term memory, and is variable across contexts (Wilson 
1993-4, Carston: personal communication). 
This idea leads to an interesting consequence. That is, the second conjunct in (76) 
which is generally analysed as a loose or metaphorical use and so as false, would 
now become true with the new concept BACHELOR' being incorporated into the 
proposition expressed. This provides an explanation for Lakoff's intuitions regarding 
the truth values of (63) and (64) repeated here. 
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(63) Esther Williams is a fish. (false) 
(64) Esther Williams is a regular fish. (seems to be true) (Lakoff 1972: 197) 
The new concept communicated FISH' is wider than the concept encoded by the 
word fish in that the states of affairs or set of individuals to which it can be applied 
include both those that the encoded concept refers to and some that it does not: i. e. 
the crucial point here is that it has certain stereotypical properties. However, the new 
concept communicated may well also be narrower in that the states of affairs or set of 
individuals to which it can be applied might exclude the ones which the lexical 
concept refers to if they do not have those stereotypical properties. The following 
diagram (i) might be helpful to understand this. Diagram (ii), on the other hand, 
illustrates Lakoff's view that regular bachelor cannot be said of a real bachelor and 
therefore Tom in (76) does not belong to the set of bachelors. 
Diagram (i) bachelor regular bachelor Diagram (ii) bachelor regular bachelor 
(79). 75). . 
(76 (79). (76). 
(75). 
(adapted from Wilson 1994a) 
(75) Tom is a bachelor and in fact he is a regular bachelor. 
(76) Tom has just got married but he is still a regular bachelor. 
(79) Tom is a bachelor but he is not a regular bachelor. 
In (77) (repeated below) Tom might belong to that category of people of whom it 
is relevant to say they are bachelors as this would give rise to the intended 
interpretation i. e. many contextual implications associated with bachelorhood, at less 
cost than would have been needed to literally spell them out. Here, the new concept 
formed from a regular bachelor is wider than the concept BACHELOR in that the 
set of people to whom it can be accurately applied may include both actual bachelors 
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and non-bachelors (e. g. (76)). Or in some context it may well also be narrower in 
that it will exclude certain actual bachelors who do not have the stereotypical 
properties. The example of the latter is given in (79) above. 
(77) Tom is a regular bachelor. 
In (79) Tom belongs to the bachelor category but does not belong to that subset of 
bachelors who have the stereotypical properties. For instance, Tom might be a 
highly responsible unmarried father. Here a regular bachelor encodes a new concept 
which picks out a subset of the set picked out by the concept encoded by the word 
bachelor. Considerations of optimal relevance would determine the range of 
bachelors the new concept would refer to. The contribution of the use of a regular to 
the overall relevance of (77) would be to cut down the hearer's effort for interpreting 
the word bachelor loosely by explicitly indicating the loose use of the concept. 
The use of a regular leads the hearer to drop the logical defining properties of the 
following word, focusing on certain stereotypical properties (i. e. encyclopaedic 
information), but this does not mean that it entails the negation of the logical 
properties either, as (75) above shows. 
Now is the speaker of (77) hedging? We could argue that a regular in (77) is a 
hedge as the speaker might communicate her low commitment to the truth of the 
proposition that Tom is a bachelor. This is partly attributable to the claim that the 
defining properties of the concept that follows a regular are dropped and the focus is 
on some stereotypical features derived from the encyclopaedic information of the 
concept. 
However, we would hesitate to say that a regular in (75) is a hedge as the speaker 
does not communicate her weak conviction in the proposition that Tom is a bachelor: 
i. e. the speaker believes the truth of the proposition quite strongly. As I argued in 
Chapter 1, hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon and therefore it is predictable that the 
suspension of the defining criteria can go in both ways: i. e. one is a certain degree of 
the speaker's endorsement of the criteria, and the other, not endorsing at all, a matter 
which is determined pragmatically. So the use of a regular might or might not 
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communicate the speaker's weak endorsement of the defining properties of the 
concept encoded by the word it modifies. It is a hedge just in the broad sense that it 
loosens or weakens the lexical concept it modifies. 
The adjective typical in a typical bachelor also leads the hearer to focus on 
stereotypical encyclopaedic content of the concept BACHELOR, such as leading a 
care-free life, childless etc. However, a regular and a typical are importantly 
different in their semantics, as I will show in the next section. 
3.3.4 A Typical - concept narrowing 
Let us consider (72)a. again (repeated as (80)): 
(80) Tom is a typical bachelor. 
The speaker of (80) is not only communicating that Tom is an unmarried adult male, 
but also, more crucially, that Tom has stereotypical properties of bachelors, such as 
leading a care free life etc. The logical implication, i. e., that of being an unmarried 
adult male, is of low relevance in (80). However, (80) cannot be conjoined with the 
proposition that contradicts Tom's bachelorhood as seen in (81), although that was 
possible with a regular (see (76)). 
(81) Tom has just got married but he is a typical bachelor. * 
Some further modification is necessary in order for (81) to be acceptable (see (82) 
whose second conjunct means that he behaves like a typical bachelor), or the whole 
predicate a typical bachelor has to be taken loosely or metaphorically. 
(82) Tom has just got married but he is a typical bachelor in his habits. 
In contrast with a regular which loosens a concept in that it drops the defining 
properties of the following word it modifies, a typical does not affect the defining 
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properties i. e. the logical content of the concept encoded by the following word 
bachelor. So we cannot use a typical bachelor with the conjunct which asserts 
Tom's marital status while we can use a regular bachelor in the same situation. This 
characteristic of a typical that it leaves the analytic content of the concept it modifies 
untouched is better demonstrated in (83) where it is contrasted with (84): 
(83) Esther Williams is a typical fish. (false) 
(84) Esther Williams is a regular fish. (true) 
In this example, the defining properties of the concept FISH (e. g. cold-blooded and 
(perhaps) having gills, living in water, etc. ) are not suspended when it is modified by 
TYPICAL and these are obviously not true of Esther Williams, a human being. In 
contrast with this, a regular can perfectly be used as in (84). This is because it does 
indeed suspend those defining properties of the concept FISH, making the new 
concept FISH' (constructed on the basis of the instruction encoded by regular) 
literally true of Esther Williams. 
In the last section I have argued that a regular loosens a concept and directs the 
hearer to focus on the encyclopaedic content, dropping the defining properties of the 
concept. So in (77) (repeated below) a regular is used to direct the hearer to derive 
stereotypical properties of bachelors such that Tom leads a care-free life, is childless, 
etc. 
(77) Tom is a regular bachelor. 
Likewise, a typical is used to communicate similar properties of bachelors, but this is 
not due to `concept loosening'. 
Here I would like to turn to the Relevance theory idea of `concept narrowing' 
(Wilson 1993-4) and argue that a typical in (80) explicitly requires this. There are 
people of whom it is true to say that they are bachelors. If they are unmarried adult 
males, they belong to the bachelor category. However, on any given occasion of 
utterance, people of whom it is relevant to say that they are bachelors are only a 
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subset of the bachelor category. For example, there are not many contexts in which 
we would want to say (85), though it is a true statement: i. e. the pope IS an 
unmarried adult male: 
(85) The pope is a bachelor. (? ) Wilson (1993-4) 
Wilson (1993-4) argues that in some contexts, a concept which applies to a wide 
range of objects or states of affairs is narrowed in use. The pope does not belong to 
this narrower range and therefore the utterance in (85) is unacceptable (i. e. 
irrelevant). This `concept narrowing' is not semantic but pragmatic, which enables 
us to maintain the assumption that concepts such as BACHELOR can be defined. 
That is, because of examples like (85), some (e. g. prototype theorists) argued that 
the concept BACHELOR cannot have the necessary and sufficient conditions 
UNMARRIED ADULT MALE. However, according to Wilson (1993-4), the 
concept BACHELOR does have those defining conditions and the reason that we 
hesitate to say (85) is not because it is not true, but because it is not 'relevant': i. e. in 
most contexts it does not satisfy the criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance. The word bachelor would give rise to unwanted contextual implications 
such as leading a care-free life, etc. which are not true of the pope. So (85) is 
semantically fine but will very often be pragmatically anomalous and speakers, 
observing the principle of relevance, will not say (85). 
What modification by a typical does in (80) is narrow down the set of people 
picked out from all bachelors to that range of bachelors who have stereotypical 
properties. In other words, a typical X forms a new concept X' which picks out a 
subset of the set picked out by the concept encoded by X. Tom belongs to this 
narrowed range of bachelors who have stereotypical properties. Obviously, the pope 
does not belong to this range encoded by the new concept BACHELOR' and 
therefore the predicating a typical bachelor of the pope makes a false statement. 
`Concept narrowing' is semantically motivated by concept encoded by the word u 
typical. It is, however, important to note that concept narrowing and loosening are 
generally pragmatic processes driven by optimal relevance considerations; what the 
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adjectives typical and regular do is make it explicit to the hearer which of these 
processes to carry out and what sort of properties to focus on. 
I argued that a typical encodes a concept which is dependent on the noun it 
modifies. My claim in this section is that this dependency of a typical manifests 
itself in such a way that it narrows the concept encoded by the word it modifies, so 
that the subject is claimed to belong to the narrower range: i. e. the range of 
individuals who have stereotypical as well as defining properties of bachelors. 
There may be another distinction to be made between typical and regular; they 
may encode different semantic types, a concept in the first case, a procedure in the 
second. There is no discussion in the literature, as far as I know, of the possibility of 
procedural adjectives, but I would suggest that if such a category exists, regular (and 
perhaps sort of) might be good candidates. This idea is implicit in my discussion of 
the third category of adjectives in 3.3.2 where it seemed natural to talk of regular as 
INDICATING loosening and as INSTRUCTING the hearer to perform a certain 
inferential operation on the concept it modifies. This idea is merely suggestive and 
needs much more motivation than I am currently able to give it. 
Lakoff (1972: 196) includes a typical in his `some hedges and related 
phenomena'. It intensifies the meaning of the word it modifies, i. e. in his terms 
making it more true. Contrary to Lakoff, I have reservations about calling the term in 
question a hedge as there is high speaker commitment to the defining properties of 
the concept of the word it modifies: e. g. in (80) the speaker expresses her strong 
commitment to Tom's being literally a bachelor. All elements that intensify 
commitment are obviously excluded from my characterisation of hedges. A typical 
does not seem to contribute to the higher-level explicature in which the speaker's 
lower commitment to the proposition expressed is communicated. Rather it 
contributes to the proposition expressed in such a way that it and the following word 
form a new concept which picks out a subset of the set picked out by the concept 
encoded by the word it modifies. 
So far we have seen cases of adjectives a regular and a typical. I argued that 
they make a contribution to the loosening and narrowing of the concepts encoded by 
the words they modify. I argued that the pope does not belong to the narrowed range 
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of bachelors encoded by a typical bachelor and therefore a typical bachelor cannot 
be predicated of the pope. Nor does the pope belong to the loosened range of 
bachelors encoded by a regular bachelor, and therefore a regular bachelor cannot be 
predicated of the pope either. However, technically a bachelor can be predicated of 
the pope and I would now like to turn to the use of technically which seems to have 
the effect of commenting on the use of a particular linguistic expression. 
3.3.5 Technically - metarepresentational comment 
Let us consider the following: 
(86) Tom is technically a bachelor. 
Technically in (86) directs the hearer to concentrate on the defining properties of 
bachelorhood i. e. on an unmarried adult male, indicating that whether or not Tom has 
other, say, stereotypical, properties of bachelorhood is of low relevance. Indeed, in 
some contexts it might implicate the absence of stereotypical properties of bachelors, 
and so we might want to analyse technically in (86) as having a semantics which 
narrows the range of bachelors to those who are categorically so but who do not have 
stereotypical properties of bachelors: i. e. it picks out a sub-set of the set of bachelors 
which the lexical concept BACHELOR refers to. 
However, let us consider the following context. Tom has been legally married but 
has led a life an ordinary bachelor would lead for many years. Finally, the divorce is 
established and the speaker utters (86). In this context, Tom belongs to the sub-set of 
bachelors who do have stereotypical properties of bachelors. However, the point is 
what is communicated: i. e. what is communicated is that he now belongs to the set 
of bachelors. That is, technically does not in itself narrow or loosen the range of the 
concept which it modifies. Here it is relevant enough to talk about Tom simply 
belonging to the class of bachelors. 
The implications of not having stereotypical properties of bachelorhood which are 
derived in some contexts are not due to the semantics of technically but are due to 
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pragmatic factors. Because of the focus on certain defining properties given by 
technically, the absence of the usual associations with bachelorhood may be 
communicated. This negation of the stereotypical properties of bachelorhood is a 
pragmatic matter rather than a semantic one. There must be some point in using 
technically and that point will often, though not always, be to suggest atypicality. 
The use of technically in (86) is a case of sentence adverbials which modify an 
implicit illocutionary verb of speaking and the paraphrase (87) might characterise 
this. (86) distinguishes itself from the predicate adverbial use in the following (88)- 
(89): i. e. notice that technically falls within the noun phrases `a good computer- 
programmer' and `an accomplished musician' while technically in (86) does not. 
(87) Technically speaking, Tom is a bachelor. 
(88) Tom is a technically good computer-programmer. 
(89) Tom is a technically accomplished musician. 
In (88) and (89) the speaker is expressing the technical expertise of the computer- 
programming and musicianship as opposed to, say, inspiration, creativity, 
expressiveness etc. In some contexts, the speaker might implicate the absence of 
Tom's inspiration, creativity etc. which are also important qualities of a computer- 
programmer and a musician. In such contexts, we can argue that the speaker is 
hedging. However, in a context in which the issue is not the general ability but the 
technical ability of a computer programmer and a musician, the speaker is not 
necessarily hedging: i. e. Tom's inspiration, creativity might be communicated to the 
hearer contextually. In this predicate adverbial use, it is clear that technically fully 
contributes to the proposition expressed, and I am not going to pursue this predicate 
adverbial use. 
I am interested in technically in its sentence-adverbial use whose paraphrase is 
given in (87). It is often argued that the hedge technically does not make a 
contribution to the proposition expressed. For example, Kay (1983) argues that 
technically is a hedge which makes a meta-linguistic comment on the proposition. 
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The paraphrase technically speaking might support this view that it is commenting on 
the use of a certain linguistic expression or concept. 
Further, other sentence adverbs such as frankly and seriously which can also be 
paraphrased as in frankly/seriously speaking are claimed to fall outside of the 
proposition expressed by an utterance. For example, Ifantidou-Trouki (1993) gives 
Relevance-based analyses of frankly and seriously, arguing that they do not fall under 
the scope of the proposition expressed but contribute to higher-level explicatures in 
which they modify the speaker's verb of saying i. e. saying frankly/seriously. Along 
the same line, we might be able to argue that technically in question contributes to 
the higher-level explicature in which it modifies the speaker's saying. And this way 
the meta-linguistic comment might be explicated. 
However, if technically contributes to higher-level explicature, not contributing to 
the proposition expressed, the following (90) should be perceived as contradictory as 
the speaker is saying `P but not P' at the level of the proposition expressed. (90) is 
not a contradictory remark. There are many more examples which show that 
technically appears to make a contribution to the truth-conditional content of an 
utterance. Consider (91)-(93): 
(90) Tom is technically a bachelor but, in reality, he is not. 
(91) Technically, he is innocent but, morally, he is guilty. 
(92) Technically, we can do but, in practice, we cannot because... 
(93) Technically, R. Nixon was a Quaker but, in reality, he was not. 
This complies with Wilson & Sperber's argument that "in some cases a sentence 
adverbial does seem to contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance which 
conveys it" (Wilson & Sperber 1990: 106). They give the following example to 
argue that (94)b. should be perceived as contradictory if the sentence adverbials on 
the record and off the record do not contribute to the truth-conditions of (94)b; yet 
intuitively it is not. 
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(94)a. Peter: What can I tell our readers about your private life? 
b. Mary: On the record, I'm happily married; off the record, I'm about to 
divorce. 
(Wilson & Sperber 1990: 106) 
Likewise, if technically in (90)-(93) makes no contribution to the proposition 
expressed, then they should be understood as contradictory and yet they are not. This 
shows that the term in question does contribute to the truth-conditions of the 
utterance. 
I would now like to return to the Relevance notion of `representation by 
resemblance' in order to explain how the term in question contributes to the 
proposition expressed in Relevance terms. Wilson & Sperber (1989) characterise 
`representation by resemblance' as the exploitation of the resemblance either between 
linguistic expressions i. e. linguistic forms, or between concepts/contents. A clear 
case of `linguistic form resemblance' is the case of `mention' in which a word is not 
used to refer to a particular entity in the world but to represent itself. On the other 
hand, `linguistic content resemblance' involves two representations sharing not all 
but some of their logical and contextual implications (Sperber & Wilson 1986). 
Wilson (1994: personal communication) suggests that terms such as so-called and 
so-to-speak and the sentence adverbials technically/strictly speaking might indicate 
that `resemblance in form' is exploited, communicating that a linguistic 
expression/form is spoken/used by certain criterion. For example, in (95)-(96) below 
the word violin does not refer to a particular entity in the world but merely represents 
a linguistic form i. e. a word of English which is a technical word for a fiddle. This 
can be shown in (97) which is the paraphrase of (96). In the philosophical literature, 
this kind of self-referential use of words/expressions is called `mention' as opposed 
to `use' in which a word/expression is used to pick out an entity in the world (Wilson 
& Sperber 1989: 100). 
(95) A fiddle is a violin. (Deirdre Wilson: personal communication) 
(96) Technically (speaking), a fiddle is a violin. 
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(97) `Violin' is a technical word for a fiddle. 
The linguistic form given by the word violin in (95)-(96) represents an identical 
linguistic form which is given by the word of English violin, a technical version of 
fiddle. On the other hand, what the linguistic form given by the word fiddle 
represents is the concept FIDDLE with its conceptual information such as being a 
musical instrument, creating a beautiful sound etc. Technically (speaking) which has 
a scope on the expression that a fiddle is a violin seems to indicate that `resemblance 
in form' is exploited in that expression. 
A slightly different way of viewing the situation is to say that technically tells us 
that the proposition expressed is from the view-point of some technical criterion. So 
we might be able to argue that technically in its sentence adverbial use indicates that 
the expression involves the Relevance-notion `resemblance in form' and/or it is 
uttered from a particular technical perspective. 
Let us now consider another example: 
(98) A bug is technically (speaking) an insect. (adapted from Kay 1983: 134) 
(99) `Insect' is a technical word for a bug. 
Likewise, (98) can be paraphrased as in (99) which shows that the word insect in (98) 
is not used to pick out a particular entity in the world but represents an identical 
linguistic form which is given by the word of English insect. The word bug in (98), 
on the other hand, is used to communicate the concept BUG with its conceptual 
information such as being an animal, small creatures etc. Again, technically 
(speaking) seems to indicate that `resemblance of form' is involved in the use of the 
word insect and that it is uttered from the perspective of some domain of technical 
expertise. 
Can the same argument be applied to technically in (86) (repeated below) ? 
(86) Tom is technically a bachelor. 
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In this example, Tom is used not to refer to a word of English Tom but to refer to a 
particular person called Tom in the world: i. e. this does not involve `resemblance in 
form' 
. How about the word 
bachelor? Bachelor is used to communicate the 
conceptual content of the concept BACHELOR encoded by the lexical bachelor. 
However, due to the use of technically, only a sub-set of the conceptual content 
seems to be communicated: i. e. the defining properties , unmarried adult male are 
strongly communicated to the hearer. This does not seem, then, to be a case of 
resemblance of form. 
The resemblance involved here is between the linguistic contents: i. e. the 
conceptual information of BACHELOR with a focus on the defining properties and 
that of BACHELOR. Because of the focus on defining properties, the concept 
BACHELOR in (86) might not share all the logical and contextual implications of 
the unmodified concept BACHELOR. However, they definitely share at least some 
of those implications, i. e. the defining properties, and therefore we can observe 
`resemblance in content' here. 
According to Kay (1983: 134), technically has a meaning something like "as 
stipulated by those persons in whom society has vested the right to so stipulate". In 
some contexts, this stipulation might be, as Kay (1983) suggests, attributed to certain 
experts. For example, technically or technically speaking might indicate that the 
word insect instead of bug is used as that is what experts would say when talking 
about the same object which can be referred to by the common word bug. However, 
what the use of technically focuses on in (86) i. e. the defining properties of Tom's 
being an unmarried adult male, is not only what some experts stipulate but also what 
everybody understands: i. e. the word bachelor is uttered not because some experts 
would say so. So a certain defining criterion associated with the use of technically is 
not necessarily the experts' one. 
Technically indicates that the word bachelor is used to communicate that the 
subject is a bachelor by its defining criterion rather than his being a bachelor in some 
looser sense. The crucial properties might be the logical properties of the encoded 
concept as in the case of the word bachelor: i. e. an unmarried adult male. Or they 
might be part of the encyclopaedic information of the encoded concept as in the case 
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of the word mammal: i. e. the logical entry of the concept MAMMAL would be an 
animal of a certain kind, and the encyclopaedic entry would have the defining 
information such as animals which feed their young with milk from the breast. For 
example: 
(100) A whale is technically a mammal. 
In this example, the expression technically a mammal is used to communicate the 
concept MAMMAL with the focus on the defining properties of a mammal rather 
than other properties associated with mammals such as living on land, walking 
animals, etc. all of which are stereotypic encyclopaedic properties of the concept 
MAMMAL. 
In (100) the word whale is used to communicate the concept WHALE with its full 
conceptual information. The word mammal is used to communicate a subset of the 
conceptual information of the concept MAMMAL such as defining properties due to 
the use of technically. Here, what is encoded by the word mammal and what is 
communicated by it do not share all the conceptual information but share some of it. 
So we can say that the Relevance notion `resemblance in content' is involved in 
(100). 
Schematically, we have so far cases such as the following in which (ling. 
form/content) means that `resemblance in form/content' is exploited: 
(101)a. X is technically Y (ling. form). e. g. (96) (98) 
b. X is technically Y (ling. content). e. g. (86) (100) 
(101)a-b. can be contrasted with utterances such as (102)a-b. in which there is no 
`resemblance in content/form' involved. 
(102)a. My favourite musical instrument is a violin. 
b. Tom enjoys being a bachelor. 
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That is, either `resemblance in form' or `resemblance in content' is exploited in the 
expression that technically (speaking) modifies, i. e. has scope over. Therefore, I 
might be able to argue that technically makes a meta-representational comment in 
such a way that `representation by resemblance' is involved in the expression and 
that it is uttered in accordance with a certain defining criterion, which often belongs 
to a particular domain of expertise. 
Now I said that sentence adverbs such as frankly and seriously modify the implicit 
illocutionary verb speaking. But would we want to argue that `representation by 
resemblance' is involved in the expression they modify? Consider: 
(103) A fiddle is frankly/seriously a violin. 
(104) Tom is frankly/seriously a bachelor. 
(105) A whale is frankly/seriously a mammal. 
(103) might be uttered, for example, in a context in which the hearer insists that a 
fiddle is a guitar. Here violin is not used to represent a word of English, another 
linguistic form and `resemblance in form' is not involved. Violin is used to 
communicate the conceptual content of the concept VIOLIN. In (104) the speaker is 
not communicating a sub-set of properties associated with bachelors, i. e. defining 
criteria of bachelors such as an unmarried adult male. She is communicating the 
conceptual content of the concept BACHELOR, i. e. properties of bachelors in 
general and there is no involvement of `resemblance in content'. (105) would be 
uttered in, for example, the context in which the hearer insists that a whale is a fish as 
it lives in the water. Here, not the full conceptual information of the word mammal is 
communicated as the speaker and the hearer know that a whale lives in water and a 
common association of mammal's living on land is not communicated. So 
`resemblance in content' is involved here. However, this has nothing to do with the 
adverbial but to do with contextual factors. 
(103)-(104) show that it is not always the case that the implicit illocutionary verb 
speaking sentence-adverbs modify indicates the exploitation of `resemblance in 
form/content'. This is supported by the fact that frankly and seriously can be used in 
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the utterances (102)a-b. which do not involve `resemblance in form/content', while 
technically cannot. Finally, it is clear that the relationship that technically has to the 
verb of saying and the relationship that frankly/seriously have are quite different as 
their positions relate to that show: 
(106) I say/assert/suggest frankly that P. 
(107) 1 say/assert/suggest that technically (speaking) P. 
That is frankly modifies a speech act verb while technically modifies the following 
proposition. Therefore I would like to maintain the claim that technically in its 
sentence adverbial use indicates that `representation by resemblance' is involved in 
the expression it modifies, metarepresentationally commenting that the expression is 
used in accordance with some technical criterion. 
I have said that `resemblance in form' is involved for `mention' cases while 
`resemblance in content' is involved for `interpretive use' cases (see 2.4.2-3). What 
is happening in `resemblance in form' cases is that technically indicates that the 
expression (or part of the expression) it modifies involves `mention', communicating 
that a certain word is used from some technical point of view. As it is clear from the 
paraphrases (97) and (99), this use of technically undoubtedly contributes to the 
proposition expressed. On the other hand, in `resemblance in content' cases 
technically sets a point of view, something like `from certain defining criterion' and 
it indicates that the expression it modifies does not describe states of affairs the 
speaker endorses but represents similar representations which the speaker may or 
may not endorse. Technically changes the status of the representation to an 
attributive interpretive one (i. e. attributed to some technical or defining criterion) and 
following Ifantidou (1994: 213), I claim, therefore, that it contributes to the 
proposition expressed. 
All sorts of speaker attitude can be expressed to an interpretively represented 
assumption: i. e. from no endorsement to full endorsement, or from total disapproval 
to total approval. For example, in (91) (repeated below), the speaker might hesitate 
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to say that he is innocent (i. e. disapproval) while she accepts that he is innocent from 
the technical (i. e. legal) point of view. 
(91) Technically, he is innocent but, morally, he is guilty. 
In (86) and (100) (repeated below), on the other hand, the speaker might be happy to 
say that Tom is a bachelor and that a whale is a mammal but accepts that Tom and a 
whale are so from the technical (legal/biologists') point of view. 
(86) Tom is technically a bachelor. 
(100) A whale is technically a mammal. 
Sentence adverbials such as morally, in practice, in reality, on the record, off the 
record etc. might also set a certain point of view, from which the speaker might be 
happy to endorse the propositions they modify, indicating that the expression is 
attributively (interpretively) represented. My claim then is the following: the 
semantics of technically in its sentence adverbial use encodes that `representation by 
resemblance' is involved in the proposition it modifies, which is being attributed to a 
particular technical viewpoint. 
As was argued in Chapter 1, hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon, and an 
expression which helps to communicate the speaker's low commitment in one 
context, might help to communicate the speaker's high commitment in another. The 
focus on a certain defining criterion by technically might lead to the dissociation 
from the full range of implications carried by a word/utterance or a 
concept/proposition. For example, technically in (86) (repeated below) may have a 
hedging function as it can dissociate the speaker from some of the implications i. e. 
stereotypical properties that might be communicated by the word bachelor. 
(86) Tom is technically a bachelor. 
In such a case, we can say that technically is a hedge. 
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However, in other contexts, the defining properties of Tom's being an unmarried 
man are put forward without suspending any of the stereotypical properties: e. g. 
recall the case that the divorce is established for Tom who has been married officially 
but has led a bachelor-like life for many years. In this example, Tom's stereotypical 
bachelor properties are contextual assumptions and the speaker is not communicating 
any doubt about them. Further, if (100) (repeated below) is uttered to the hearer who 
incorrectly insists that a whale is a fish, the use of technically here helps to 
communicate the speaker's high commitment by resorting to its defining criterion. 
(100) A whale is technically a mammal. 
I have said that in (86) some of the implications standardly associated with 
bachelors may be weakened and we can observe that the speaker's low commitment 
to such implications is communicated. Likewise, in the predicate adverbial cases 
such as (89) (repeated below), the speaker might communicate that Tom lacks 
professional or some other qualities of musicianship though he has technical 
virtuosity. 
(89) Tom is a technically accomplished musician. 
Then, the speaker communicates her doubt (low commitment) to Tom's professional 
ability and musicianship in general which otherwise would have been derived as 
implicatures. This satisfies our general definition of hedging as given in 
(45)(Chapter 1) in which P is any communicated proposition which includes 
implications: 
(45)(Chap 1) Hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon by which the speaker 
communicates that the speaker has limited conviction in or commitment to 
a proposition communicated by her utterance. 
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Lakoffian hedges are contrasted with the attitudinal expressions such as I suppose 
and probably as the speaker's weak endorsement expressed by these attitudinal 
expressions is manifest at the explicit level. The characterisation of hedging was 
given in (16)" (repeated below): 
(16)" Hedges are expressions which communicate the speaker's low 
commitment to the proposition that carries the main relevance or which 
weaken the speaker's commitment to a proposition which is entailed by the 
proposition expressed. 
Obviously (16)" does not apply to the three terms in question a regular, a typical 
and technically which I investigated in this section. I have argued that a typical does 
not function as a hedge but a regular and technically may do in certain contexts 
where some implicitly communicated assumptions receive low backing from the 
speaker. 
3.3.6 Last Remarks on Regular, Typical and Technically 
So far we have analysed the use of the alleged hedges a regular, a typical and 
technically and shown that they function in various ways to fill the gap between what 
is encoded by words/utterances and what is communicated by them: i. e. a regular 
loosens the concept encoded by the following word, directing the hearer to interpret 
it loosely; a typical, on the other hand, narrows the concept encoded by the 
following word, focuses on its stereotypical properties i. e. encyclopaedic information 
while maintaining its logical content, and the sentence adverbial technically indicates 
that the expression it modifies involves the Relevance-notion `resemblance in 
form/content'. 
A regular and a typical encode dependent concepts which make a contribution to 
the proposition expressed in such a way that the concepts they modify are loosened 
and narrowed respectively. On the other hand, technically in its sentence-adverbial 
use indicates that the expression it modifies involves `mention' or `interpretive 
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representation' from the view point of some technical criterion. Without any of the 
terms in question, Tom can be interpreted as being a regular bachelor, a typical 
bachelor, technically bachelor in (108): 
(108) Tom is a bachelor. 
If Tom who is married leads a care-free life of bachelors, (108) might be uttered 
instead of (73)a. (where a regular is used) involving a loose use of bachelor. Tom's 
girlfriend might utter (108) instead of (80) (where a typical bachelor is used) in an 
angry tone of voice as Tom does not want to have a committed relationship with her. 
And instead of (86) (where technically a bachelor is used), (108) might be uttered of 
Tom who has a stable family but is not married legally. However, with the use of a 
regular, a typical and technically the hearer is given explicit information regarding 
the speaker's intended interpretation, thus contributing to the overall relevance by 
reducing processing effort. 
I argued that a regular X forms a new concept X' by taking a set of stereotypical 
encyclopaedic properties of X and making them the defining properties of V. This 
new concept X' which is derived by `concept loosening' contributes to the 
proposition expressed and on such an analysis metaphorical utterances such as (64) 
(repeated below) become true statements. 
(64) Esther Williams is a regular fish. 
On the other hand, a typical X forms a new concept X' by taking over the set 
consisting of both the logical and the stereotypical encyclopaedic properties of X. 
This new concept X' which is derived by `concept narrowing' contributes to the 
proposition expressed. Now the contextual as well as logical implications are the 
new defining properties of X' and they constitute the propositional content of an 
utterance. In (72)a (repeated below) for example, the new concept BACHELOR' is 
formed to communicate that Tom belongs to the set of bachelors who have 
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stereotypical properties. (72)a. cannot be correctly uttered of Tom if he does not 
have certain stereotypical properties. 
(72)a. Tom is a typical bachelor. 
Lastly, I have argued that technically tells us `mention' or `attributive interpretive 
use' as well as the involvement of some defining criterion/point of view. In the case 
of `mention', it indicates that a technical name/expression is given while in the case 
of `attributive interpretive use' it indicates that the expression it modifies does not 
describe states of affairs but represents another representation from which the speaker 
may dissociate herself. To this representation, all sorts of speaker attitudes can be 
expressed: i. e. from her disapproval as in (90)-(93) (repeated below) to her approval 
as in (109). 
(90) Tom is technically a bachelor but, in reality, he is not. 
(91) Technically, he is innocent but, morally, he is guilty. 
(92) Technically, we can do but, in practice, we cannot. 
(93) Technically, R. Nixon was a Quaker but, in reality, he wasn't. 
(109) A whale is technically a mammal but, for most ordinary folk, it is a fish. 
I have argued that the proposition that falls within the scope of technically does 
not describe a state of affairs i. e. is not used descriptively, but is an interpretive 
representation and so represents by resemblance. 
I have so far analysed the sentence adverb technically whose meaning is different 
from its predicate-adverbial use observed in (88)-(89) (repeated below): 
(88) Tom is a technically good computer-programmer. 
(89) Tom is a technically accomplished musician. 
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Here technically means `with regard to the skill required for master- of subject' 
while technically in (90)-(93) does not have this meaning ((91) repeated here, for 
convenience). 
(91) Technically, he is innocent, but, morally, he is guilty. 
It might appear that technically (speaking) as a sentence adverb never has this 
meaning. However, consider (110): 
(110) Technically, the pianist's performance was perfect. (Papi 1992: 123) 
Here technically means the skill of piano performance and has a distinct semantics 
from the use that alters the following proposition to a case of `representation by 
resemblance'. So, the sentence adverb technically seems to be at least two ways 
ambiguous. So I have to make it clear that the indication of `representation by 
resemblance' does not apply to the sentence adverb technically whose meaning 
concerns technical skill. 
For the `skill' meaning of technically, Papi (1992) suggests a Relevance-based 
analysis. Papi (1992: 139) considers technically in (110) to be a domain adverb 
which contributes to the proposition expressed by providing access to encyclopaedic 
information such as `skill' and restricting the range of properties which can be 
associated with the perfection of the pianist's performance: e. g. her performance 
might not be perfect in other domains such as expressiveness and art. In this 
analysis, technically does not indicate an interpretive representation, and the 
proposition expressed by (110) seems to describe a state of affairs, to which 
technically contributes. 
3.4 Conclusions 
In Chapter 1I mentioned the problem with analysing the speaker's hedging 
expressed by the main-clause I think and probably as part of the Gricean what is 
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implicated. Further, in this chapter (3.2.4) I pointed out more specifically why it is 
problematic to do so. First of all, the truth-conditionality test shows that these 
expressions contribute to the proposition expressed by an utterance, which meshes 
with our intuition that they should be treated as part of the explicit content of an 
utterance. Secondly, `conventional implicature' under which the speaker's limited 
commitment is supposed to fall, is a poorly defined concept and does not seem to 
form a discrete category. 
In the Gricean framework, the explicit content of an utterance is what is said, i. e. 
the proposition expressed by an utterance. The expression of limited conviction does 
not always fall under this category, as seen in the true parenthetical use of I suppose, 
which had to be captured by the notion of what is implicated. Relevance theory, on 
the other hand, provides a more developed account of explicit content including the 
concept of 'higher-level explicature' which can capture this limited conviction. 
Thus, the speaker's hedging expressed by true-parenthetical I suppose has been 
shown to be communicated to the hearer as a higher-level explicature. 
The main-clause counterpart I suppose/think and the sentence adverb probably 
are, on the other hand, shown to contribute to the proposition expressed by the truth- 
conditionality test in 3.2.5. I have, however, argued that the use of the main-clause I 
suppose/think does not always communicate the speaker's weak endorsement. That 
is, they might be used descriptively in Urmson's sense, and might describe the 
psychological state of speaker's supposing/thinking. In such a case, I argued that the 
speaker is not hedging and the main relevance lies with the speaker's explicit attitude 
I suppose/think as well as the embedded proposition. Hedging expressed by the 
attitudinal expressions was thus characterised as the communication of the speaker's 
weak endorsement to the proposition that carries the main relevance, i. e. the one 
which gives rise to the main bulk of the contextual effects. 
Among the Lakoffian hedges, I mainly focused on a regular, a typical and 
technically as they present interesting distinctions in Relevance theory. I argued that 
a regular and a typical respectively `loosen' and `narrow' the concepts encoded by 
the words they modify. For example, a regular bachelor requires the construction of 
a new concept which designates those adult men (bachelors and non-bachelors) who 
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have certain stereotypical properties associated with bachelors. Or a typical bachelor 
encodes a new concept which refers to bachelors who have stereotypical properties, 
i. e. picks out a subset of bachelors, which excludes those who do not have 
stereotypical properties. 
The sentence adverbial use of technically, on the other hand, indicates that the 
Relevance-notion of `representation by resemblance' is involved in the expression it 
modifies. For example, in (98) (repeated below) the word insect is used not to 
communicate the conceptual content of the concept INSECT encoded by the word 
but to communicate an identical linguistic form encoded by a word of English insect. 
(98) A bug is technically (speaking) an insect. 
Further, in (86) (repeated below) the word bachelor is used to communicate a certain 
conceptual content, i. e. properties of bachelors with a focus on the defining criteria. 
(86) Tom is technically a bachelor. 
Here the different linguistic contents are manipulated: i. e. the linguistic content the 
word bachelor encodes and what is communicated by this use of the word might 
share only some analytic and contextual implications. That is, technically a bachelor 
might be bachelors by definition and refer to all bachelors in the world who do not 
have stereotypical properties : e. g. bachelors who have a family. In such a case, what 
is communicated is only a subset of the information attached to the lexical concept 
BACHELOR and it is argued that the expression technically modifies is being used 
attributively (interpretively). 
Lastly, as to the question whether the terms in question are hedges, I excluded a 
typical from the class of hedges as its use does not communicate the speaker's weak 
endorsement tc the proposition expressed, nor of implicatures. On the contrary, 
some implicatures associated with the word it modifies are put forward rather 
strongly by the use of a typical. On the other hand, I argued that a regular and 
technicall i' can be hedges in some context: i. e. a regular contributes to the 
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dissociation of the speaker from the defining criteria of the word it modifies while 
technically, from some implications associated with stereotypical properties of the 
word/utterance it modifies. 
I argued that the terms in question encode properties that seem to direct the 
pragmatic processes of loosening/narrowing and the recognition of 
metarepresentational use. This might suggest that these hedges encode procedural 
semantics (mentioned in 2.3.1) which constrains the hearer's inferential processes, 
rather than contributing to conceptual representations. However, conceptual 
enrichment by inferential processes are not uncommon for adjectives such as rich 
(for a student/lawyer? ), tall (for a basket-ball player/a three-year-old child? ) and 
good (at what? ) which are standardly analysed as encoding conceptual semantics. 
Typical seems to function in much the same way as good, i. e. to encode a concept 
which operates on the concept encoded by the word it modifies to give a new concept 
with a narrower designation. I suggested that a regular (in the Lakoffian hedging 
sense) might be a candidate for a procedural semantics instructing a hearer to loosen 
the following concept in a particular way, though this possibility needs much more 
investigation. Technically contributes to the proposition expressed as I argued in the 
last section, but its effect is to change the status of the following proposition to a case 
of `representation by resemblance'. 
In this chapter I have given Relevance-based analyses of so-called hedges in 
English. In the next chapter, I will examine Japanese examples of so-called hedging 
devices. I will give Relevance-based analyses of utterance-final particles ne, tte, ka 
and kedo which have been considered as hedges; Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) 
analyse ne as a hedge as shown in 1.4.3; they analyse the Tzeltal quotative particle 
lah as a hedge and analogously they would analyse the Japanese quotative particle tte 
as a hedge; Kendal (1985) analyses ka as expressing the speaker's weak commitment; 
and Mizutani & Mizutani (1987) argue that utterance-final kedo makes an utterance 
softer and more polite. I will firstly point out problems with the analyses of these 
particles in the past and then show that Relevance notions can provide convincing 
analyses of these words. 
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Chapter 4: Hedged Utterances in Japanese 
4.1 Introduction 
Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) argue that the human concern for 'face' holds across 
cultures and hedging is one of many 'face'-preserving politeness strategies. They 
(1978: 146) argue that in some languages hedging is encoded in particles and give 
the Japanese particle ne as an example. Brown & Levinson base their argument on 
R. Lakoff s claim (1972: 919) that by using the particle ne "a normally obligatory 
rule of conversation is relaxed". However, as I pointed out in 1.4.3 her analysis is 
inadequate. First, her rule of conversation that a declarative force in general 
demands a hearer's belief is too strong and, second, ne used in an assertion 
sometimes has the effect of seeking a hearer's agreement, which is not a suspension 
of the requirement that the hearer believe the proposition expressed. For example, ne 
in `It's cold today ne (= isn't it? )' uttered on a freezingly cold day does not suspend 
the claim for the hearer's belief in the freezingly cold weather. 
It is true that in some contexts ne can communicate the speaker's hedging i. e. the 
speaker's limited conviction in the proposition expressed by the utterance. For 
example, the use of ne in (1) might communicate that the speaker does not give her 
full endorsement to the proposition that John is Irish, compared with (2) which does 
not have this particle. 
(1) John is Irish ne. (John is Irish, isn't he? ) 
(2) John is Irish. 
However, ne used in (3) shows that this is not always true. Ne used in (3) has the 
effect of urging the hearer to admit (agree) that he hasn't cleaned up and certainly 
does not decrease the degree of 'face-threat'. 
(3) You haven't cleaned up yet ne. 
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In the next section I will attempt to give a full analysis of the particle ne and isolate 
its intrinsic semantic meaning that carries across all contexts. I will show that in the 
terms of Relevance theory this meaning contributes to a higher-level representation. 
Another Japanese particle I will consider in this chapter is utterance-final tte, 
which, like the Tzeltal particle lah that Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) analyse, 
functions as a quotative, or hearsay particle. As with all hearsay particles, tte can 
communicate the speaker's limited commitment by putting responsibility for the truth 
of the utterance in someone else's hands. For example, suppose someone asks me 
whether Kyoto is a beautiful town and worth visiting or not, I can hedge by 
appending tte as in (4) when I am not sure about it. 
(4) Kyoto is a beautiful town and worth visiting tte. 
However as I mentioned in 1.4.3 hearsay lexicals do not always communicate the 
speaker's limited conviction as demonstrated in (5) whose reading is that people say 
that Kyoto is a beautiful town and that is also the speaker's view. Here tte is used to 
communicate what is said about Kyoto in general and there is no hedging element 
there. 
(5) Kyoto is a beautiful town and worth visiting tte and I believe it is indeed so. 
So it is incorrect to analyse this particle as encoding hedging: in fact hedging is a 
pragmatic phenomenon as argued in Chapter 1 and though tte can be a hedge in one 
context, it is not always so. In 4.3 I will explicate the hearsay function of tte in the 
Relevance-based framework. 
According to Brown & Levinson (1978: 154), the Tzeltal dubitative particle mak 
which is translated as 'perhaps', 'I guess' softens an assertive force and sometimes 
turns a statement into a question. This amounts to saying that questions can be 
placed along the continuum of the speaker commitment, mak being placed at the 
weak end of the continuum, of course. However, as I mentioned in 1.4.3 there is a 
crucial difference between (6) and (7): i. e. the proposition with the speaker's weak 
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commitment and the proposition represented as a question in which the speaker 
communicates nothing as regards her belief in the propositional form of the 
utterance. 
(6) I guess that Kyoto is a beautiful town. 
(7) Is Kyoto a beautiful town? 
In the same spirit, Kendal (1985) places the Japanese question particle ka along 
the speaker commitment continuum and analyses ka as encoding the speaker's weak 
commitment to the truth of the proposition. In 4.4, I will turn to the Relevance-based 
notion of representation of a `desirable thought' which can be contrasted with 
descriptive representations such as the one in (6) that describe a state of affairs, and 
point out problems in analysing ka as expressing the speaker's weak commitment, or 
as encoding the illocutionary force of asking. 
Lastly, I will give a Relevance-based analysis of the utterance-final use of kedo 
which is readily translated as English 'but' or 'although'. Many authors claim that one 
of the ways of talking politely in Japanese is to use utterance-final kedo (Mizutani & 
Mizutani (1987: 26), Ogino et al. (l 983: 65), Sakuma (1983: 107)) because this use of 
kedo conveys the speaker's reserved attitude. Again I argue that this reserved attitude 
is not an intrinsic semantic meaning of kedo but a result of an interaction between the 
semantics of kedo and the context in which kedo-appended utterances are processed. 
I will show how these politeness effects are derived in the light of Relevance theory. 
Let me first turn to the particle Ne. 
4.2 Japanese Sentence-Final Particle Ne 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Japanese grammarians agree that sentence-final particles including ne do not affect 
the proposition expressed by an utterance and that their primary function is to 'act 
upon the addressee' (Haga 1953: 59, Watanabe 1953: 26-27, Saji 1956: 26-31, etc. ). 
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However, they do not clarify what it means to act upon the addressee and I feel we 
need an explicit account of the intrinsic nature of ne in terms of the hearer's utterance 
interpretation process. In this section, I will make an attempt to arrive at the 
semantics of this particle. I will first look at kinds of usage listed by the National 
Language Research Institute (1951): 
(8) Exclamation 
e. g. Baka ne. Anta wa hitori ni narya shinai. 
silly! you alone will not be 
`How silly (of you to have such an idea)! You won't be left alone. ' 
(9) Speaker's insistence 
e. g. Kohii to chiisana pan dake desu kara ne. 
coffee and tiny bread only were since 
`Since there were only coffee and a tiny bread roll, you know. ' 
(10) Seeking for agreement, encouraging a response 
e. g. Anna daisuisei wa mettani arawarenai deshoo ne. 
Such big comet rarely appear will 
`Such a big comet will rarely come into sight, won't it? ' 
(11) Questioning 
e. g. Nan to kaite aru ne? 
what written is 
`What is written (there)? ' (National Language Research Institute 1951) 
The alleged differences among these four uses are not clear at all: e. g. some 
might argue that in (11) the speaker is encouraging the hearer to respond to her 
question and so this utterance should be under (10). Furthermore, in all of the 
examples above, the same aspect of meaning such as exclamation, speaker's 
insistence etc. can be communicated to the hearer even without ne, if an 
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appropriate tone of voice and contextual information are given. This shows that 
none of the above uses is intrinsic to this particle. Now what is the intrinsic nature 
of this particle? I will first show that existing analyses of ne are not accurate and 
then present a Relevance-based analysis of ne. 
4.2.2 Problems with Existing Analyses 
4.2.2.1 Uyeno (1971) 
Uyeno (1971) analyses Japanese sentence-final particles including ne within the 
framework of generative semantics and presents detailed sociolinguistic constraints 
on the use of these particles. She argues that ne can be associated with at least four 
underlying performative verbs: i. e. `state', `ask', `order' and `suggest'. For 
example, Uyeno (1971) would argue that (10) and (11) above have the following 
underlying structures: 
(12) The speaker STATES that such a big comet will rarely come into sight. 
(13) The speaker ASKS what is written (there). 
Although Uyeno (1971: 125) claims that ne cannot be appended to exclamative 
sentences, this needs further consideration as (8) and the following (14) show. What 
makes an utterance exclamative in Japanese is basically an exclamatory tone of 
voice. Words such as nante ( =what a ...! ) and maa/waa (= dear! /boy! ) might be 
used but such words do not have to be used. So, Uyeno (1971) would have had to 
include `exclaim' in the underlying performative verbs: 
(14) Nante takai n deshoo ne! 
how expensive is s. f. p. 
`How expensive! ' (s. f p. = sentence-final particle) 
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According to Uyeno (1971: 12), "Generative semantics claims the illocutionary 
force of a sentence is to be represented in logical form by the presence of a 
performative verb which may or may not appear overtly in the surface form of the 
sentence. " Therefore, the underlying performative verbs ne can be associated with 
might indicate the range of illocutionary forces an utterance with ne can have: i. e. 
ne can be associated with the force of stating e. g. (10), force of asking e. g. (11). 
force of exclaiming e. g. (14), force of ordering e. g. (15), and force of suggesting e. g. 
(16) (shimashoo/shinai-n-desu-ka = let's/why don't you constructions). 
(15) (Mother to her little boy) Katazuke nasai ne. 
tidy up imp. inflection, s. f. p.? 
`Tidy up, will you? ' 
(16) Nichiyoo wa eiga ni ikimashoo ne. 
Sunday film to let's go s. f. p.? 
`Let's go to see a film on Sunday, shall we? ' 
So ne can be associated with just about every speech act verb; then what job does it 
do in indicating anything about speech act/illocutionary force to the hearer? Ne does 
not appear to perform the function of picking out any particular illocutionary force, 
i. e. it is not obviously an illocutionary particle. 
Naturally, linguistic clues or other clues such as contextual information etc. are 
necessary to determine which illocutionary force ne is associated with. For example, 
in (11) the illocutionary force `ask' is indicated by the use of an interrogative nan (= 
what) and it is on the basis of this that ne in (11) is to be associated with the 
underlying performative verb `ask'. Clearly, aspects of linguistic form other than 
the particle ne are indicating a specific illocutionary force of an utterance and ne 
does not even constrain the choice of the illocutionary force of the utterance. 
Then, it seems natural to conclude that ne is better not analysed as intrinsically 
associated with any particular illocutionary force. 
Uyeno (1971: 131) also makes the more plausible claim that the particle ne gives 
the effect of softening the basic nature of each illocutionary force: e. g. an imperative 
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force can be softened by using ne and so can an assertive force. This claim has led 
R. Lakoff (1972: 919) to argue that the use of ne allows conversational rules such 
as the maxim of truthfulness to be suspended, and Brown & Levinson (1987: 146) 
to argue that the Japanese sentence-final particle ne hedges on illocutionary forces. 
These seem better ideas than ne being an illocutionary force indicator. However, 
as I argued in 1.4.3, if Mother utters (15) with an angry tone of voice, this ne- 
appended version does not communicate less force than the version without ne. That 
means ne in (15) does not necessarily soften the imperative force of the utterance. So 
the claim that ne weakens the illocutionary force of an utterance, is not entirely 
adequate, either. 
4.2.2.2 Tsuchihashi (19 8 3) 
Tsuchihashi (1983: 361), following Givon (1982), argues that Japanese sentence- 
final particles "seem to represent the lexicalisation of a non-discrete speech act 
continuum between what has been traditionally labelled as 'declarative' and 
'interrogative"'. According to them, types of speech acts are non-discrete categories 
and they argue that there exists a coherent speech act continuum ranging from 
assertions to questions on which Japanese sentence-final particles including ne and 
modals are placed. However, this analysis ignores the fact that ne is sometimes 
associated with exclamatives as in (8) and (14), and imperatives as in (15): i. e. her 
declarative-interrogative continuum does not cover exclamatives and imperatives. 
Tsuchihashi (1983: 374) places an auxiliary verb daroo (= may be) near the 
interrogative end of the continuum and the sentence-final particle ne near the 
declarative end. This implies that ne has more assertive force than daroo and daroo 
has more questioning force than ne. However, as (17) shows, we have a 
combination daroo-ne about which she gives no explanation. 
(17) Soto wa ame daroo-ne. 
Outside rain may be-s. f. p. 
`It may be raining outside, don't you think? ' 
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She might want to argue that the two different forces associated with daroo and ne 
off-set each other and daroo-ne is placed between the two on her continuum. 
However, (17) clearly shows that this is not the case: i. e. daroo indicates the 
speaker's limited conviction in the proposition expressed by (17) with or without ne 
appended while ne indicates that the speaker is seeking for the hearer's agreement 
with or without the modal daroo. The assertive force of (17) (weak due to daroo) is 
indicated by the utterance being of declarative sentence type, rather than by the 
sentence particle ne. Neither in (17) nor in the examples in the previous section does 
ne have anything to do with assertive force, and there does not seem to be any reason 
to place ne on the declarative-interrogative speech-act continuum. 
It is true that some declaratives could be said to have question force although they 
are not in the interrogative mood. For example, when a speaker expresses her 
uncertainty towards the proposition expressed by an utterance, the hearer's response 
might sound as if he was replying to an ordinary interrogative. For example, the 
reply `Yes, it is' to the declarative (17) might lead some people to analyse (17) as an 
interrogative. Then, ne should better be placed near to the interrogative end and the 
whole conception of declarative-interrogative continuum does not hold. 
The point is that Tsuchihashi fails to distinguish linguistic mood (a semantic 
matter) and illocutionary force (a pragmatic matter). Weak assertions in the 
declarative mood are still semantically declarative and are distinct from 
interrogatives. Even in a declarative with the speaker's weak commitment, the 
utterance represents a state of affairs whose factuality the speaker weakly believes (as 
declarative syntax indicates). 
On the other hand, an ordinary interrogative does not represent a proposition 
which can be straightforwardly analysed in terms of truth-conditions. This is because 
the proposition represented is not endorsed by the speaker: i. e. in the case of Yes-No 
interrogatives, the speaker does not know the truth of the proposition represented, 
and in the case of Wh-interrogatives, the proposition is incomplete (the speaker does 
not know 'who', 'where'. etc. ) and truth-conditions cannot be assigned to it. 
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In Relevance-terms, declaratives are 'descriptive' representations which describe 
states of affairs, i. e. can be assigned truth-conditions, while interrogatives are 
'interpretive' representations which do not represent states of affairs but some other 
similar representations. The proposition expressed in the declarative mood, however 
weak the assertive force, is a descriptive representation while an interrogative is an 
interpretive representation. It is true that a declarative can be used interpretively as 
seen in the irony `It's a lovely day' uttered when it is raining badly. However, the 
point is that an interrogative is specialised for interpretive use, while a declarative is 
not. They encode different types of representation and cannot be placed on the 
same continuum, though they may give rise to similar effects in context. 
Now, as against Tsuchihashi, there might appear to be a case for ne in (17) 
(repeated below) as indicating an interrogative and in fact when the response (18) 
follows, the status of (17) as an interrogative might appear to be firm. 
(17) Soto wa ame daroo-ne. 
outside topic-marker rain maybe - s. f p. 
`It may be raining outside, don't you think? ' 
(18) Iya futte imasen yo. 
No, fall isn't s. f. p. (strong assertion) 
`No, (rain) isn't falling. (= No, it isn't)' 
This might be due to the function of ne being 'acting upon the addressee' as is 
generally claimed by Japanese grammarians (Haga 1953: 59, Watanabe 1953: 26, 
Saji 1956: 31 etc. ), or more specifically due to the function of this particle being 
'seeking the hearer's agreement' as discussed by Mizutani & Mizutani (1987: 133). 
That is, by seeking the hearer's agreement, (17) communicates that the speaker 
wants a response from the hearer: this gives it some question force, as the translation 
into an English tag-question further suggests. 
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However, what about the case of ne used in a strong assertion as in (19)A? 
Nobody would argue that the following (19)A is an interrogative (indicated by ne) to 
which B responds: 
(19)A: Zettaini gogo 
For sure afternoon 
wa ame da ne. 
rain copula s. f. p. 
`For sure it will rain this afternoon. ' 
B: Iya furi masen yo. 
No, fall is not s. f. p. 
`No, (rain) won't falling (= No, it won't)' 
Here again, the function of ne seems to be 'seeking for the hearer's agreement'. 
However, as seen in this example, this function of ne is not particularly related to 
the force of asking, nor to the force of asserting: i. e. in (17) and (19)A it is the use of 
daroo (auxiliary verb meaning 'will/may') and zettaini (adverb meaning 'for sure'), 
respectively, that affects the assertive force of the utterances. It follows then that 
placing the particle ne on the declarative-interrogative continuum is unfounded since 
ne is not more strongly associated with either assertive or question force. 
4.2.2.3 Kendal (1985) 
Kendal (1985: 172) does not stipulate any particular relation between ne and 
illocutionary force types or speech act types as Uyeno (1971) and Tsuchihashi (1983) 
do. She argues that Japanese sentence-final particles and modals can be placed on 
a speaker commitment scale ranging from strong to weak. According to Kendal 
(1985: 171), "commitment refers to a willingness to be held accountable to the truth- 
conditional content and illocutionary force of an utterance". Here, the relation 
between speaker commitment and truth-conditional content/illocutionary force is 
unclear. 
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By speaker commitment, she might mean a greater or lesser degree of strength or 
conviction toward the truth-conditional content and illocutionary forces such as 
`telling', `asking', `warning' etc. For example, when a speaker `tells' strongly, she 
might want to indicate that she is strongly committed to the truth of the 
proposition expressed by an utterance. When the speaker `warns' strongly, she 
might want strongly that the event expressed by the warning will not come true 
for the sake of the hearer. And when the speaker `asks' strongly, it might mean 
that the speaker strongly demands the hearer's response. 
According to Kendal (1985: 171), using ne shows that speakers would like the 
hearer to confirm what they say. She admits this is a simplistic characterisation, as 
there are cases of ne being used to just pretend that the speaker wants confirmation 
in order to be polite (e. g. see (19)A). Here, she does not clarify the relation between 
the particle ne and speaker commitment, either. Seeking for confirmation would 
generally indicate that the speaker is less than fully certain. However, in (19)A the 
speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition expressed and yet ne is used. 
Thus, seeking for confirmation, as claimed by Kendal (1985: 171), does not have a 
direct relation with speaker commitment to the truth-conditional content of an 
utterance. If there is a relation between ne's function of seeking for confirmation and 
speaker commitment, Kendal has to make it explicit. 
Let me nevertheless present Kendal's argument. Like Tsuchihashi (1983), 
Kendal (1985) considers ne to indicate stronger commitment than daroo (auxiliary 
verb meaning 'will/may') does, but again she does not talk about the combination 
daroo-ne which I discussed in the last section: 
(20) (strong)........ yo....... ne....... ka...... daroo....... (weak) 
(only relevant s. f. ps and modals are given) (adapted from Kendal 1985: 171) 
She (1985: 171) places yo (see (18) and (19)B) nearer to the strong end of speaker 
commitment than ne. However, in the following utterance (21) ne is used to 
convey the mother's insistence on the son's agreeing to tidy up and replacing ne with 
yo in (21) does not make her insistence any stronger. 
165 
(21) Katazukenasai ne. 
tidy up, I say! 
(It is clear to Mother and her son that he has to tidy up and Mother says to him in an 
angry tone of voice) 
So it is not always the case that ne indicates weaker speaker commitment than 
yo: i. e. the speaker wants only weakly the state of affairs described by (21) to come 
true. As for the speaker's commitment to the truth-conditional content, ne can be 
used in both weak and strong assertions (see (17) and (19)A respectively). 
That is, ne can be used when commitment expressed is both weak and strong, and 
this shows that ne cannot in fact be associated with a particular point on a scale of 
commitment. Thus, the analyses of ne in terms of speech act/ illocutionary force 
types and speaker commitment fail. I would like to suggest a new analysis of this 
particle and then to try to locate it within the Relevance-based framework. 
4.2.3 Reanalysis of Ne 
4.2.3.1 Showing/Seeking Agreement 
Ne is a sentence-final particle. This is a syntactic notion and as for the function of 
this type of particle in utterance interpretation, the only feature agreed by Japanese 
grammarians is that sentence-final particles do not fall within the scope of the 
proposition expressed (Watanabe 1953: 27, Saji 1956: 26, etc. ). So the following 
utterances have the same truth-conditional content: 
(22) Pan wa kirei desu. 
Paris topic marker beautiful is 
`Paris is beautiful. ' 
(23) Pari wa kirei desu ne. 
Paris topic marker beautiful is s. f. p. 
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`Paris is beautiful, isn't it? ' 
Does the particle ne then affect the speaker's propositional attitude? The answer 
seems to be 'No'. As shown in the last section, I have argued that ne cannot be 
associated with any specific level of commitment. Ne can be appended to 
utterances in which sentential attitudinal adverbs such as tabun (= probably) and 
zettaini (= for sure) are used and it can be appended to auxiliary verbs such as daroo 
(= will/may be) and nichigainai (= must be). Ne in tabun-ne/daroo-ne and zettaini- 
ne/nichigainai-ne does not further convey weakened and strengthened speaker 
commitment respectively. Contrary to Brown & Levinson (1987), ne itself is not a 
hedge which communicates the speaker's limited commitment. Ne has some other 
function than modifying strength of propositional content or attitude. 
Japanese grammarians seem to agree that the primary function of the sentence- 
final particle ne is to 'act upon the addressee' as in seeking the addressee's agreement, 
as seen in the example (17) (Haga 1953: 59, Watanabe 1953: 26, Saji 1956: 31). 
Mizutani and Mizutani (1987: 133), analysing politeness in Japanese, state that 
"several sentence (final) particles are used in conversation to express the speaker's 
feelings and attitude toward the listener". According to Mizutani & Mizutani 
(1987: 133), ne is used either to show agreement or to seek the hearer's agreement. 
For example: 
(24) Honto ni soo desu ne. 
Certainly so is s. f. p. 
`That's certainly true, isn't it? ' 
(25)A: Ii otenki desu ne. 
Lovely weather is s. f. p. 
`Lovely day, isn't it? ' 
B: Ee, soo desu ne. 
Yes, so is s. f. p. 
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`Yes, isn't it? ' 
(26)A: Kore de juubun deshoo ne. 
This enough will be s. f. p. 
`This is enough, don't you think? ' 
B: Saa, chotto tarinai kamo shiremasen. 
Well, a little insufficient may be 
`Well, it may be a little insufficient. ' 
(Mizutani & Mizutani 1987: 134) 
Ne in (24) and (25)B is considered to show speaker agreement with what the other 
person has said(Mizutani & Mizutani 1987: 133). In (25)A and (26)A, on the other 
hand, A seeks B's agreement and B does or does not agree with A as seen in (25)B 
and (26)B respectively. 
Ne can also be used to carry focal stress and express certain attitudes. Consider: 
(27)A: Atsui desu ne. 
hot is s. f. p.? 
`It's hot, isn't it? ' 
B: Nee. 
'Isn't it (just). ' 
Here the particle is pronounced 'nee' and it expresses the speaker's attitude to the 
proposition that it is hot. The speaker of (27)B might not like the hot weather and 
communicates her displeased attitude. 
Other than that, however, it seems that ne can be used to communicate the 
speaker's desire to share with the hearer the proposition expressed by a ne-appended 
utterance. In cases of (24) and (25)B in which ne is considered to show agreement, 
this particle seems to communicate the speaker's desire that the hearer understands 
that they share the view/belief which the propositional form expressed by the 
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utterance represents. (24) and (25)B sound more polite than the corresponding 
versions without ne appended, and Mizutani & Mizutani (1987: 133) argue that this 
particle is a linguistic device of politeness to express friendliness and intimacy 
(positive politeness in Brown & Levinson's term) like tag-questions in English. 
According to Brown & Levinson (1987: 103), 'claiming common ground' is a 
positive politeness strategy. The use of agreement phrases is one means of 
complying with this politeness strategy as seen in (28)B, but the particle ne which 
additionally communicates the speaker's desire to 'claim common ground' would 
make (28)B sound even more polite. 
(28)A: Kyoo mo atsui desu ne. 
today too hot is s. f. p. 
`Today is again hot, isn't it? ' 
B: Honto ni soo desu. Iya ni narimasu yo. 
Indeed so is fed up become s. f. p. 
`Indeed, it is. I'm fed up with this. ' 
Now Mizutani & Mizutani (1987: 34) state that in (25)A and (26)A ne is used to 
seek agreement. This is another way of saying that ne is used to communicate the 
speaker's desire to establish 'common ground'. If it is desired that the proposition 
expressed is established as common ground between the speaker and the hearer, it is 
also desired that the hearer would agree with what the speaker said. It follows that 
the speaker is seeking agreement. 
In (25)A, the speaker is uttering what is obvious to the hearer (suppose that A 
and B are outside, looking at the blue sky). (25)A cannot achieve relevance by 
communicating that it is a lovely day today, which is a redundant piece of 
information. But rather, it achieves relevance by communicating explicitly (by 
using ne) that the speaker has a desire to 'establish common ground'. This way, the 
speaker can be polite and fulfil the social function of 'greeting'. In fact, (25)A 
cannot function as a greeting if ne is not appended. 
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It is true that 'lovely weather' is already common ground (or, at least, mutually 
manifest) for the speaker and the hearer. However, by using ne. the speaker's desire 
to establish this piece of information as common ground is explicitly communicated 
to the hearer. So ne has a function of communicating the speaker's desire to establish 
the proposition expressed as common ground with the hearer, which would be taken 
to be a positive politeness strategy in (25). 
On the other hand, (26)B appears to be a reply to (26)A and ne in (26)A might be 
taken to convey 'questioning' as in (11) presented by the National Language Research 
Institute. However, as I argued, the proposition expressed by (26)A is used 
descriptively and is endorsed by A: i. e. A is uttering what A believes (even if A 
believes only weakly) and is seeking to establish this proposition as common ground 
although, in fact, she does not succeed in this case. This is indicated by (26)A being 
a declarative sentence type, and ne does not change (26)A into an interrogative. 
Now I have said that ne communicates explicitly the speaker's desire to establish 
that she and the hearer share an idea/opinion with the hearer. From this it follows 
that the speaker is seeking agreement. That is, the speaker (= A) desires to share 
with the hearer (= B) the opinion that this is enough, i. e. to share the proposition 
expressed by (26)A. In other words, the speaker desires to get the hearer's 
agreement, i. e. seeks agreement. It might appear that the particle ne communicates 
that the speaker desires that she and the hearer establish the proposition expressed as 
part of their mutual knowledge (or, in Relevance theory terms, their mutual cognitive 
environment). Therefore, some might claim that ne encodes meaning such as (29): 
(29) The speaker desires that she and the hearer establish the proposition 
expressed as common ground. 
However, in figurative utterances such as (30) and (31), ne does not communicate 
the speaker's desire that she and the hearer establish the (false) proposition expressed 
as common ground, but her desire that she and the hearer establish implicatures 
given rise to by the utterance as common ground. 
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(30) Yamada san wa hotoke san desu ne. 
Mr. Yamada topic marker Buddha is s. f. p. 
`Mr. Yamada is Buddha, isn't he? ' 
(31) Orikoo san desu ne. 
a smart child is s. f. p. 
`You are a smart child, aren't you? ' 
(Mother to her little boy who has spilt milk) 
In (30) which is a metaphor, it is clear that neither she nor the hearer would 
believe the truth of the proposition that Mr. Yamada is Buddha. What is 
communicated here is a range of implicatures concerning Mr. Yamada's kindness, 
wisdom and generally fine character. It is these that the speaker wants to establish as 
common ground with the hearer. For example, the speaker would like to share with 
the hearer the same opinion on Mr. Yamada such that he is very kind which is a 
standard implicature of the utterance that someone is Buddha. So ne here 
communicates the speaker's desire that the hearer share with her belief in the 
implicated assumptions. Also in (31), which is an irony, it is clear that neither the 
speaker nor the hearer will believe the truth of the proposition that the little boy is 
a smart child. However, by using ne, Mother is conveying to the child that he 
would as well agree that he is, for example, a clumsy boy. Again, ne here 
communicates the speaker's desire that she and the hearer establish implicatures, i. e. 
what is communicated by (31), as common ground. So we need to revise (29) as in 
(32): 
(32) The speaker desires to establish the assumptions communicated by the 
utterance as common ground 
However, ne appended to exclamatives and interrogatives as in (8) and (11) does 
not appear to indicate speaker's showing or seeking agreement. Therefore, (32) 
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might not appear to apply to ne appended to exclamatives and interrogatives. In the 
following sections, I will look into the use of ne in exclamatives and interrogatives. 
4.2.3.2 Ne Appended to Exclamatives 
In Relevance theory exclamatives which involve the use of exclamative words such 
as nante (=what a... ! /how ... 
!) are not descriptive truth-conditional representations but 
they are interpretive representations. They encode an incomplete thought or 
incomplete logical form and do not describe a state of affairs: i. e. the speaker's 
attitude expressed is therefore not descriptive but interpretive as discussed in 2.4.2. 
Additionally they encode information that she has in mind its relevant completion 
and that the pragmatic completion of an incomplete logical form is relevant to the 
speaker. Let us again consider (8) and (14) which have exclamative force: 
(8) Baka ne! 
silly s. f. p. `How silly of you! ' 
(14) Nante takai n deshoo ne! 
how expensive is s. f. p. 
`How expensive (it) is! ' 
The above utterances can have exclamative force whether ne is there or not. Also, 
ne neither weakens nor strengthens the effect of exclamation in (8) and (14): i. e. it is 
intonation that affects this. As I have already argued, the semantics of ne has no 
particular relation with exclamative force, nor with the strength of the force. 
On the other hand, ne is not excluded from being appended to exclamatives as 
seen in (8) and (14). As for (8), it can be argued that it is in fact a declarative 
sentence though uttered with exclamative tone of voice, and the translation might 
better be You are silly, aren't you?! ' rather than `How silly! '. However, (14) is 
definitely an exclamative sentence which involves the use of nante (an interjective 
meaning 'what a... ! ') and interpretively represents a relevant (=desirable) thought. So 
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with ne appended, the speaker communicates that she wants to establish as common 
ground the relevant thought that is a true completion of the incomplete logical form 
`It is --- expensive' encoded by (14): That is, the assumption the speaker desires to 
establish as common ground is a relevant (= desirable) thought that is a true 
completion of the incomplete logical form encoded by an exclamative. Hence I 
claim that ne appended to exclamatives also communicates (32). 
Contrary to this, Uyeno (1971: 117) claims that ne cannot be appended to 
exclamatory sentences (see 4.2.2.1). Although her claim is descriptively incorrect, it 
highlights one important fact which is that exclamatives are basically expressions of 
the speaker's state of mind, whether uttered to herself or to the hearer, and the use of 
ne can be anomalous in certain exclamatives. For example, suppose I panic because 
of a sudden big earthquake in Tokyo. I might exclaim `Earthquake! ' regardless of 
the presence of the hearer. Using ne in this situation is incorrect, or rather it does 
not communicate the state of emergency. The anomaly lies with the incompatibility 
of two goals: expressing panic or warning of danger, on the one hand, and the social 
nicety of seeking to establish common ground with the hearer, on the other hand. 
Communicating states of emergency such as an earthquake or a fire requires the 
most efficient possible means, and generally overrides all other concerns at the time, 
so this additional piece of information (32) which is not sufficiently relevant in an 
emergency would only decrease the communicated effect of emergency. Of course 
if I would like to communicate that I am not panicking in the big earthquake, I can 
utter "Earthquake ne" with a calm tone of voice and seek the hearer's response. This 
piece of evidence confirms that this particle has an element of 'acting upon the 
addressee' as claimed by Japanese grammarians. 
Let us now turn to interrogatives and see if ne used in interrogatives also 
communicates (32). 
4.2.3.3 Ne Appended to Interrogatives 
I have argued that the questioning force of (11) (repeated below) is not due to the use 
of ne but due to the interrogative pronoun nan(i) (= what). Like exclamatives, 
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interrogatives encode that they interpretively represent relevant (= desirable) 
thoughts as I argued in 2.4.2. 
(11) Nan to kaite-aru ne? 
what quotative written-is(plain) s. f. p. 
`What is written (there)? ' 
What is communicated by an interrogative is that the completion of the 
propositionally incomplete assumption is relevant to the hearer and/or to the speaker. 
In a genuine question, the speaker regards the completed proposition i. e. the answer 
as being relevant to herself while in a rhetorical question she regards the answer as 
being relevant to the hearer. My assumption here is that ne in an interrogative 
indicates the speaker's desire to establish the answer as common ground. 
Now (11) is an example of male speech used e. g. by a senior staff speaking to his 
junior colleague. When ne is appended to a plain form auxiliary (i. e. aru as opposed 
to arimasu (polite form)) interrogatives, the utterance seems to be either male speech 
or non-standard speech. Let us consider a neutral standard case of interrogative to 
which ne is appended: 
(3 3) Ima nan ji desu ka ne? 
now what-time is(polite) Q-marker s. f. p. 
So what time is it now? 
(33) without ne being appended can be uttered to a stranger on a street when the 
speaker wants to know what time it is now. However, (33) in which ne is appended 
cannot be uttered in the same situation. This is because the speaker of (33) 
communicates by using ne her desire to establish the answer as common ground. 
The speaker has of course no reason to establish any common ground with a stranger: 
i. e. (33) would perplex a stranger. 
Of course if the speaker is in a curfew-imposed town when it is getting dark, then 
knowing the time would be relevant to everybody who is in the town. In such a 
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context (33) can be uttered to a stranger: i. e. the time is relevant to the speaker of 
(33) and ne communicates that she desires the answer (i. e. the time) to be established 
as common ground because the time is relevant to the hearer as well (especially when 
it is getting dark). 
Here it is important to point out the following. The speaker of (33) seems to be 
claiming some 'common ground' with the hearer which has been claimed to be a 
positive politeness strategy (Brown & Levinson 1987: 117). Yet this does not lead to 
politeness in the context: on the contrary, (33) could sound rude to a stranger. This 
is because (33) communicates that the speaker's asking a question is expected, i. e. the 
speaker assumes that she is entitled to ask a question. This assumption of the speaker 
violates one of the negative politeness strategies which is 'Don't presume/assume' 
(Brown & Levinson 1987: 144). This means that the speaker should avoid 
"presumptions about the hearer, his wants, what is relevant or interesting or worthy 
of his attention" (Brown & Levinson 1987: 144). 
Brown & Levinson (1987: 147) list ne as a hedging device on illocutionary forces 
which comes under the negative politeness strategy 'Don't presume/assume'. 
However, (33) demonstrates that there is something contradictory in Brown & 
Levinson's framework of politeness. Ne, on one hand, satisfies a positive politeness 
strategy which is 'establishing common ground' as shown in the last sections, while 
on the other hand it violates another politeness strategy which says 'Don't 
presume/assume'. Ne in (33) does not weaken the question force, so again, Brown & 
Levinson's analysis of ne as weakening illocutionary forces (one of negative 
politeness strategies) does not hold. 
Now if (33) is a genuine question, the hearer of (33) without ne appended knows 
that the answer will be relevant to the speaker. In Relevance terms, the enrichment 
of the incomplete representation (incomplete due to the wh-interrogative 'what time') 
which is (interpretively) represented by the interrogative utterance is relevant to the 
speaker. Interrogatives are non-truth-conditional interpretive representations. The 
use of ne in (33), on the other hand, indicates the speaker's desire to establish the 
answer as common ground. 
Let us now consider (11) (repeated below) as a rhetorical question. 
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(11) Nan to Kaite-aru ne? 
what quotative written-is(plain) s. f. p. 
`What is written (there)? ' 
Take a context in which there is a big sign saying `no smoking' which a boss and his 
secretary can see clearly, and yet the secretary has started to smoke. In this case, the 
answer is relevant to the secretary rather than to the boss. 
It is not the use of ne that makes (11) a rhetorical question. (11) can be a 
rhetorical question without ne appended in this context. The speaker (the boss) 
regards the enrichment of the incomplete assumption as being relevant to the hearer 
(the secretary) rather than to himself. A rhetorical question is an interpretive 
representation and what the hearer is reminded of is the pragmatically enriched or 
completed proposition communicated by the utterance. Now the use of ne again 
additionally communicates the speaker's desire to establish the answer i. e. the 
completed assumption as common ground. That is, the boss makes it explicit that the 
sign `no smoking' stands as their common ground. 
Ne used in any sort of question in fact communicates the speaker's desire to 
establish the answer as common ground. That is, the speaker indicates her desire to 
establish the completed proposition as common ground. Now can we say that the 
answer is an assumption communicated by an interrogative? 
An interrogative encodes an interpretive representation of an incomplete (wh- 
interrogative) or complete (Yes-No interrogative) logical form as was discussed in 
2.4.2. The hearer assumes that the completion of the logical form is relevant to the 
speaker and/or to the hearer. The answer to an interrogative is a fully propositional 
completion of the logical form communicated by the interrogative. In rhetorical 
questions, the speaker has in mind a fully propositional form (i. e. the answer) and we 
can argue that by using ne she wants to establish the assumption communicated by an 
interrogative as common ground. However, in genuine questions the speaker does 
not have in mind the relevant completion i. e. the answer and so she cannot be 
communicating it. 
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Interrogatives encode that they interpretively represent relevant (= desirable) 
thoughts. As argued, the speaker does not always know the answer i. e. does not 
always have in mind the relevant completion. So the speaker communicates that she 
wants to establish as common ground the relevant thought which is interpretively 
represented by the interrogative. 
So we have to modify (32) as in (32)': 
(32)' The speaker desires to establish as common ground the assumptions 
communicated by her utterance or the assumptions interpretively 
represented by her utterance as desirable (i. e. relevant). 
Now let us examine whether ne used in hortative (= Let's constructions) also 
communicates (32)'. 
4.2.3.4 Ne Appended to Hortatives 
Clark (1993: 191) analyses the semantics of let-constructions within the framework 
of Relevance theory and suggests that "to utter a let's-construction with propositional 
content P is to communicate that P represents a thought entertained as a description 
of a state of affairs which is potential, and desirable from the speaker's point of 
view. " This analysis is based on the analysis of imperatives discussed in 2.4.1. For 
example, the imperatives (34) and (35) are analysed as representing potential and 
desirable states of affairs, i. e. as describing states of affairs (that the hearer will go 
straight and turn right, and that the hearer will bring the speaker a cup of tea) which 
are compatible with what we know about this world (hence potential) and are 
desirable from the view point of the hearer and the speaker respectively. 
(34) Go straight and turn right. (when instructing how to get to the station) 
(35) Bring me a cup of tea. 
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The difference is that a potential state of affairs described by hortatives is desirable 
from the speaker's point of view while that of imperatives is either from the 
speaker's or hearer's point of view as shown in (34)-(35). 
Along the same line, we can analyse the hortative (16) (repeated below) as 
representing a state of affairs (that the speaker and the hearer will go to see a film on 
Sunday) that is potential and desirable from the speaker's point of view. Hortatives 
encode descriptive representations and they are contrasted with exclamatives and 
interrogatives in the previous sections which encode relevant (= desirable) thoughts 
i. e. interpretive representations. 
(16) Nichiyoo wa eiga ni iki-mashoo ne. 
Sunday topic-marker film to go-let's s. f. p. 
`Let's go to see a film on Sunday, shall we? ' 
The speaker of (16) communicates the potentiality and desirability of the state of 
affairs that the speaker and the hearer will go to see a film on Sunday and the 
additional ne in (16) indicates that the speaker communicates that she wants to 
establish this assumption as common ground. So (32)' applies in the case of 
hortative, too. 
I would now like to discuss why ne is often considered to have politeness effects. 
4.2.4 Ne and Politeness 
Ne is often considered to have intrinsically a social function (Brown & Levinson 
1987, Mizutani & Mizutani 1987 etc. ). Indeed, there is a case in which the use of ne 
is essential to serve a certain social purpose. For example, comments on weather 
such as (25)A and (27)A (repeated below) are common greeting phrases in Japanese, 
and the use of ne is crucial here. 
(25)A: Lovely day ne? 
B: Yes, it is so ne. 
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(27)A: It's hot ne? 
B: Nee. 
The utterances without ne appended would not function as greeting. This is 
predicted from the semantics of ne I have argued so far. Ne communicates that the 
speaker desires to establish assumptions or an interpretively represented assumption 
communicated by the utterance as common ground. That is, when the speaker 
presents a proposition P, she is presenting the extra information concerning inter- 
personal relations by communicating her desire to establish P as common ground 
with the hearer. Further, the reason that led Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) etc. to 
analyse ne as a hedging device is that it can take away the assertive force. That is, 
the information (32)' is contextually implemented as seeking agreement as seen in 
(25)A/(27)A and satisfies a social goal such as `not being coercive' which has 
softening effect. 
However, this sort of effect is not something ne semantically encodes. Ne can be 
used in utterances which bluntly threaten the hearer's face and sometimes it even 
increases the degree of face-threat: i. e. it cannot function as a politeness strategy 
device. For example, criticism is a face-threatening act and yet ne can be used to 
increase the effect of criticism as seen in the following: 
(36) You've broken the glass ne. 
Here ne communicates (32)' i. e. the speaker's desire to establish common ground, 
and it has the effect of urging the hearer to admit (agree) that the hearer has broken 
the glass. So 'claiming common ground' is not always a politeness strategy. It 
depends on what the speaker wants to establish as common ground. 
Social approaches concerned with politeness have not been able to capture the 
intrinsic nature of ne: i. e. Brown & Levinson (1987) and Mizutani & Mizutani 
(1987) face counter-examples in which ne has effects of not communicating anything 
regarding speaker politeness, or, on the contrary, of her being rather blunt to the 
hearer as seen in (36). 
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This justifies our turning to the more cognitive approach of Relevance theory 
which seems promising in explaining the particle ne in terms of the hearer's 
interpretation processes, while capturing social implications such as politeness when 
they arise. In fact, Relevance theory is the only theory which seems to provide us 
with the necessary notions to explain the true feature of ne, as the other main 
pragmatic theory, i. e. Gricean theory, cannot do this job. That is, the Gricean notion 
of `what is said' cannot explain the information (32)' which is the semantics of ne 
(i. e. its intrinsic meaning) and yet does not fall within the scope of the proposition 
expressed. The Gricean notion of conventional implicature seems to be the only 
possible candidate for ne which communicates (32)' regardless of the context. 
However, I have pointed out the problems with this notion in 3.2.3 and it is not 
reasonable to resort to this notion simply on the basis that the function of ne does not 
seem to be captured by the concepts of what is said or conversational implicature. 
As mentioned, Japanese grammarians claim that sentence-final particles do not 
fall within the scope of the proposition expressed (Watanabe 1953: 27, Saji 1956: 26, 
etc. ) and I have followed this line. The standard truth-conditionality test, however, 
cannot be employed, as sentence-final particles, like true parentheticals such as I 
suppose, fall outside of the scope of if... then.. or .... or.... 
So we have to appeal to our 
intuition that for example (22) and (23) (repeated below) are truth-conditionally 
identical though they might have different pragmatic effects. 
(22) Paris is beautiful. 
(23) Paris is beautiful, ne? 
Indeed, both (22) and (23) are true if and only if Paris is beautiful, and therefore we 
can argue that ne does not constitute a part of the proposition expressed. 
In Relevance theory, a linguistic element which does not contribute to the 
proposition expressed by an utterance is not necessarily a part of the implicit content 
of the utterance. A linguistic element can encode a piece of information which 
contributes in some way to a higher-level explicature. In the following section, I will 
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try to explain (32)' in the light of this Relevance-theoretic concept and see how ne 
contributes to the hearer's utterance interpretation processes. 
4.2.5 Ne as a Procedural Constraint on Higher-level Representations 
I have claimed that the semantics of ne is to indicate the speaker's desire to establish 
communicated assumptions as common ground. This is the information that the 
particle ne encodes although aspects of the content of the assumptions which the 
speaker desires to establish as common ground have to be inferred contextually. 
What we have to consider now is the type of information ne encodes: i. e. conceptual 
or procedural, the distinction I mentioned in 2.3.1. If it is conceptual, it encodes a 
concept which should be able to go through logical operations such as denial. 
However, this is not possible. For example, the semantic content of ne in (23) 
(repeated below) cannot easily be denied (see (37)a. ) while the proposition expressed 
which is a conceptual representation can (see (37)b). 
(23) Paris is beautiful ne. 
(37)a. That's not true. You don't desire to establish this as common ground. (? ) 
b. That's not true. Paris ISN'T beautiful at all. 
(37)a. sounds odd and this indicates that the semantic content of ne is most likely 
procedural and cannot be brought to our consciousness and challenged easily. So I 
might argue that the semantic content (32)' is procedural and constrains the 
formation of a higher-level explicature rather than being a part of the proposition 
expressed. 
In cases of non-figurative declaratives, imperatives, exclamatives, hortatives and 
interrogatives, the assumption the speaker desires to establish as common ground is a 
pragmatic development of the logical form of the utterance to which ne is appended. 
For example, ne in (25)A (repeated below) encodes the information (32)' (repeated 
below) and the utterance (25)A communicates (38): 
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(25)A: Lovely day ne. 
(32)' The speaker desires to establish as common ground the assumptions 
communicated by her utterance or the assumptions interpretively 
represented by her utterance as desirable (i. e. relevant).. 
(38) The speaker desires to establish as common ground that it is a lovely day. 
(38) is a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance (25)A and so (38) 
is, what Wilson & Sperber (1990: 98) call, an explicature, more specifically a higher- 
level explicature which is constructed by enriching a linguistically encoded logical 
form to the point where it expresses a determinate proposition and then embedding it 
under a higher-level description. Now in cases of interrogatives, exclamatives, 
imperatives and hortatives such as (33), (14), (21) and (16), ne encodes (32)' and the 
utterances communicate the higher-level explicatures (39)-(42) respectively: 
(39) The speaker desires to establish as common ground the relevant thought that 
the time is 
(40) The speaker desires to establish as common ground the relevant thought that 
it is ---- expensive. 
(41) The speaker desires to establish as common ground that the hearer will tidy 
up his room. 
(42) The speaker desires to establish as common ground that the hearer and the 
speaker will go to see a film on Sunday. 
Can we then argue that ne encodes a semantic constraint on a higher-level 
explicature? The answer is 'No, not always'. 
utterance (30) (repeated below): 
(30) Mr. Yamada is Buddha ne. 
Let us go back to the figurative 
Here the particle ne encodes the information (32)'. However, the assumption that the 
speaker desires to establish as common ground is not the pragmatically completed 
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propositional form given by (30), but implicatures given rise to by the utterance. 
(30) might communicate: 
(43) The speaker desires to establish as common ground that Mr. Yamada is very 
kind. 
(43) is definitely not a higher-level explicature: i. e. it is a development of an 
implicature given rise to by (30) which is then embedded into a higher-level 
description whose construction the particle ne linguistically constrains. I would like 
to call a higher-level representation such as (43) i. e. a development of an implicature, 
a higher-level implicature by analogy with the term 'higher-level explicature'. 
It seems that ne constrains the construction of higher-level representations 
whether they are higher-level implicatures or higher-level explicatures. Ne is not the 
only linguistic element whose content can make a contribution at either the explicit 
or implicit level. Please in English seems to be another. It encodes the information 
that the speaker is making a request. Yet the content of the request may be the 
propositional content expressed by e. g. (44) or it may be an implicature given rise to 
by e. g. (45) (Robyn Carston: personal communication). 
(44) Please get off my foot. 
(45) Please, you are standing on my foot. 
The word please might constrain the formation of higher-level representations, 
whether explicatures or implicatures, and so both (44) and (45) might communicate: 
(46) The speaker is requesting the hearer to get off her foot. 
(46) can be a higher-level explicature which is a development of the logical form 
given by (44), or a higher-level implicature given rise to by (45). To this extent, ne 
and please seem similar as both can contribute to either the level of explicature or 
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implicature. It seems correct then that ne linguistically encodes (32)' and constrains 
the formation of higher-level representations. 
4.2.6 Conclusions 
The sentence-final particle ne does not contribute to the proposition expressed, nor 
does it affect the speaker's propositional attitude to that content. I claim that this 
particle linguistically encodes the information (32)' and constrains the formation of 
higher-level representations, whether they are higher-level explicatures or 
implicatures. 
Although it is true in many contexts that ne has politeness implications, I have 
given cases where this is not so and argued that the semantics of ne is not 
intrinsically a marker of politeness. Ne encodes (32)' i. e. encodes procedural 
information, which can be spelled out conceptually, and as in (47) which can operate 
either as an explicature or as an implicature: 
(47) The speaker desires to establish as common ground that ............ 
Ne is non-truth-conditional and procedural in that it does not contribute to the 
proposition expressed, nor does it encode a concept. (47) can operate either at the 
level of explicature or implicature and the propositionally completed assumption or 
interpretively represented assumption can be communicated to the hearer either as a 
higher-level explicature or as a higher-level implicature. 
The sentence-final particle ne is often associated with illocutionary force or 
speaker commitment to the proposition expressed (Uyeno 1971, Tsuchihashi 1983 
and Kendal 1985). However, I have shown in Section 4.2 that this line of analysis 
does not explain the full range of data adequately. I have instead presented a 
Relevance-based analysis which can provide all the necessary notions for the 
explanation of the way ne contributes to the hearer's utterance interpretation 
processes. Let us now turn to the Japanese hearsay particle tte. 
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4.3 Japanese Sentence-final Particle Tte 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Another way of communicating the speaker's weak commitment in Japanese is to use 
the so-called hearsay particle tte which can be translated as `so I hear' or 'so they say'. 
Hearsay is a type of evidentivtj which marks that the speaker does not have direct 
evidence for the information and therefore its use might often communicate that the 
speaker has weak commitment to the truth of the information. According to the 
National Language Research Institute (1951), the Japanese sentence-final particle tte -a 
colloquial version of the complementiser to - has the meanings of reporting and 
echoing. I will however try to give a unified account of its semantics which explains 
the various aspects of its meaning including reporting and echoing. 
Unlike evidential adverbials such as evidently, apparently, allegedly studied by 
Ifantidou-Trouki (1993), the particle tte does not seem to encode a concept. As I 
argued for ne in the last section, it is difficult to bring its meaning to consciousness. 
Nevertheless, tte clearly does encode some sort of information which affects 
interpretation. I shall argue that the semantics of tte is not conceptual but is procedural 
as I argued for ne and constrains the construction of a higher-level explicature (to be 
clarified in Section 4.3.7). 
Tte and to can be used utterance-medially to embed a complement clause. In such a 
case, they are complementisers and do not have a feel of hearsay. This is not surprising 
as a hearsay particle marks that the proposition expressed by the utterance as a whole is 
second-hand information and it helps the hearer to recover the higher-level explicature 
of the utterance which expresses the evidential status of the proposition expressed. 
Embedded sentences or clauses, on the other hand, are obviously not explicated in this 
way (Wilson 1994). 
Ifantidou (1994: 219) argues that tte might be a genuine hearsay particle, so 
identifying the information encoded by tte may shed light on the adequate description 
of the nature of hearsay particles more generally. I shall use the concepts of Relevance 
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theory to provide a convincing description and explanation of the nature of the particle 
tte. 
4.3.2 Hearsay as an Indicator of Diminished Speaker Commitment 
It has been argued that the main function of a hearsay particle is to indicate diminished 
speaker commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed (Palmer 1986; Chafe 
1986). That is, a hearsay element is treated as a case of an evidential which indicates 
the kind or amount of evidence the speaker has for her utterance. Hearsay marks that 
the utterance is based on second-hand information, i. e. the speaker says what she has 
heard and might not herself have direct evidence for. For example, (48) can 
communicate the speaker's limited commitment compared with its counterpart which is 
not appended with tte. 
(48) Mary wa kashikoi tte. 
Mary topic smart s. f. p. 
'Mary is smart, I hear/so I'm told. ' 
However, low speaker commitment is not an inevitable outcome of the use of tte. 
The speaker might be attributing the utterance to an authority in whom she has absolute 
trust, though she has no direct evidence of her own, and she could thereby 
communicate her own high commitment. As an evidential treatment would correctly 
predict, the speaker could indicate that she has reliable (hearsay) evidence for her 
utterance. For example: 
(49) According to her teacher, Mary is smart tte. I always knew it. 
(50) According to the weather report, it is sunny today tte. I knew it would be. 
So a hearsay particle itself does not indicate a particular degree of speaker 
commitment. A reliable source of evidence is expressed in according to... phrases in 
(49) and (50): i. e. it is not the hearsay particle tte that indicates this. The speaker's 
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varying levels of commitment (weak and strong) are communicated in the tte-appended 
utterances (48) and (49)/(50), but, again, this is not what tte itself linguistically 
encodes. Different degrees of speaker commitment are contextually inferred with the 
help of tte indicating that the proposition expressed is second-hand information. So 
Palmer's claim that the main function of hearsay is to indicate a diminished speaker 
commitment is descriptively inadequate. In the following sections, I will use 
Relevance theory ideas to describe and explain the function of this hearsay particle. 
4.3.3 Utterance-final Tte and Attributive Use 
According to a study done by the National Language Research Institute (1951: 74-5), 
tte is used when introducing or reporting someone's speech (pretty much standard 
hearsay usage) or when echoing back a part or whole of the immediately preceding 
utterance. For example, (48) as a reply in (51) and (52) illustrates these usages. (51)B 
is a reporting use and (52)B is an echoic use: i. e. (51)B reports the teacher's speech and 
(52)B echoes a part of the immediately preceding utterance. 
(51) A: What did Mary's teacher say? 
B: Mary ga kashikoi tte. 'Mary is smart, she says. ' 
(52)A: Our teacher said that Mary is smart. 
B: Mary ga kashikoi tte! 'Mary is smart, did she say that? Goodness! ' 
Now (48) (=(51)B, (52)B) can also have the interpretation given in (53) which shows 
that tte can be used when echoing a past utterance of the speaker herself. 
(53) `She is smart, did I say that? Goodness! ' 
In Itani (1991) 1 argued that tte marks the Relevance-theoretic notion attributive use, a 
sub-case of interpretive use. Ifantidou (1994: 219) seems to assume that tte is 
appended only to direct quotations which involve resemblance of linguistic form and 
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therefore it is not a case of interpretive use involving resemblance of content. 
However, tte-appended utterances do not have to be direct quotations: i. e. they can be 
quite a loose paraphrase. For example, the original utterance of the teacher in (51) 
might have been something like `Mary got straight As' which has a resemblance-in- 
content relation with (51)B. 
As I outlined in Chapter 2, propositional forms can be used to represent either a state 
of affairs in the world or to represent other propositional forms. In the former case, 
which Sperber & Wilson (1986) call descriptive representation, the relation between 
the representation and what is represented is truth-conditional. In the latter, which 
Sperber & Wilson (1986) call interpretive representation, the relation is one of logical 
resemblance, i. e. the sharing of analytic and contextual implications. 
In Sperber & Wilson's framework, every utterance is an interpretation of a thought 
of the speaker's, in the sense that the propositional form of the utterance is intended to 
resemble the propositional form of the thought communicated to a greater or lesser 
degree. However, some utterances are 'interpretive' in a second order way, in that the 
thoughts they 'interpret' are themselves 'interpretations' of other thoughts or of 
utterances. 
In Relevance theory, this second order interpretation, called 'interpretive use', 
characterises, on the one hand, the use of language in reported speech and echoic 
utterances, and on the other, the meaning encoded by interrogatives and exclamatives. 
Blass (1989: 325) argues that the particle re in Sissala marks this second order 
interpretation as it is used under verbs expressing propositional attitudes such as belief 
and desire, in questions and answers to questions, and in ironical utterances as well as 
to indicate hearsay evidence. So she analyses this so-called hearsay particle as an 
'interpretive use' marker. 
I showed in Itani (1991) that tte has a narrower range of functions than re and 
encodes a sub-case of this second-order interpretation: i. e. it is used in reported speech 
and echoic utterances but not in interrogatives and exclamatives. The utterances (51)B, 
(52)B, (48) and the interpretation in (53) are cases in point. They are a sub-case of the 
second order interpretation. i. e. they all involve the attributive aspect of language use. 
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The propositional form of (48) does not describe a state of affairs but 'interprets' the 
propositional form of a thought or an utterance attributed to someone other than the 
speaker (e. g. (51)B (52)B), or the speaker in the past (e. g. (53)). In the following 
section, I will pursue this analysis. 
4.3.4 Hearsay Particles and Attributive Use 
(48) with the interpretation (52)B and (53) (repeated as (48)' below) and the following 
(54) are cases of echoing, the second usage listed by the National Language Research 
Institute (1951). On a Relevance-based analysis, echoic use is a sub-case of attributive 
use with the crucial characteristic that it involves an expression of attitude by the 
speaker to the original utterance. 
(48)'Mary wa kashikoi tte! 
'Mary is smart, did she say that? (for (52)B)/did I say that? (for (53)) Goodness! ' 
(54) Oh, so it can remove any stain tte. 
(Expressing the speaker's disgust at the overstated claims made for the new product) 
adapted from Itani (1991)) 
However, there is a crucial restriction on the sort of echoic utterances tte can be 
attached to. It can mark direct/indirect speech and paraphrase, but it cannot echo 
implications recovered by inference without actually being heard. So while (54) does 
not have to be an identical reproduction of the original T. V. commercial, tte cannot be 
appended to a contextual implication such as (55) which the speaker might recover 
from the T. V. commercial, a point I shall return to shortly. 
(55) So it can remove this wine stain tte. * 
Sperber & Wilson (1986: 238) argue that the attributive aspect of the second order 
interpretation i. e. interpretation of someone else's utterance/thought, or the speaker's 
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utterance/thought in the past, can achieve relevance in either of the following two ways. 
It can achieve relevance by informing the hearer that the speaker in the past or someone 
else has said something or thinks something as seen in (48) and (51)B, or it can achieve 
relevance by informing the hearer of the fact that the speaker has in mind what some 
individual(s) say/think and has a certain attitude toward it. The latter is called echoic 
use and (48)' and (54) are cases in point. 
For example, (48)' echoes what the teacher/the speaker said and the main relevance 
i. e. the point of the utterance lies, not with reporting what the teacher/the speaker said, 
but with the attitude of surprise and disbelief the speaker expresses toward it. Likewise 
in (54), the utterance echoes what the T. V. commercial has said and its main relevance 
lies, not with reporting it, but with the attitude of scorn and disbelief the speaker 
expresses toward it. This is a fairly typical case of irony. (48)' and (54) can be 
interpreted as ironical in Japanese even if they are not appended with tte, which shows 
that attributive use does not have to be marked linguistically, i. e. with a linguistic 
device such as a particle, but may be pragmatically inferred. 
Linguistic devices certainly include intonation and there might exist a certain type 
of intonation associated with the kinds of attitude the speaker conveys in irony. 
However, here I take linguistic devices to mean those that encode a certain type of 
information, whether it is a concept, or a non-truth-conditional indicator of attributive 
use. It is unlikely that a certain intonation solely encodes irony but nothing else, as 
irony can be expressed in various ways with various attitudes, i. e. subtly, obviously, in 
an exaggerated way and so on, which are standardly accompanied by different tones of 
voice and intonation. 
Now, the use of a linguistic device indicating attributive use makes it explicit to the 
hearer that a certain utterance does not directly describe a state of affairs, but interprets 
an attributed utterance, thus increasing the overall relevance of an utterance by reducing 
the processing effort involved in arriving at the intended interpretation. The English 
translations of (48)' and (54), on the other hand, would not involve any attributive use 
marker and the hearer would have to infer this aspect of the intended interpretation 
without any explicit linguistic clue such as particles. 
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Now if tte does mark all types of attributive use as I argued in Itani (1989/199 1) and 
if Sperber & Wilson are correct that ALL cases of irony are echoic, then it should be 
possible for all ironical utterances to be appended with tte. However, this is simply not 
the case. In addition to (55) above, consider the following: 
(56) Ii ten o torimashita tte. * 
'So you've scored a good mark, tte. ' 
(As a teacher hands back a badly scored exam to her pupil) 
(57) This is a lovely party tte. * 
(When the speaker intends to communicate that the party is boring) 
(58) You can tell he is upset tte. * (Wilson & Sperber 1989/1992) 
(Coming upon a customer complaining in a shop, blind with rage and making a 
public exhibition of himself) 
(56)-(58) without tte would be perfect ironies in which the speaker dissociates 
herself from the proposition echoed and is expressing her disapproving attitude toward 
it. The proposition expressed in (56)-(58) is not used to describe a state of affairs, but 
is interpretively used to represent an attributed thought, according to Sperber & Wilson, 
where the thought concerned may be peculiar to a particular individual or may be a 
general hope or expectation that people tend to have, i. e. it need not have been verbally 
expressed. 
If tte marks all types of attributive use, (56)-(58) should be acceptable but the fact 
that they are not indicates that tte is restricted to the hearsay function. What is this 
'hearsay function'? Blass (1989: 300) discusses the minimalist position which says that 
hearsay particles should be used only for reporting actual utterances; reported thought 
would be excluded. She goes on to show that re in Sissala has a much broader range of 
functions and could be appended to all the irony cases above. 
It seems, though, that tte conforms with the minimalist hypothesis: it can only be 
appended to utterances whose propositional forms are attributed directly, not to 
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thoughts, but to utterances, whether spoken or written. In (56)-(58) the propositional 
forms represent attributed thoughts which the speaker dissociates herself from, and they 
have never been heard in the past, i. e. they are not attributed to utterances. The 
standard understanding of hearsay is that it is a kind of indirect evidence: i. e. the 
utterance is what the speaker heard or what someone or the speaker in the past said. 
A definition of hearsay particles can nevertheless be built around the Relevance 
notion of attributive use. I claim that the main function of a hearsay particle is to 
indicate that the propositional form of an utterance is attributed to an utterance of 
someone else or the speaker in the past, i. e. it is `quotative'. Whether the utterance 
achieves relevance as a reported speech or as an echoic utterance is a matter which is 
determined pragmatically. What tte itself encodes is that the utterance it is attached to 
is based on another utterance. Along this line of analysis, the unacceptability of (56)- 
(58) can be explained as follows: i. e. the hearsay particle tte is appended to utterances 
whose propositional forms are directly attributed to someone's thoughts, but not to their 
utterances, and so there is a conflict with the encoded content of tte. 
This definition of a hearsay particle naturally accounts for the straight case of 
reported speech, i. e. one of the ways the second-order interpretation achieves relevance. 
Let us consider (51) again: 
(51) A: What did Mary's teacher say? 
B: Mary wa kashikoi tte. 'Mary is smart, she said. ' 
The function of tte in (51) is to indicate that the propositional form does not describe a 
state of affairs, but represents another propositional form which is attributed to the 
teacher's utterance. And it achieves relevance by informing the hearer that the teacher 
has said that Mary is smart. 
In this section, I have argued that the function of a hearsay particle is to indicate that 
the propositional form is attributed to an earlier utterance. I have shown that this 
definition explains straightforward cases of hearsay: reported speech, and certain echoic 
utterances, including certain types of irony i. e. those which involve the echo of an 
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earlier utterance. This supports the Sperber & Wilson's unified account of irony in 
terms of echoic use. 
Tte is the colloquial version of to which is used utterance-medially and is standardly 
analysed as a predicate-complementiser (Nakau 1973 Josephs 1976). Indeed, it could 
be argued that (51)B is an elliptical utterance and 'Mary's teacher said' has to be 
recovered as part of the proposition expressed. Then, tte itself would be a predicate- 
complementiser. In the following section I will look into the predicate-complementiser 
to, as the analysis of to also applies to utterance-medial tte (though the level of 
formality differs). I hope this may give further insight into the analysis of utterance- 
final use of tte and point to the possibility of a unified account of the final and medial 
uses. 
4.3.5 Utterance-medial Use of To 
Kuno (1973) argues that to is a predicate-complementiser and is used mainly with non- 
factive predicates or verbs. It is contrasted with noun-complementisers such as koto 
and no. According to this line of analysis, while to can be used in (59) where a non- 
factive verb omou (= think) is used, it will not be used in (60) where a factive verb 
shiru (= know) is used. 
(59) Mary wa kashikoi to omou. 
Mary topic smart predicate-comp. think 
'I think that Mary is smart. ' 
(60) Mary wa kashikoi koto/no o shi-tteiru. 
Mary topic smart noun-comp. o-accusative know-ing 
`I know Mary's being smart. ' 
However, Kuno (1973) also mentions that there are a number of Japanese verbs such 
as kiku (= hear) which are indifferent to factive and non-factive paradigms and so they 
can occur with both to and koto/no. For example, 
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(61) Mary is smart to ki-iteiru 
pre-comp. hear-ing. 
'I hear that Mary is smart - she might or might not be so. ' 
(62) Mary is smart koto/no o ki-iteiru. 'I hear Mary's being smart, which she is'. 
noun-comp. acc. hear-ing 
(adapted from Josephs 1976: 316) 
The choice between to and koto/no results in a subtle difference in meaning, which 
is reflected in the English translations above (Josephs 1976: 316) and might lead me to 
argue that to encodes that its complement clause expresses a proposition that is not 
factive. However, as expected from the argument in Section 4.3.2 concerning the 
utterance-final use of tte, the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition that 
Mary is smart can be a strong one if we add 'from her teacher' as seen in (63). 
(63) A: Is Mary smart? 
B: Un soo-da yo. Sensei kara mo Marii wa kashikoi to ki-iteiru. 
Yes so-is s. f. p. -assertive teacher from also Mary topic smart pre-comp. hear-ing 
'Yes, it is so. Also from her teacher I hear that Mary is smart - and she is. ' 
In (63), B believes the truth of the proposition that Mary is smart and in order to 
provide strong evidence for her view, she is reporting the teacher's view. In such a 
context, the non-factivity of the complement clause which is felt in (61) is not 
communicated; rather, the speaker resorts to authority and her sureness of the factivity 
of the complement clause is communicated. This means, as argued with utterance-final 
uses of tte, the non-factivity of complement clauses associated with to is not semantic, 
i. e. is not a linguistic meaning which to encodes, but is one of the contextual 
implications which would be frequently derived. In other words to/tte is not encoded 
as factive or non-factive. 
It would be misleading to use to (instead of koto/no) when the speaker is sure about 
Mary's smartness, as argued by Kuno (1973). When the speaker knows that Mary is 
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smart, it is usually odd to say that she hears so, because this would explicitly express 
that the information is second-hand, and communicate in many contexts an implication 
that the speaker does not have direct evidence for its truth. So it is usually 
unacceptable contextually, but it is acceptable semantically, as (63) shows. If to does 
not encode [- factive], this particle should also be able to be used in certain 
circumstances with factive verbs such as shiru (= know). Indeed we can say (64) and 
observe the co-occurrence of to and the factive verb shiru(= know): 
(64) Watashi wa sensei kara ki-iteiru node, Marii ga kashikoi to shi-tteiru yo. 
I topic teacher from hear-ing as, Mary subject smart pre-comp. know-ing s. f. p 
'Because I've heard from the teacher, I know that Mary is smart. ' 
To was originally a particle for reporting someone else's statement (Kano 1973: 
215). However, as the examples above show, to is not only used with verbs of 
reporting but with all sorts of factive and non-factive predicates. So it can well be 
analysed as a predicate-complementiser syntactically as many linguists do (Kuno 1973 
Nakau 1973 Josephs 1976 etc. ). Likewise, utterance-medial tte - the colloquial version 
of to - can be analysed as a predicate-complementiser: i. e. to can be replaced with tte in 
(59), (61), (63) and (64). And some of the utterance-final uses of tte such as (51) might 
turn out to be cases of a predicate-complementiser, too, if the ellipsis analysis alluded 
to in the previous section can be maintained. 
I will pursue a semantic analysis within the Relevance theory framework, which is 
compatible with the syntactic analysis of to as a predicate-complementiser. I will see if 
the analysis applied to the utterance-medial use of to meshes with the utterance-final 
use of to (used only among older generation) or tte. As was argued in the last section, 
in utterance-final uses tte communicates hearsay and conveys that the proposition 
expressed by the utterance has been uttered in the past and heard by the speaker directly 
or indirectly (or entertained by the speaker as will be argued in Section 4.3.8). The 
same thing can be said of utterance-final to - the less colloquial version of tte. 
Now the question is why is it that the utterance-final use of tte or to always has an 
element of hearsay while this element in their utterance-medial use in examples such as 
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(59) and (64) is not felt to be present? This would seem to lead one to the conclusion 
that the utterance-final tte encodes meaning which its medial-use does not. However, I 
hope to show there is a common semantic core to both of these uses. I will come back 
to this matter in Section 4.3.9. In the following section, I will introduce another 
common use of to, to-yuu. 
4.3.6 The Meaning of To-yuu 
To-yuu consists of to (= predicate-complementiser discussed in Section 4.3.5) and yuu 
(= say) and it literally means 'that says... '. It can be used utterance-finally as seen in 
(65) where to in to-yuu is a predicate complementiser which falls under the scope of the 
main clause `People say... ' In the utterance-final use of to-yuu, to is utterance-medially 
used and the argument in the last section applies 
utterance-medial uses of to-yuu. 
(65) Hitobito wa Mary wa kashikoi to(tte) yuu. 
people topic Mary topic smart that say 
`People say that Mary is smart. ' 
I will therefore only consider 
The utterance-medial use of to-yuu is standardly analysed as a noun-complementiser 
(Joseph 1976; Nakau 1973 etc. ). As for its semantics, Josephs (1976: 359) assumes 
that "to-yuu connotes varying degrees of doubt on the part of the speaker that the 
embedded proposition (i. e. the noun complement) is true" and that "it has an inherent 
meaning that is essentially non-factive". Furthermore, he argues that the anomaly of 
the factive noun-complementiser koto used with non-factive predicates such as 
utagawashii(= is doubtful) and machigaida (= is mistaken) can be resolved by the 
addition of to-yuu. So we have the following example: 
(66) Marii ga kashikoi 
Mary sub. smart 
to-yuu koto/koto* wa utagawashii. 
n-comp/n-comp topic doubtful 
'That Mary is smart is doubtful. (The fact that Mary is smart is doubtful)' 
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(modelled after Josephs 1976: 359-60) 
It has to be noted here that although to-yuu is analysed as a noun-complementiser 
which is associated with non-factivity (Nakau 1973), the use of to-yuu alone without 
koto (= fact) would be anomalous syntactically in (66). It must always have a noun 
antecedent, as to-yuu alone cannot form noun clauses. Instead of koto we can have 
shirase (= news) or houkoku (= report) as antecedents in (66). So to-yuu-koto, not to- 
yuu nominalises the clause that Mary is smart, and the internal structure of to-yuu koto 
would be something like [TO-YUU [KOTO]n]comp. 
Now we can use to-yuu koto in examples such as (67) in which factivity of the noun 
clause is established as it is predicated with factive verbs such as shiru (= know). In 
(67) the use of to-yuu does not make the factivity of koto non-factive as was assumed in 
(66), or create a [+ factive], [- factive] contradiction. 
(67) Mary ga kashikoi to-yuu koto wa yoku shi-tteiru. 
Mary sub. smart. n-comp. topic well know-ing 
'I know full well (the fact) that Mary is smart. ' 
So the points made about the predicate-complementiser to apply also to the noun- 
complementiser to-yuu. That is, the inherent meaning of to-yuu is not non-factivity. 
The non-factive understanding arises contextually. In (66), for instance, the non-factive 
connotation of the noun clause is due to the non-factive predicate utagawashii (= is 
doubtful), and this goes well with to-yuu which is indifferent to factive/non-factive 
paradigms, and in this case associated with non-factivity. 
In (67), on the other hand, the proposition expressed by the noun clause is 
understood as factive but this factivity arises on the basis of the semantics of elements 
other than to-yuu, i. e. due to the factive verb shiru (= know). And again, this is totally 
compatible with the use of to-yuu which can nominalise factive and non-factive clauses 
given an appropriate antecedent noun, and can be used with factive and non-factive 
predicates. 
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To-yuu and the colloquial version tte-yuu have the literal meaning '... that says... ', and 
apart from koto which means 'the fact', they are mostly used with head nouns 
designating messages or forms of communication such as shirase (= news) and 
houkoku(= report) (Alfonso 1966: 1155-60). This seems to be further evidence for to, 
or the colloquial version tte, being a particle for reporting someone else's or the 
speaker's previous speech. 
However, what still remains to be accounted for is the use of to or tte with verbs not 
designating communication, as in examples (59) and (64) (repeated below), i. e. cases 
where the hearsay element seems to have been lost. 
(59) Mary wa kashikoi to omou. 
Mary topic smart predicate-comp. think 
`I think that Mary is smart. ' 
(64) Watashi wa sensei kara ki-iteiru node, Marii ga kashikoi to shi-tteriru yo. 
I topic teacher from hear-ring as, Mary subject smart pre-comp. know-ing s. f. p. 
`Because I've heard from the teacher, I know that Mary is smart. ' 
It might indeed be the case that no cases of utterance-medial to/tte communicate any 
hearsay feel. That is, when utterance-medial to/tte is used with verbs of some sort of 
communication, the hearsay feel comes from those verbs not from the complementiser 
to/tte. In the next section, I will argue that the hearsay feel is derived in the form of a 
higher-level explicature for whose recovery utterance-final to/tte, not utterance-medial 
to/tte, is partly responsible. I will argue that its role is one of constraining the recovery 
of higher-level explicatures in relevance-theoretic terms. 
4.3.7 Tte as a Procedural Constraint on Higher-level Explicatures 
In 2.3 1 have introduced the distinction between explicit and implicit content in 
Relevance theory. An utterance is considered to have only one identifiable 
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propositional form (= the truth-conditional content) but it can have many explicatures. 
An explicature can be the propositional form of an utterance which is recovered by 
enriching a linguistically encoded logical form to the point where it expresses a 
determinate proposition, or can be a further developed one which is recovered by 
embedding the propositional form under higher-level descriptions of speech act or 
attitudinal verb type. 
So (68) might have higher-level explicatures such as (69)-(71). 
(68) A (happily): Mary is smart. 
(69) The speaker says that Mary is smart. 
(70) The speaker believes that Mary is smart. 
(71) The speaker is pleased that Mary is smart. 
And (70) might be further elaborated so as to represent the speaker's degree of 
conviction (very strong, moderately strong, etc. ) 
I have argued that the utterance-final use of tte is essentially quotative and can be 
appended only to an utterance which was heard by the speaker directly or indirectly at 
one time in the past. Now tte in (48) (repeated below) marks a sub-type of interpretive 
use which, according to Ifantidou (1994: 213), automatically suspends the speaker's 
commitment. So the recovery of (70) is automatically suspended. Instead, tte 
constrains the recovery of a higher-level description such as the following (72) and 
when context allows, (72)' where the strength of the speaker's belief has to be further 
explicated contextually. 
(48) Mary is smart tte. 
(72) Someone (the speaker in the past) said that Mary is smart. 
(72)'The speaker believes (based on hearsay evidence) that Mary is smart. 
When (48) is used to report someone's speech or opinion, a higher-level explicature 
such as (72) is the assumption which carries the main relevance, i. e. where the point of 
the utterance lies. When the main relevance lies here and context allows, (72) is likely 
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to be enriched into a more specific content such as 'Peter said that... ' etc. Another 
possible analysis of reporting cases such as (51)B (repeated below) would be that tte is 
a complementiser and the hearer recovers the main clause such as 'Mary's teacher said 
that... ' as part of the propositional form of an utterance. 
(51)A: What did Mary's teacher say? 
B: Mary ga kashikoi tte. `Mary is smart, she says. ' 
Then, tte would not be functioning as a hearsay particle but a predicate- 
complementiser. 
On the other hand, when (48) is uttered as a case of echoic use, a range of speaker's 
propositional attitude including varying degree of commitment may be recovered 
pragmatically. In the case of an irony, higher-level attitudinal descriptions such as 'The 
speaker believes it is ridiculous for someone to say that... ' and what may be inferred 
from that if the speaker is considered trustworthy: i. e. 'It is ridiculous for someone to 
say that... ' are contextually recovered, considerably enriching the minimal information 
tte encodes. These are the assumptions where the main relevance lies, i. e. which carry 
the contextual effects and (72), though communicated, is less important. 
Let us look again at some of the utterance-medial complementiser cases, such as 
(73) and (74) which do not communicate a feel of reporting or quoting at all, and where 
a higher-level description of the sort in (72) is obviously not communicated. 
(73) Mary is smart tte shitteiru. 'I know that Mary is smart. ' 
(74) Mary is smart tte utagawashii. 'It is doubtful that Mary is smart. ' 
Why this is so follows from the definition of higher-level explicature. Higher-level 
explicatures are recovered by embedding the whole proposition expressed, not a part of 
the proposition i. e. complement clauses to which tte is attached. For example, Wilson 
(1994) says that it is the mood indicators of the MAIN CLAUSE such as the sentence 
type (e. g. indicative, imperative, etc. ) and attitudinal particles (e. g. English well) that 
determine the speaker's propositional attitude A hearsay feel is also reflected in the 
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higher-level description such as (72), to which the complementiser tte obviously does 
not contribute. 
Now the speaker's attitudes such as belief and disbelief are also expressed to the 
complement clause as seen in (75) and (76). However, (75) and (76) are straightforward 
logical implications of (73) and (74) respectively, hinging on the meaning of the main 
verb and they are not recovered based on the information encoded by tte. 
(75) The speaker believes that Mary is smart. 
(76) The speaker does not believe that Mary is smart. 
In 4.2.5 I argued that ne encodes procedural information that the speaker desires to 
establish (interpretively represented) assumptions communicated by an utterance as 
common ground, and also argued that it constrains the construction of higher-level 
representations. 
Similarly, the semantics of the utterance-final tte is not conceptual but procedural 
unlike English hearsay adverbs such as reportedly and allegedly argued by Ifantidou- 
Trouki (1993). Tte does not map onto a conceptual representation and therefore we 
cannot deny its meaning with phrases such as `You haven't heard so'. Instead of 
making a contribution to a conceptual representation, it constrains the hearer's inference 
processes in constructing higher-level descriptions I have argued so far. 
Let us consider (52) again: 
(52) A: Our teacher said that Mary is smart. 
B: Mary ga kashikoi tte?! 
Mary sub smart s. f. p. -hearsay 
`Mary is smart?! Did she say that? Goodness! ' 
In this utterance, the use of tte suspends the speaker's commitment to the truth of the 
proposition that Mary is smart, and the propositional form, though it is enriched to the 
point where it is a determinate proposition, is not communicated as a true assumption, 
i. e. is not communicated as an explicature. On the other hand, assumptions which 
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embed this proposition in higher-level descriptions such as (77) and (78) are 
communicated to the hearer as true assumptions, i. e. are explicatures. 
(77) The speaker is surprised that the teacher has said that Mary is smart. 
(78) The speaker believes that the teacher has said that Mary is smart. 
These are developed from another higher-level explicature (79) which is recovered 
on the basis of the information encoded by tte (i. e. quotative attributive use) and 
contextual information. And if the hearer trusts the teacher enough, (79) provides 
evidence for (80). In Relevance theory all of these constitute part of the explicit import 
of an utterance. 
(79) The teacher said that Mary is smart. 
(80) The speaker believes (on hearsay basis) that Mary is smart. 
This does not mean that tte-appended utterances may never have their propositional 
form communicated to the hearer as a true assumption, i. e. explicated. Let us consider 
(81): 
(81) (Looking at the teacher's report) Mary is smart tte. 
In this example, the speaker is echoing the proposition to which she gives her own full 
endorsement: this is because the proposition is attributed to an authority. Then (81) 
communicates the propositional form (82) as an explicature and (83) as a higher-level 
explicature derived as a result of the constraint imposed by tte and the contextual 
information. 
(82) Mary is smart. 
(83) The teacher said that Mary is smart. 
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As the attribution is made to the authoritative report, another higher-level explicature 
(84) in which a more specific description of the speaker's belief is given, is likely to be 
communicated. 
(84) The speaker strongly believes that Mary is smart. 
Wilson & Sperber (1993: 22) argue that the content of this type of higher-level 
representation will have much more specific and richer concepts than simple 
abstractions such as 'believing that' or 'saying that', and (84) is ß case in point. My 
claim, then, is that the Japanese hearsay particle tte does not encode any concept, but 
encodes the procedural information that the propositional form is attributed to an 
utterance or the speaker's thought (i. e. a representation directly accessible to the 
speaker). This information constrains the sort of higher-level explicatures that are 
derived. 
In (52)B the utterance-final tte encodes the information that the propositional form 
is attributed to an utterance, i. e. in this case the teacher's utterance that Mary is smart, 
thus constraining the recovery of a higher-level explicature such as (83) where the 
source of attribution is specified. There are cases in which the source of the tte- 
appended utterance cannot be recovered contextually and it is not important. In such a 
case tte constrains the recovery of a higher-level explicature such as `someone said 
that... ' and it is relevant without further specification as in (83). Such an abstract 
higher-level explicature is derived on the basis of the hearsay indicator, tte, which in 
one context leads the hearer to interpret the speaker's weakly believing the proposition 
expressed; and in another, the speaker's having strong commitment to the proposition 
expressed. 
In this section, I argued that the utterance-final tte has a procedural semantics of 
constraining the recovery of higher-level explicatures. That is, what tte encodes is not a 
conceptual representation, but a set of clues (i. e. quotative attributive use) for 
constructing ones, i. e. higher-level explicatures such as (83). So it can be characterised 
as making a direct contribution to inference processes, and this type of semantic 
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information, together with contextual information and the pragmatic criterion based on 
optimal relevance will determine the content of the higher-level explicatures. 
Now Japanese is a language which has a grammaticalised evidential system. The 
main types of evidentiality are reporting someone else's sensations, reporting 
something which is not knowable and indicating that information was derived via 
hearsay or inference (Chafe & Nichols 1986: x). In the next section I will turn to the 
issue of evidentiality. 
4.3.8 Utterance-final Tte and Evidentiality 
Let me now consider (85)B -a standard answer to the question in (85)A. In such a 
case, tte seems to be clearly a complementiser. 
(85) A: What does Mary's teacher think of her? 
B: Mary wa kashikoi tte omotte-iru yo. 
Mary topic smart comp. think-ing s. f. p. -assertive 
'She thinks that Mary is smart. ' 
C: Mary wa kashikoi tte. 
Mary topic smart s. f. p. -hearsay 
'Mary is smart, she thinks/That Mary is smart. ' 
Now, as we might expect, we can also have (85)C as a reply to A, a case of using the 
so-called hearsay particle. In this example, the utterance achieves relevance by 
informing the hearer that the teacher thinks that Mary is smart. This might appear to be 
a counter-example to my claim that tte attributes utterances, but not thoughts, 
contributing to the recovery of higher-level explicatures such as (72). The point lies 
with reporting the teacher's thought as in (85)B. 
However, the propositional form is attributed to what the speaker must have heard 
from the teacher directly or indirectly, not to what the speaker B-C is speculating as to 
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what the teacher is thinking about Mary. Otherwise, (85)B-C would not be uttered in 
Japanese. The reason that we have hearsay feel from (85)B does not follow from the 
presence of tte but follows from the fact that the speaker is asserting someone else's 
thinking which is not knowable without her having heard him saying so directly or 
indirectly. On the other hand, the hearsay element in (85)C is present due to the 
utterance-final tte which distinguishes this sort of case from (73) and (74). 
If A asks B to speculate on what B thinks the teacher thinks of Mary, a natural way 
of questioning in Japanese is the following way as expressed in English in (86)A, and a 
natural way to answer this would be (86)B in which the speaker's thinking is explicitly 
given, or (86)C in which the inferential forms of modals YOU mitai etc. readily 
translated as 'seem', 'look like', 'appear' or left untranslated are used (Aoki 1986). As 
was mentioned, in Japanese the thought, belief, desire, feeling etc. of others cannot be 
directly asserted as in English, but must be marked with some evidential indicators 
(Aoki 1986). 
(86) A: What do you think Mary's teacher thinks of her? 
B: Mary Wa kashikoi tte omotte-iru tte/to omou yo. 
Mary topic smart comp. think-ing comp. think s. f. p. -assertive 
'I think that the teacher thinks that Mary is smart. ' 
C: Mary wa kashikoi tte/to omotte-iru-yoo/mitai. 
Mary topic smart comp. think-ing-seem/appear (inferential modals) 
'The teacher seems to think that Mary is smart. ' 
In (86)B the speaker has to explicitly give the verb of B's (the speaker's) thinking 
omotte-iru (=think-ing) as the information on Mary's smartness has never been heard 
by B and it is a pure speculation of B regarding what the teacher is thinking of Mary. 
In such a case, the utterance-medial tte, as I mentioned, functions as a complementiser 
and as such does not contribute to the recovery of higher-level explicatures which 
communicate a feel of hearsay. This is comparable to tte used in (73) and (74) where 
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the predicate of the main clause is describing the speaker's propositional attitude and 
tte is used as a complementiser. 
It has to be noted however that the utterance can echo a thought of the speaker as 
well as an utterance of the speaker in the past. Let us consider (87): 
(87) Mary is smart tte?! What am I thinking? 
(87) shows that the speaker did not have to utter it in order to echo it, i. e. she did not 
have to utter overtly in the past that Mary is smart. The speaker could echo her own 
thought and ridicule it. How does this fit with the hearsay/quotative nature of tte? 
Although `hearsay' evidence for a particular view is indirect evidence, the utterance 
which provides this evidence has itself been directly perceived (aurally or visually). 
We all have a kind of direct access to our own thoughts which we do not have to other 
people's thoughts, so we may consider or think about our own (unuttered) thoughts in 
much the same way as we may think about other people's utterances. I think it is this 
that makes the hearsay particle use possible in these cases. 
In the case of someone else's unuttered thought, on the other hand, the speaker does 
not have direct access but can only speculate about what that person thinks, and verbs 
of the speaker's thinking so or inferential modals have to be explicitly used as seen in 
(86)B-C. When the speaker utters (85)C, i. e. apparently echoing someone else's 
thought, the thought must have been expressed at some stage and heard by the speaker 
directly or indirectly, thereby giving her some evidence for it, and this makes the use of 
the hearsay particle tte possible. This seems to explain why tte can be appended to an 
utterance which involves attributing a thought to the speaker herself as in (87), but not 
to an utterance which attributes an unverbalised thought to someone else. 
So we have to modify (72) as in the following: 
(88) Someone said or the speaker thinks or thought that.... 
I would now like to argue that utterance-final tte/to encodes procedural information 
such as (88) which constrains the construction of higher-level explicatures. 
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4.3.9 Conclusions 
In the recent Relevance theoretic work on evidentials, Ifantidou (1994: 213) argues 
that English evidentials such as allegedly and reportedly affect the truth-conditional 
content of an utterance by changing the status of the proposition to an interpretive one. 
Further, she argues that the use of a parenthetical comment like I hear changes the 
truth-conditions of the utterance, i. e. it contributes to the proposition expressed. Her 
analysis complies with Blass (1990: 123) who considers Sissala interpretive use 
marker re to be truth-conditional. 
Now it is also true that the use of tte makes the proposition of an utterance 
interpretive. Then, similarly, it affects the truth-conditional status of an utterance and 
this means that tte contributes to the proposition expressed. Although tte does not 
encode concepts as allegedly, reportedly or I hear do, it contributes to the proposition 
expressed in that it determines the status of representation as interpretive. 
Then, I have to discard the assumption made by Japanese grammarians that 
Japanese sentence-final particles do not affect the truth-conditions of an utterance. Ne 
does not change the truth-conditions of an utterance as shown in (22)-(23) (repeated 
below), nor does it change the truth-conditional status of the proposition that falls 
within its scope. 
(22) Paris is beautiful. 
(23) Paris is beautiful ne (= isn't it? ) 
Tte, however, suspends the speaker's commitment and does change the truth- 
conditional status by making the proposition interpretive. That is, different properties 
are associated with sentence-final particles: non-truth-conditional for ne and truth- 
conditional for tte, and the Japanese grammarians general claim does not hold. This 
means that sentence-final particles cannot be given a unified semantic analysis as to the 
question of whether or not they contribute to the proposition expressed. 
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Hearsay particles are standardly included as a case of evidentials (Palmer 1986: 53) 
and this seems correct as the source of evidence is what someone has said. Against 
this, Blass (1989; 1990) has shown that supposed hearsay data from Sissala are better 
analysed as general markers of 'interpretive use' rather than as restricted to the reporting 
of actual speech, or as belonging to a modal/evidential system. 
The Japanese data, however, show that tte favours an analysis of hearsay particles as 
markers of quotative attributive use, over an analysis as markers of 'speaker's 
diminished commitment' or those of 'interpretive' or perfectly general attributive uses. I 
claimed that the utterance-final tte communicates a feel of hearsay by encoding the 
procedural information that the propositional form is attributed to an utterance or the 
speaker's thought, i. e. a quotative attributive use, and that it constrains the recovery of 
higher-level explicatures. 
The utterance-medial tte, on the other hand, does not constrain the recovery of 
higher-level explicatures and does not communicate any feel of hearsay. This follows 
from the definition of higher-level explicatures in that they are recovered by embedding 
the whole proposition, not a part of the proposition such as a complement clause the 
utterance-medial tte marks. 
The original meaning of to - the more formal version of tte - was reporting someone 
else's statement (Kuno 1973: 215), but it is true that the complementiser tte in (73) and 
(74) (repeated below) reports the speaker's thought that Mary is smart. 
(73) Mary is smart tte shitteiru. `I know that Mary is smart. ' 
(74) Mary is smart tte utagawashii. `It is doubtful that Mary is smart. ' 
The proposition the complementiser to or tte marks does not describe the state of affairs 
in the world, but interprets someone's thought. So we might be able to argue that the 
complementiser to or tte marks `interpretive use'. Indeed Blass (1990: 123) mentions 
that the English complementiser that is a candidate for an interpretive-use marker. 
If this line of argument is correct, we could give a unified analysis for both the 
utterance-medial and final tte. That is, tte in both the utterance-medial and final uses 
indicates `interpretive use': i. e. the complementiser tte marks general `interpretive use' 
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while the utterance-final particle tte has a narrower semantics, i. e. indicates attribution 
to a previous utterance or the speaker's thought which is a quotative attributive use, i. e. 
a sub-type of `interpretive use'. 
I have argued that the utterance-final tte linguistically encodes procedural 
information i. e. clues for constraining a conceptual representation i. e. a higher-level 
explicature. Like ne the semantics of the utterance-final tte is not conceptual but 
procedural, encoding quotative attributive use, a sub-case of `interpretive use'. I would 
now like to give a full analysis of the Japanese interrogative particle ka which, like 
English interrogative syntax, is likely to mark `interpretive use'. 
4.4 Japanese Sentence-final Particle Ka 
4.4.1 Introduction 
In 4.2.2.2 I argued against Tsuchihashi (1983) who does not consider declaratives 
and interrogatives as discrete categories. Instead I argued that they have totally 
distinct properties: i. e. declaratives encode descriptive representations while 
interrogatives encode interpretive representations. I argued that declaratives with the 
speaker's weak endorsement might have similar pragmatic effects to the 
interrogative: e. g. (18) replied to (17): 
(17) It may be raining outside ne. 
(18) No, (rain) isn't falling. (= No, it isn't. ) 
Conversely, yes-no interrogatives might have the pragmatic effects of 
communicating the speaker's weak endorsement of their fully propositional logical 
form. For example, the interrogative `Is it raining? ' might well communicate that the 
speaker is not certain that it is raining. I am, however, interested in the semantics of 
ka rather than its pragmatic effect and I would first like to consider Japanese 
interrogatives. 
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While English interrogatives are usually marked by syntactic features such as 
subject-auxiliary inversion, wh-fronting etc., Japanese interrogatives are marked by 
the use of the sentence-final particle ka and the use of question words such as dare 
'who', nani 'what', etc. Both in English and in Japanese, rising intonation can turn a 
statement into a question and there are some interesting correlations between 
intonation and sentence types. However, as Bolinger (1989: 98) argues, no 
intonation is associated exclusively with any particular sentence type. So intonation 
is not a primary concern here as basically any intonation can occur with an 
interrogative which is indicated in some other way. 
Examples of interrogatives in Japanese are given in (90) -(92), with the 
corresponding declaratives in (89) : 
(89) Yamada-san wa gakusei desu-0. 
Mr. Yamada topic student is-present (0 = no inflection) 
`Mr. Yamada is a student. ' 
Yamada-san wa Tokyo ni iki-mashita. 
Mr. Yamada topic Tokyo to go-past 
`Mr. Yamada went to Tokyo. ' 
Tokyo ni Yamada-san wa iki-mashita. 
Tokyo to Mr. Yamada topic go-past 
`Mr. Yamada went to Tokyo. ' 
(90) Yamada-san wa gakusei desu-0 ka? 
Mr. Yamada topic student is-present Question-marker 
Is Mr. Yamada a student? ' 
(91) Yamada-san wa doko ni iki-mashita ka? 
Mr. Yamada topic where to go-past Q-marker 
`Where did Mr. Yamada go? ' 
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(92) Doko ni Yamada-san wa iki-mashita? 
Where to Mr. Yamada topic go-past 
`Where did Mr. Yamada go? ' 
The verb inflection we see in (89)-(92) is an indication of tense rather than of an 
interrogative mood and, as the examples show, Japanese does not have an 
interrogative mood in this sense. Neither is there any syntactic marking of questions: 
i. e. there is no wh-fronting, so both (91) and (92) are possible; there is no subject- 
auxiliary inversion, as seen in (90) -(92) . 
Note that it is not obligatory to use ka in 
yes-no interrogatives (since rising intonation can turn a statement into a question), 
nor in wh-interrogatives (see (92) ). Japanese interrogatives seem to be indicated by 
the use of ka as well as interrogative words such as doko 'where'. So Japanese 
interrogatives are marked lexically rather than syntactically. 
As is the case with English interrogatives, ka-appended utterances are often 
analysed as encoding an underlying performative verb of asking or a speech act of 
requesting information (Uyeno 1971, Tsuchihashi 1983). Kendal (1985: 172), on the 
other hand, argues that ka, like modals, is associated with the degree of speaker 
commitment (see 4.4.3). In the following section, I will show that the problems with 
the existing analyses for ne also apply to ka. 
4.4.2 Problems with Performative Verb/Speech Act Analyses 
Uyeno (1971) analyses ka within the framework of generative semantics. She (1971: 
39) maintains that the use of ka as a sentence-final particle is "a direct reflex of the 
performative verb `ask"', so she would argue that ka encodes the underlying 
performative verb `ask' which appears in the logical form of a ka-appended 
utterance. 
Tsuchihashi (1983: 361), on the other hand, places ka on a speech act continuum 
which has a 'declarative' at one end and an 'interrogative' at the other. She argues that 
many Japanese sentence-final particles, including ka, represent the lexicalisation of a 
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speech act continuum, and that ka falls towards the interrogative end of the 
continuum. Tsuchihashi (1983) takes this idea of the non-discrete nature of speech 
acts from Givon (1982: 105). 
A major problem with these performative verb/speech act analyses is that they 
cannot explain the non-final use of ka. For example, ka-appended sentences can be 
embedded in another clause as seen in (93) and (94) : 
(93) (Mr. Yamada is a student ka dou (= how) ka) shirimasen. 
I do not know (whether Mr. Yamada is a student). 
(94) (Where Mr. Yamada went ka) shirimasen. 
I do not know (where Mr. Yamada went). 
Ka is required in embedded interrogatives which confirms the claim that it is an 
interrogative marker. (93) can be compared with an embedded declarative (95) in 
which not ka but the complementiser to or tte is required (see 4.3.5): 
(95) (That Mr. Yamada is a student to/tte) shiranakatta. 
I did not know (that Mr. Yamada is a student). 
(94) would not be correctly paraphrased as "I do not know I ask where Mr. Yamada 
went" as the performative verb account would seem to predict. From a speech-act 
point of view, (94) is certainly a declarative sentence which would be associated 
with a performative verb `state', so here the force of asking, supposedly encoded by 
ka 
, 
has to be lost. This is, of course, a quite general problem for speech-act analyses 
of interrogatives. 
Let us nevertheless pursue the analyses of Uyeno (1971) and Tsuchihashi (1983) a 
bit further. On their approach, the sentence-final particle ka encodes a performative 
verb `ask', or a speech act of asking that an interrogative sentence type is usually 
associated with. Hence ka is treated as linguistically encoding the following 
conceptual representation: 
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(96) The speaker is asking 
A yes-no question such as (90) might encode the information in (97) while a wh- 
question such as (91) and (92) might encode the information in (98) : 
(97) The speaker is asking whether Mr. Yamada is a student. 
(98) The speaker is asking where Mr. Yamada went. 
On this approach, the conceptual representation (96) is not treated as part of the 
proposition expressed by the utterances, but as a non-truth-conditional aspect of 
sentence meaning. Austin (1962) classified this kind of non-truth-conditional 
meaning via a taxonomy of performative verbs such as `asking', while Searle (1976) 
presented a more abstract scheme of five basic kinds of act, including directives, 
together with felicity conditions on the successful performance of these acts. 
Asking is defined by Searle and his followers as a directive speech act, which is 
an attempt to get the hearer to do something: in this case, to provide information 
(Searle 1976). The felicity conditions on requests for information, and hence on 
asking, are that the speaker believes the hearer is able to provide the information, the 
speaker does not already have the information and the speaker wants the hearer to 
supply the information. 
The objections to this approach to the semantics of English interrogatives are well 
known, and have been discussed extensively by Wilson & Sperber (1988a). These 
objections apply just as much to comparable analyses of ka in Japanese. I will show 
in the following examples that even literal and serious cases of ka-appended 
sentences do not always have the force of requests for information, given the 
characterisation of requests for information discussed above. 
Consider (99) and (100) : 
(99) Tabako wa suwa-nai to dare ga iimashita ka? 
cigarette topic smoke-not quotative who focus said Q-marker 
`Who said that he will not smoke? ' 
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(The hearer has already claimed that he will not smoke) 
(100) Ittai disinfureeshion to wa nani-o imisuru no ka? 
on earth disinflation quotative topic what-acc. mean nom. Q-marker 
`What on earth does 'disinflation' mean? ' 
(Lecturer addressing students) 
(The National Language Institute: 1951: 13) 
(99) is not a request for information as defined above. The speaker of (99) already 
has the information concerning who said that he will not smoke. The speaker is not 
requesting the hearer to provide this information, as the speech act analysis requires. 
(99) is a rhetorical question and functions as a reminder. 
(100) may be uttered as an expository question. If so, it is not a request for 
information as defined above. A lecturer who utters (100) as an expository question 
already knows the answer, and is aiming to arouse the students' interest in certain 
information rather than getting them to provide it. She will most likely follow the 
utterance in (100) with an answer. Expository questions such as (100) are in fact 
offers of information rather than requests for information (Wilson & Sperber 1988a. ). 
There are many other counter-examples to performative verb/speech act type 
analyses of interrogatives. They include exam questions, guess-questions in which 
the speaker already knows the answer, and surprise questions in which the expression 
of surprise is more relevant than any element of asking (See Wilson & Sperber 
1988a. for further counter-examples). All these counter-examples apply to ka in 
Japanese. This confirms that the analysis of ka as encoding a conceptual 
representation such as (96) is not appropriate and so in 4.4.9 I will pursue a 
procedural analysis of this particle. In the following section, I will turn to the 
analysis of Kendal (1985), which does not resort to the notion of speech 
act/performative verb. 
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4.4.3 Ka and Strength of Commitment 
It is not the particle ka alone that determines the speech act communicated by an 
interrogative in Japanese. Many other elements, including lexical items such as dare 
'who' and doko 'where', rising intonation, contextual information etc., are involved. 
By not stipulating any relation between ka and an underlying performative verb or 
speech act type, Kendal (1985)'s analysis in terms of degrees of commitment allows 
for the full range of illocutionary forces (e. g. reminding in (99) ) that ka can express 
in interaction with different elements of linguistic form and context. Moreover, her 
analysis avoids the problems that arise in explaining the non-final use of ka , 
how 
combinations of particles such as ka-ne/yo work, and so on, because ka is not 
associated with any particular illocutionary force. 
As I mentioned in 4.2.2.3, Kendal (1985: 171) places some modals and sentence- 
final particles, including ka , on a speaker commitment scale which 
has 'strong' at one 
end and 'weak' at the other. Ka is placed near the weak end of the scale. Kendal 
(1985: 164-5) argues that ka is used when the speaker is not sure whether the 
proposition expressed is true or false. She also argues that ka makes absolutely no 
claims about the state of affairs described (e. g. by the proposition "the window is 
open"), and requires the hearer to determine whether the proposition is true. Thus 
Kendal might argue that ka in (90) expresses the speaker's weak or rather zero 
commitment to the proposition that Mr. Yamada is a student. Similarly, Haga (1953: 
54) analyses ka as expressing the speaker's doubt about the truth of the proposition 
expressed by a ka-appended utterance. 
However, ka is not always used in utterances where the speaker has weak or zero 
commitment to the proposition (or logical form) expressed. For example, in the 
rhetorical question (99) , the speaker 
is committed to the truth of the proposition that 
the hearer said at some time that he would never smoke. Similarly, in the expository 
question (100) , the speaker 
is committed to the truth of the proposition that 
disinflation has a certain meaning. 
Or consider the following: 
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(101) A: Ichijikan kakarimasu yo. 
one hour will take s. f. p. -assertive 
`It will take an hour. ' 
B: Ichijikan kakarimasu ka? Ja, moo dekakenakya. 
one hour will take Q-marker Then, now must leave 
`It will take an hour? I have to leave now then. ' 
(Mizutani & Mizutani 1987: 137) 
In (10l )B the speaker is not expressing doubt about the proposition that it will take 
an hour. Rather, she indicates that she believes it and she follows it up by expressing 
a conclusion she has drawn on the basis of her belief in it. So ka can be associated 
with both strong and weak speaker commitment to the proposition expressed by an 
utterance, and it seems unlikely that analysing ka as indicating a particular degree of 
commitment will work. 
There is another way of interpreting Kendal's proposal, however. At one point 
she says, "When used sentence-finally, the effect of using a SFP (sentence-final 
particle) is that speakers indicate an attitude toward some IF (illocutionary force) - 
they are still asking or telling, explaining or warning, etc. (as determined by other 
elements in the utterance and by context), but with a greater or lesser degree of 
strength or conviction (which I call commitment)" (Kendal 1985: 170). 
Here, she seems to be assuming that ka encodes an interrogative force but one that 
comes with a weak intensity as compared with other interrogative indicators such as 
dare 'who' and doko 'where'. That is, by appending ka , the strength of the request for 
information will become weaker. However, it is not the case that the ka-appended 
interrogative (91) makes a request with less strength than (92), which has no ka. 
Similarly, in (99) and (100) , 
ka does not weaken the strength of a request for 
information, since there is no request for information communicated in these 
examples ((99) is a rhetorical question and (100) an expository question). So her 
argument for 'weak intensity' of the requesting force does not seem to hold. 
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Furthermore, the arguments given above against speech act analyses of 
interrogatives hold here too. Not all ka-appended utterances are requests for 
information as defined above. In particular, the existence of embedded interrogatives 
is a decisive objection to the speech act approach so that ka cannot be weakening a 
request force in an embedded case. Thus existing analyses of ka in terms of 
performative verbs/speech act types and speaker commitment have failed. We need 
an adequate semantics for ka which will interact with contextual and other pragmatic 
factors to yield a full account of all its uses. I would now like to explore the 
possibility of a Relevance-based approach. 
4.4.4 Interrogative-marker Ka and Interpretive Use 
Recall that propositional forms can be used to represent either states of affairs in the 
world or other propositional forms. In the former case, which Sperber & Wilson 
(1986) call 'descriptive representation', the relation between the representation and 
what is represented is truth-conditional. In the latter, which Sperber & Wilson 
(1986) call 'interpretive representation', the relation is one of logical resemblance. 
In Sperber & Wilson's framework, every utterance is an interpretation of a thought 
of the speaker's, in the sense that the propositional form of the utterance is intended 
to resemble the propositional form of the thought communicated to a greater or lesser 
degree. However, some utterances are interpretive in a second order way, in that the 
thoughts they interpret are themselves interpretations of other thoughts or utterances. 
This second order interpretation, called interpretive use, characterises, on the one 
hand, the use of language in reported speech/echoic utterances to a sub-set of which 
the hearsay particle tte is appended, and on the other, the meaning encoded by 
interrogatives or exclamatives. Recall also Sperber & Wilson (1986; Wilson & 
Sperber 1988a) argue that interrogatives and exclamatives are interpretive 
representations of desirable thoughts, by which it is meant that the thoughts so 
represented are seen as relevant to the speaker and/or to the hearer. 
Here, I should make it clear what I mean by interrogatives, as I do not wish to 
conflate a certain linguistic form i. e. an interrogative, with the illocutionary force that 
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is often associated with it. Uyeno (1971) and Tsuchihashi (1983) assume that ka- 
appended utterances are Japanese interrogatives, which are in turn associated with the 
illocutionary force or speech act type of asking. I maintain that a Japanese 
interrogative is a certain linguistic form, indicated by the use of ka and interrogative 
words such as doko 'where', as seen in (91)-(92). By contrast, I have argued that ka 
does not encode illocutionary force representations (i. e. a conceptual representation) 
such as (96). 
Following Wilson & Sperber (1988a), I argue that an interrogative indicates a 
rather abstract property. In the first place, it is specialised for interpretive rather then 
descriptive use. In the second place, it indicates that the logical form expressed is a 
representation of a desirable thought, and hence that the thought so represented 
would be relevant if true. On this account, the logical form of an interrogative does 
not descriptively represent any state of affairs, but interpretively represents a 
desirable thought. Hence I assume that the logical forms of Japanese interrogatives 
such as (91)-(92) and (99)-(100) or yes-no questions such as (90) do not represent 
any state of affairs either, but interpretively represent a certain thought (the answer to 
the question) and indicate that it is desirable (relevant) from someone's point of view. 
There is an indeterminacy here - desirable/relevant to whom?, speaker or hearer? 
According to Sperber & Wilson, this is resolved contextually and is one of the factors 
determining the type of 'question' communicated. For example, in genuine questions 
such as (90) , 
in which the speaker does not know whether Mr. Yamada is a student 
or not, the speaker indicates that she regards the answer as relevant to the speaker 
herself. To be relevant, the answer must have a range of contextual effects. For 
example, the answer to (90) might imply that Mr. Yamada can get a discount for 
theatre tickets, that he can travel with reduced fare by trains, that he is on tight 
budget, and so on. 
In the case of rhetorical questions such as (99) , the speaker already 
knows the 
answer, i. e. that the hearer has said at a certain time that he will not smoke. Here the 
speaker indicates that she regards the answer as relevant not to the speaker herself but 
to the hearer. For instance, the speaker might have caught the hearer smoking despite 
the fact that the hearer promised the speaker not to smoke again. In expository 
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questions such as (100) , there 
is no expectation on the speaker's part that the hearer 
will supply the answer and this is clear from the circumstances, e. g. a formal lecture. 
In (100) the speaker indicates that she regards the answer as relevant to the hearer(s) 
and the question is designed to arouse their interest. So the analysis of ka as an 
interrogative particle indicating the desirability/relevance of a thought which would 
constitute its answer seems to account nicely for the examples (90), (91), (99) and 
(100). 
However, there are some uses of ka in Japanese that do not, at first sight, fit 
happily into this interrogative analysis. In (101)B (repeated below), for example, 
since both speaker and hearer already know the answer, it does not seem that ka can 
be indicating that the answer would be relevant to either speaker or hearer. 
(101)A: It will take an hour. 
B: It will take an hour ka? I have to leave now then. 
On the other hand, (101)B is clearly echoic, and one might be tempted to think that 
here ka is encoding the information that the utterance is echoic. If this analysis 
proved correct, ka might be seen as a general indicator of all types of interpretive use, 
rather than an indicator of the particular type of interpretive use associated with 
interrogative utterances. In the next section, I will consider this more general 
analysis, and argue against it. 
4.4.5 Ka and Echoic Utterances 
Recall that in Relevance theory, reported speech and echoic utterances are varieties 
of interpretive use. They interpretively represent attributed thoughts/utterances: that 
is, someone else's thoughts/utterances or the speaker's thoughts/utterances in the 
past. This attributive aspect of the second order interpretation can achieve relevance 
in either of the following ways: by informing the hearer that someone has said/thinks 
something, or by informing the hearer of the fact that the speaker has in mind what 
some individual(s) say/think and has a certain attitude to it. 
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(101)B cannot achieve relevance in the former way, as there is no point in B's 
informing A of what A has just said. When interpretations achieve relevance in the 
latter way, Sperber & Wilson (1986: 238) say that they are echoic. Thus ka in 
(101)B might appear to be indicating echoic use (a sub-type of interpretive use). Let 
me now look at (101) again (repeated below): 
(101) A: Ichij ikan kakarimasu yo. 
one hour will take s. f. p. -assertive 
`It will take an hour. ' 
B: Ichij ikan kakarimasu ka? Ja, moo dekakenakya. 
one hour will take Q-Marker Then, now must leave. 
`It will take an hour? Then I have to leave now. ' 
(101)A expresses the proposition that it will take an hour, and gives it A's strong 
backing (indicated by the use of the assertive particle yo). Based on his acceptance 
of the truth of this proposition, B concludes that he must leave straightway. A is not 
invited to answer or respond to a request for information, having just given that very 
information. Nor should the ka-appended utterance in (101)B be regarded as a 
rhetorical or expository question, in which the answer is relevant to the hearer, i. e. to 
A. 
The function of (101)B is to echo what A has just said and to express a certain 
attitude to it. In this case, as the continuation makes clear, B accepts the proposition 
echoed. In different circumstances, B could echo what A has said without accepting 
it: for example, B could go on to say that it will not take that long, so he does not 
have to leave immediately. In either case, by echoing what A has said, B gives 
evidence that she has paid attention to A's utterance and is weighing up its reliability 
and implications (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 238). The question is, can ka here be 
analysed as indicating that (101)B is echoic? If this line of analysis were correct, ka- 
appended utterances could interpretively represent not only desirable thoughts but 
also attributed thoughts. Then ka would indicate the full range of cases of 
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interpretive use i. e. the second order interpretation of a thought or utterance. 
However, I will show this to be incorrect. 
Notice, first, that (101)B without ka appended would have the same interpretation 
as (101)B. That is, the echoic nature of (101)B does not have to be indicated by ka; 
it is enough that the first part of (101)A is immediately repeated by B. Furthermore. 
if ka indicates echoic use, the echoic utterances (102)B and (103)B should be 
acceptable: 
(102) A: Kinoo doko ni i-tta? 
yesterday where to go-past(plain form) 
`Where did you go yesterday? ' 
B: 'Kinoo doko ni i-tta? ' ka 
yesterday where to go-past(plain form) s. f. p. 
'Where did I go? ' 
(103) A: Doko ni Yamada-san wa iki-mashita ka? 
where to Mr. Yamada topic go-past Q-Marker 
`Where did Mr. Yamada go? ' 
B: 'Doko ni Yamada-san wa iki-mashita ka? ' ka 
where to Mr. Yamada topic go-past s. f. p. 
'Where did Mr. Yamada go? ' 
As the English translations show, (102)B and (103)B are echoic utterances in which 
B echoes A's questions (echoed parts indicated by single quotation marks). If ka 
indicates echoic use, (102)B and (103)B should be acceptable, as practically any 
sentence can be used echoically, including interrogatives, imperatives etc. The 
unacceptability of (102)B and (103 )B shows that ka does not in fact mark echoic use; 
hence it is incorrect to argue that ka is responsible for the echoic feel of (101)B. 
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Incidentally, the sentence-final particle tte -a marker of a sub-case of attributive use 
- can be appended to (102)B and (103)B, a point I return to in a later section. 
Now, can we say that (101)B is an echo of an interrogative? The answer is clearly 
'no'. What is echoed in (10l )B is not the interrogative 'it will take an hour - ka? ' but 
only the declarative 'it will take an hour'. So in (101)B ka is not itself echoed. What 
is its function, then? I have said that ka in general indicates that the utterance is 
interrogative, i. e. that it represents a thought that the speaker regards as desirable ( or 
relevant). In the case of (101)B, I have also said that the speaker already has this 
thought in mind: that is, the speaker is already entertaining the thought that it will 
take an hour. 
Recall, though, that in the framework of Relevance theory, thoughts can be 
entertained with varying degrees of strength. The use of ka, or interrogative 
intonation, in an echoic utterance like this lets the hearer know that the speaker is 
weighing up the evidence for, and reliability of, the proposition expressed, with a 
view, precisely, to increasing its strength, and hence its relevance (since relevance is, 
among other things, a function of strength). (101)B, in other words, represents a 
desirable thought -a thought that is desirable because of its increased strength -and 
ka indicates this. The echoic feel comes not from the use of ka but from the 
circumstances of utterance: it is not linguistically encoded. 
In this section I have argued that ka does not indicate echoic use, but is a 
specialised marker of interrogation - i. e. representation of a desirable thought. 
However, ka is also used in ironical utterances, which are a typical case of echoic 
use. In the following section, I will argue that in ka-appended ironies, the function of 
ka is not to encode this information and that its use is still consistent with the claim 
that ka is an interrogative marker, an indicator of the representation of a desirable 
thought. 
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4.4.6 Ka and Irony 
In Relevance theory, irony is a typical case of echoic interpretive use, in which the 
speaker echoes a thought or an utterance and expresses one of a range of 
disapproving attitudes towards it. For example: 
(104) A: It's a lovely day for a picnic. 
(They go for a picnic and it rains. ) 
B(sarcastically): It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed. 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986: 239) 
Here the speaker B echoes an utterance attributed to A, dissociates herself from the 
opinion echoed and indicates that she does not endorse it but rather rejects and even 
ridicules it. In Japanese, ka can be appended to the equivalent of (104)B, and this 
might be taken as evidence that ka can be a marker of echoic use. 
ka can be appended to other types of ironical utterance too. In irony, the 
proposition echoed does not have to be some other particular person's thought or 
utterance: it can be the speaker's own thought or utterance in the past, or an opinion 
generally held by people e. g. an old saying. Here too ka may be used in Japanese. 
So the speaker might utter (105) and (106) in the circumstances indicated: 
(105) I never get lost on the roads ka . 
(The speaker used to tell people that she never gets lost on the roads but now she has 
no idea where she is. ) 
(106) More haste, less speed ka . 
(The speaker who thought of the proverb 'More haste, less speed' decided not to rush 
to the station and eventually she missed the train. Now she ridicules the proverb. ) 
The propositions expressed by (105) and (106) are used to represent other declarative 
utterances (what the speaker used to say in (105), and a proverb in (106)). The 
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speaker dissociates herself from these propositions, expressing her disapproval. and 
this is how ironical effects are derived. Again it might seem that ka is responsible for 
the echoic interpretation. However, (105) -(106) without ka appended could yield 
the same ironic interpretation. Again, the echoic feel does not seem to be indicated 
byka. 
What, then, is ka doing in these ironical utterances? I would like to suggest 
(pursuing an idea put forward by Deirdre Wilson) that ka has much the same function 
in Japanese as eh in English, though eh cannot be appended to embedded 
interrogatives (see (93) and (94)). Notice that eh can perfectly well be appended to 
the ironical (104)-(106) : 
(107) It's a lovely day for a picnic, eh? 
(108) I never get lost on the roads, eh? 
(109) More haste, less speed, eh? 
These utterances have two possible analyses: on one, eh/ka remains outside the 
scope of the proposition echoed, and functions to indicate that the speaker is 
questioning the truth of that proposition; on the second, eh/ka is itself echoed, and the 
speaker is ironically requesting confirmation of a proposition which is manifestly 
false. In either case, eh/ka has its regular interrogative function, encoding the 
information that the utterance is being put forward as an interpretation of a desirable 
thought. The fact that (104)-(109) are also echoic is incidental to the analysis of ka. 
As Sperber & Wilson have shown, any utterance can be echoic, and this fact does not 
have to be linguistically encoded. 
In this section, I have argued that in ka-appended ironical utterances, it is not ka 
that indicates the echoic nature of irony. I have shown how the interpretation of such 
utterances can be explained. Ka is roughly equivalent to the interrogative particle eh 
in English, with the one difference that ka can be used in embedded interrogatives as 
in (93) and (94) whereas eh can generally not. In the next section I will look at 
some uses of ka with exclamatives, and consider how these should be understood. 
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4.4.7 Ka and Exclamatives 
Recall that in the framework of Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 243-54). 
exclamatives, like interrogatives, are interpretations of desirable thoughts. The 
difference between them is that exclamatives encode two extra assumptions: that the 
speaker already has the relevant (completion of the) propositional form in mind, and 
that the (completion of the) propositional form is relevant to the speaker (Clark & 
Lindsey 1990: 39). So, for example, if I exclaim "How expensive that house is! ", I 
already have in mind that the house is very expensive, and the discovery of this piece 
of information was relevant (hence surprising) to myself. On the other hand, if I ask 
"How expensive is that house? ", I may not already have in mind the information that 
it is very expensive, and the discovery of this piece of information may be relevant 
either to the hearer or to myself. In either case, the incomplete propositional form 
expressed by the utterance is an interpretation of a desirable (i. e. relevant) thought. 
As I mentioned in 4.4.1, there is no syntactic marking of interrogatives in 
Japanese. Similarly, there is no syntactic marking of exclamatives. As in English, 
any sentence can be uttered with an exclamative tone of voice, and might be analysed 
as an exclamative. However, this would involve the conflation of a linguistic form 
(i. e. an exclamative) with its effect in use (i. e. an exclamation) in the sense 
mentioned earlier. So I shall use the term 'exclamative' to refer to a linguistic form 
which involves the use of an exclamative word such as nante 'how/what a'. Consider 
(110) : 
(110) A: How much is this? 
B: It's 10,000 yen. 
C: Nante takai n deshoo 1w? 
how/what a expensive nominalisation is s. f. p. 
`How expensive it is! eh/isn't it? ' 
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In (110) C the propositional form of the utterance is a representation of a desirable 
thought, i. e. it is ----- expensive (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 253). So, we can still 
happily say that ka marks a representation of a desirable thought. 
Relevance theory can thus capture similarities between exclamatives and 
interrogatives in terms of the unified concept 'interpretation of a desirable thought'. 
Indeed, it has been argued that there is no need to make a categorical distinction 
between exclamatives and interrogatives. For example, Clark & Lindsey (1990) 
suggest that the English exclamative 'Is syntax easy! ' is syntactically (i. e. subject- 
auxiliary inversion) and semantically indistinguishable from the corresponding yes- 
no interrogative, and that both of the cases are interpretations of a desirable thought. 
We might claim, that ka encodes this information. 
If ka is responsible for marking a propositional form as an interpretation of a 
desirable thought, we need not specify whether ka is an interrogative marker or an 
exclamative marker. The notion of a desirable thought is neutral between the two 
sentence types, and other factors will interact with it to determine whether it is 
interpreted as interrogative or exclamative. However, let us pursue further the 
analogy with the English interrogative marker A. This particle can be appropriately 
appended to these exclamatives but no one would argue that eh is responsible for the 
exclamative force. Analogously, I argue that ka in exclamatives is not responsible 
for the exclamative force as the English translation `isn't it? ' shows. That is, ka is 
not responsible for the exclamative force in (110). 
It seems clear, then, that the function of word order inversion in the English 
interrogative/exclamative cannot be performed by ka: i. e. the former indicates a 
general `desirable of thought' representation while the latter is a sub-type which 
encodes only the interrogative. I claim then that ka is an interrogative marker, and, 
following Wilson & Sperber (1993: 22), it is not analysable in terms of a conceptual 
representation of illocutionary force such as `the speaker's asking... ' but in terms of a 
constraint on constructing one as I argued for ne and tte. I will pursue this line of 
analysis in 4.3.9. In the next section, I will briefly look again at tte discussed in 4.3., 
which is similar to ka in some of the effects it can give rise to, although its basic 
semantics is importantly different from that of ka . 
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4.4.8 Ka and Tte 
In Section 4.3,1 have argued that tte is a hearsay marker and indicates a sub-type of 
attributive use in the sense of Sperber & Wilson (1986): i. e. it indicates that the 
propositional form of the utterance is a representation of an attributed utterance, or a 
thought of the speaker to which the speaker has direct access. It can function as a 
genuine hearsay particle, as seen in (111) : 
(111) Kono natsu atsuku naru tte. 
this summer hot become s. f. p. 
`It will be hot this summer, I hear. ' 
Or it can be used in (101)B and (104)B instead of ka , resulting in the same sorts of 
effect as ka gives rise to: 
(101)B' Ichij ikan kakarimasu tte. Ja, moo dekakenakya. 
one hour take s. f. p. Then now must leave 
`It will take an hour, did I hear? Then I have to leave now. ' 
(104)B' (ironically) It's a lovely day for a picnic tte. 
In (101)B' and (104)B' the speaker is echoing utterances attributed to A. These 
utterances illustrate the two basic types of attributive interpretive use. (111) would 
achieve relevance by informing the hearer of the fact that someone said that it will be 
hot this summer. On the other hand, (101)B' and (104)B' would achieve relevance by 
showing the hearer that the speaker is echoing what A said, and either endorsing it or 
dissociating from it. 
Both tte and ka-appended utterances can result in ironical effects, but the way 
these effects are derived is not identical. In a tte-appended ironical utterance, the 
speaker explicitly indicates that her utterance is attributive, and leaves her attitude 
implicit. In a ka-appended ironical utterance, on the other hand, the speaker 
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explicitly indicates that something is being questioned, and leaves implicit the fact 
that her utterance is echoic. Thus, the same results are achieved by different means. 
Unlike previous analyses, my analysis also explains how the combination ka-tte 
works. Obviously, ka-appended interrogatives or exclamatives such as (90) and 
(110) themselves can be attributed: i. e. tte in (90)' and (110)' indicates that these 
utterances are attributed to the speakers of (90) and (110) : 
(90)' Yamada-san wa gakusei desu ka tte? 
'Is Mr. Yamada a student? ', you say? 
(110)'Nante takai no deshoo ka tte? 
'How expensive it is!, isn't AT, you say? 
Here ka has scope over the logical forms 'Mr. Yamada is a student, ' and 'it is .... 
expensive', and itself falls within the scope of tte, which indicates that the speaker is 
echoing the ka-appended interrogative and exclamative (echoed parts indicated by 
single quotation marks). 
In fact, these particles can be iterated in the sequence ka-tte-ka. In the following 
examples (90)" and (110)", the sentence-final ka has scope over implicit verbs of 
asking and saying respectively: 
(90)" Yamada-san wa gakusei desu ka tte (kiiteiru no) ka? 
Mr. Yamada topic student is comp. (asking nom. ) 
`(Are you asking me) whether Mr. Yamada is a student? ' 
(110)" Nante takai no deshoo ka tte (itteiru no) ka? 
how expensive nom. is comp. (saying nom. ) 
`(Are you saying) how expensive it is? ' (nom. = nominalisation) 
Here the non-final use of tte functions as a complementiser, although the verbs of 
asking and saying are implicit. In these examples, the final use of ka indicates that 
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the speaker is surprised at what has just been said. This use of ka functions in the 
regular way, as an indicator of an interrogative, and it has the whole preceding 
utterance in its scope. 
It seems, then, that the main difference between tte and ka is that the former 
indicates a sub-type of attributive use, namely, the attribution of an utterance, or a 
thought of the speaker, while the latter indicates a sub-type of desirable thoughts. 
Their common property is that they both indicate interpretive use, but the types of 
interpretive use which they pick out are different. 
4.4.9 Ka as a Procedural Constraint on Higher-level Explicatures 
In 4.2.5 I argued that the sentence-final particle ne encodes the procedural 
information that the speaker desires to establish assumptions communicated by an 
utterance as common ground. And in 4.3.7 I argued that the hearsay particle tte 
encodes the procedural information of quotative attributive use: i. e. tte-appended 
utterances represent attributed utterances or thoughts of the speaker in the past. The 
information is not in the form of a conceptual representation but is a set of hints for 
constructing ones. In other words, the semantics of tte constrains the construction of 
higher-level explicatures. The content of higher-level-explicatures will be 
determined on the basis of contextual information, the semantics of tte, and the 
search for optimal relevance and will sometimes be more specific: e. g. `the teacher's 
saying that... ' or `the speaker's weakly/strongly believing that... ' rather than 
`someone's saying that... ' or `the speaker's believing that... '. 
So far I have argued that ka is an interrogative particle, indicating a sub-type of 
`desirable thought'. Sperber & Wilson (1986: 254) say that "illocutionary force 
indicators such as declarative or imperative mood or interrogative word order merely 
have to make manifest a rather abstract property of the speaker's informative 
intention: the direction in which relevance is to be sought. " This idea is developed 
within a framework of `procedural semantics' which was introduced in 2.3.1. That 
is, according to Wilson & Sperber (1993: 22), "illocutionary force indicators should 
be seen as encoding procedural constraints on the inferential construction of higher- 
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level explicatures. " Like the hearsay particle tte, I argue, therefore. that ka constrains 
the construction of a higher-level explicature expressing the attitude of 'desire'. 
Ka in genuine questions such as (90)-(91) would constrain the construction of the 
higher-level explicature that the speaker is asking ------, and ka in rhetorical 
questions such as (95), the higher-level explicature that the speaker is reminding 
Further, ka in expository questions such as (96) would constrain the construction of 
the higher-level explicature that the speaker is offering information that -----. 
Various illocutionary forces are derived on the basis of the semantics of ka, 
contextual information and the consideration of optimal relevance. This explains the 
data nicely. 
4.4.10 Conclusion 
Consider the following English examples: 
(111) A: Jane has finally moved, did you know? 
B: She has finally?! 
C: Has she finally?! 
The utterances (111)B and (111)C would be analysed differently while in both cases 
having the effect of expressing surprise. (111)B, which has a declarative form, would 
be analysed as echoing A's utterance, i. e. representing a thought attributed to A. On 
the other hand, (111)C would be analysed as representing a desirable thought, as it is 
an interrogative sentence-type. 
(111)B and (111)C can be translated into (112)B and (112)C respectively . My 
claim is that tte indicates that the proposition expressed is an interpretation of an 
attributed utterance or of a thought of the speaker. On the other hand, ka indicates 
that the proposition expressed is an interpretation of a sub-type of desirable thought. 
(112) A: Jein tootoo hikkoshita yo. Shitteta? 
Jane finally move 4 s. f. p. -assertive Did you know? 
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B/C: Tootoo hikkoshita tte/ka!? 
finally moved 
`Goodness, finally moved?! ' 
Although the interpretation of an attributed utterance and a desirable thought are 
different varieties of interpretive use, the speaker's surprise is communicated in both 
cases. I have argued that the sentence-final particles tte and ka are specialised for 
indicating these sub-varieties of interpretive use. 
In 4.3 and 4.4,1 have shown that Relevance theory can provide the necessary 
framework and concepts for analysing the Japanese sentence particles ka and tte. 
Unlike past analyses, the one I propose does not face problems with non-final uses of 
ka 
, since 
ka is not treated as encoding any illocutionary force. Also, my analysis can 
explain particle combinations such as ka-tte and ka-tte-ka. My claim in 4.4 is the 
following. The Japanese sentence-final particle ka is an interrogative marker which 
does not encode a conceptual representation such as (96) (repeated below) but 
constrains the construction of higher-level explicatures in which various illocutionary 
forces such as `asking', `reminding' and `requesting information' are expressed. 
(96) The speaker is asking 
These forces are derived on the basis of the `desirable thought' indication encoded by 
ka, contextual information and considerations of optimal relevance. 
So far we have surveyed three sentence-final particles ne, tte, and ka and 
explicated their semantics and the kinds of effects, including `hedging', they can 
contextually give rise to. I argued that they all encode procedural information which 
constrains the construction of higher-level representations (higher-level explicatures 
for tte and ka, and higher-level explicatures/implicatures for ne). This might lead us 
to think that so-called Japanese hedging devices used utterance-finally might be of 
this general semantic type. However, in the following section I will turn to the use of 
utterance-final kedo, which works differently. 
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4.5 Japanese Sentence-final Particle Kedo 
4.5.1 Introduction 
It is commonly observed by people working in pragmatics that making a request 
indirectly, by implicating it, is more polite than making the request directly. So 
uttering (113) is a more polite way of requesting the hearer to close the window than 
(114) is: 
(113) There's quite a draft coming from that window. 
(114) Close the window (please). 
Requesting someone to do something is to place an imposition on him: i. e. in the 
terminology of Brown and Levinson (1978,1987), it is a potential threat to his 
negative face (his freedom of action). Making the request indirectly, by implicating 
it rather than saying it, is a negative politeness strategy: it gives the hearer wider 
scope for interpreting the utterance and so he has more ways out of complying with 
the request than having to blatantly say 'no'. 
However, when making a request in Japanese, doing it indirectly may, in some 
circumstances, be not yet polite enough, and so there are ways of reducing still 
further the force of the request. One of these is to append the utterance with the word 
kedo, which is most readily translated into English as 'but' or 'although'. This is 
exemplified by (115)-(118): 
(115) Moo j ikan desu. 'It's time now' 
now time is 
Implicating the request that the hearer do something, say get ready to go out. 
(116) Moo jikan desu kedo 
now time is but ... 
232 
(117) Ocha ga hairimashita. 'Tea is ready' 
tea subj. ready 
Implicating the request that the hearer, say, come to the table. 
(118) Ocha ga hairimashita kedo ... 
tea subj. ready but... 
(from Mizutani & Mizutani 1987: 26) 
Kedo in examples such as (116) and (118) is classified as being in the same category 
as ne and ka, i. e. simply as a sentence-final particle (The National Language 
Research Institute 1951: 43). However, in the next section I argue that its semantics 
is identical with utterance-medial kedo which is a conjunctive connective whose 
meanings are translated into English as `but' and 'and'. 
The indirect request made in (115) is also made in (116), but (116) is felt to be 
more polite than (115); the appending of kedo seems to be a negative politeness 
strategy, reducing further the force of the request, giving the hearer even greater 
space for non-compliance. In this sense, the utterances in (116) and (118) are cases 
of hedging in which the speaker communicates a weakened force to the requests she 
is making indirectly. This use of kedo in (116) and (118) is a feature of women's 
speech in particular (Sakuma 1983: 107), considered to reduce the assertiveness of 
their utterances and so to be appropriate to their relatively powerless position in 
society. 
According to Mizutani & Mizutani (1987), the speaker leaves a certain part of the 
utterance unsaid and invites the hearer to complete the utterance. Presumably, it is 
this implicit proposition, which the hearer is free to recover, which is responsible for 
the politeness effect. However, it is not the case that leaving something unsaid in 
this way always has this polite, softening effect. Conjunctions other than kedo may 
be appended to utterances, similarly leaving a clause unexpressed, without having 
any particular politeness effect. Examples are given in (119) and (120) with the 
conjunctions node and kara, which are best translated as 'since' or 'because': 
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(119) It is time node... 
(120) Tea is ready trara... 
'Because it's time... ' 
'Since tea is ready... ' 
These are indirect requests just as much as the examples in (115)-(118), but they 
have no particular politeness effect. In fact they suggest that the speaker feels quite 
justified in making the request and, if anything, they have more force than the 
utterance made without any appended conjunction as in (115) and (117). According 
to Mizutani & Mizutani (1987: 26), the use of node/kara would imply that the 
speaker is making requests as a matter of course. 
Having set out the data that I want to focus on, I would like to consider the 
following questions: (i) Is the semantics of kedo in utterance-final position the same 
as, or different from, that of kedo in its standard-medial use?; (ii) What is the 
implicit proposition that the hearer recovers in (116) and (118) and how does the 
hearer recover it? What factors guide the hearer in this process which is clearly a 
pragmatic one?; (iii) How does this implicit import have the effect of softening the 
force of the request implicated by the part of the utterance which precedes kedo ? In 
other words, how is the politeness effect achieved? I will consider these questions in 
order. 
4.5.2 Semantics of Kedo 
Let us consider kedo in utterance-medial position. Like English but it has two 
closely related uses: (a) the contrastive use, illustrated in (121), and (b) the denial of 
expectation use, illustrated in (122): 
(121) Watashi wa se ga hikui kedo imooto wa takai. 
I topic back sub low but sister topic high 
'I am short but my sister is tall' 
(122) Yamada-san wa Osaka shushhin da kedo hyoujungo 
Mr. Yamada topic Osaka come from but standard Jap. 
wo hanashimasu. 
obj. speak 
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'Mr. Yamada comes from Osaka but he speaks standard Jap. ' 
In (121) kedo explicitly marks the contrast between the predicates in the two 
conjuncts. In (122) the use of kedo indicates that there is something unexpected 
about the proposition that follows it; in the terminology of Blakemore (1987), it 
encodes a procedure or instruction to the hearer to treat the proposition it introduces 
as a denial of a proposition communicated by the sentence that precedes it. In this 
case, it is a denial of a contextual implication of the first part of the utterance. That 
is, it denies the assumption in (123)b, that Mr. Yamada must speak non-standard 
Japanese, an implication which follows deductively from the first conjunct, Mr. 
Yamada comes from Osaka, together with the contextual assumption given in (123)a: 
(123)a. People from Osaka speak non-standard Japanese. 
b. Mr. Yamada speaks non-standard Japanese. 
In the Relevance-theoretic terms of Blakemore, kedo, like English but, encodes a 
semantic constraint or instruction to the hearer to process the second conjunct in a 
context such that the contextual effect derived is one of contradiction and 
elimination. In this example, (123)b, which is a contextual implication of the first 
conjunct, forms (part of) the context against which the second conjunct is interpreted. 
The second conjunct contradicts this assumption and eliminates it. 
Now, some authors, such as Lakoff (1971), have simply assumed that but is 
ambiguous between these two senses, contrast and denial. However, intuitively, 
these two meanings seem closely related, and Blakemore (1987,1989) has attempted 
to give a unitary analysis of the semantics of but, from which the two uses can be 
derived in interaction with other (contextual) factors. Her main point is that, in both 
uses, but has a procedural semantics of signalling some sort of relation of 
contradiction or antonymy, between the interpretation of the first conjunct and the 
second. In the case of the denial of expectation use, this is a relation between 
propositions, in the case of the contrast use, it is a relation between predicates or 
properties, such as short and tall (i. e. not short) in example (121). 
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Here I have to note that the contrastive use of kedo in Japanese is sometimes 
translated into English `and' and indeed the conjunction kedo is standardly analysed 
as being ambiguous at least between the meanings `and' and `but' (The National 
Language Institute 1952: 43-5). For example: 
(124) Today is Monday kedo (= and/but*) tomorrow will be Tuesday. 
(125) My name is Mr. Yamada kedo (= and/but*) your name is Mr. Tanaka. 
However, there is a fairly straightforward sense in which this use of kedo (= and) is 
also contrastive. The predicates in the conjuncts of each of the examples form a set 
of contrasting terms in a particular domain: the `days of the week' domain, the 
`surname' domain. I would suggest that the core meaning of kedo is some broad 
concept of contrast. If kedo really did encode as one of its senses the same meaning 
as English and the following should be acceptable, but they are not: 
(126)a. Today is Monday kedo your name is Mr. Tanaka. * 
b. He handed her the key kedo she opened the door. * 
So kedo encodes contrastive meaning, though its range is broader than English but. 
Now I want to argue that kedo used utterance-finally, as in (116) and (118), is 
semantically the same as kedo used utterance-medially. That is, although it has the 
effects of a politeness marker in these cases, this is to be accounted for entirely 
pragmatically; the word kedo itself has the same `contrast' or `denial of expectation' 
functions here as it has in the utterance-medial examples just discussed. My first 
point is that a univocal analysis is what we would hope for on grounds of theoretical 
economy. It would be in line with the methodological principle advocated by Grice, 
'do not multiply senses beyond necessity', a version of Occam's Razor. That is, if we 
can account for an apparent ambiguity pragmatically this is to be preferred to the 
stipulation of an extra sense for the word, since the pragmatic principles involved are 
independently required. 
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Secondly, as described informally in the literature, the examples in (116) and 
(118) seem to be understood as quite standard cases of denial of expectation. The 
idea seems to be that the second, unexpressed, conjunct denies, or at least weakens, a 
contextual implication derived from the first conjunct, that is, the implicated request 
that the hearer do something: 'get ready now' or 'come to the table for tea'. In other 
words, Japanese authors describing this use assume that a further conjunct is 
understood and has to be supplied. So kedo does not function as simply a particle 
signalling deference or politeness in these examples; it is just as much a connective 
here as it is in the utterance-medial cases. 
Thirdly, the utterance-final use of kedo does not inevitably give rise to politeness 
effects, as the examples in (127) and (128) show: 
(127) A: Is your sister smart? 
B: She is smart kedo ... 
(128) A: Is your sister good-looking?. 
B: She is good-looking kedo ... 
In these contexts there is no implicated request and B's utterance in each case has no 
particular politeness effect, in fact quite the contrary. The unexpressed part of B's 
utterance is something contrasted with or unexpected from B's utterance which is a 
positive remark on B' sister. That is, in (127) and (128) something negative about 
B's sister might be felt. 
So it seems fairly clear that we need a pragmatic analysis to account for the 
politeness effects of (116) and (118). 
4.5.3 The Recovery of the Unexpressed Conjunct 
In order to explain the effect of diminished force of the request we need to consider 
the nature of the unexpressed conjunct. Plausible possibilities for (116) and (118) 
would be (129) and (130) respectively: 
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(116) Moo jikan desu kedo. `It's time now' 
now time is 
Implicating the request that the hearer do something, say, get ready to go out. 
(118) Ocha ga hairimashita kedo... `Tea is ready' 
tea sub. is ready 
Implicating the request that the hearer, say, come to the table. 
(129) Moo jikan desu kedo dekakeru yooi wo shi-nakutemoiidesu. 
Now time is but go out ready acc. do not have to 
'It's time now but you do not have to get ready to go out. ' 
(130) Ocha ga hairimashita kedo noma-nakutemoiidesu. 
tea subj ready but drink do not have to 
'The tea is ready but you do not have to drink it. ' 
In each of these cases the reconstructed second conjunct would be a denial of a 
contextual implication of the first conjunct: for instance, in the case of (130), the 
implication that the speaker should come and drink the tea. Thus, once the second 
conjunct is supplied in this way, we have what looks like a straightforward utterance- 
medial kedo of the denial of expectation variety. 
However, a question arises here: how do we or the hearer know that the 
unexpressed conjunct is the one given in (129) and (130)? In the case of (130) could 
it not just as easily be (130)a-b or any number of other possibilities?: 
(130)a. The tea is ready but you may not want it now. 
b. The tea is ready but I see that you are too busy to come to the table. 
There does not seem to be any obvious reason to prefer the ones given in (129) and 
(130) to a range of others. I do not mean to imply that the possibilities are entirely 
unconstrained; they are not, but just that there is some indeterminacy here; that 
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there is no one particular proposition that a hearer must derive in order to have 
interpreted the utterance in the intended fashion. 
This sort of indeterminacy has been largely ignored in pragmatics. Grice (1975: 
58) did mention it as a characteristic of conversational implicatures but he gave no 
indication of how it could be treated. Within Relevance theory, the notion of weak 
implicature was introduced in order to capture indeterminacy at the level of implicit 
import. The utterances in (131)B and (132) illustrate the point: 
(131)A: Would you drive a Mercedes? 
B: I wouldn't drive any expensive car. 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986: 194) 
(132) I'm feeling a lot better today. 
Now B's response to A in (131) clearly implicates a negative answer to A's question: 
B wouldn't drive a Mercedes. However, as Sperber & Wilson (1986: 196) argue, 
since the speaker chose to use the indirect response which demands more effort from 
the hearer, it follows from the presumption of optimal relevance that the hearer can 
expect a wider range of effects than this: i. e. if the speaker wanted to make manifest 
only the negative answer, the speaker would have said it directly. 
The negative answer and the contextual assumption that Mercedes is an expensive 
car are both strongly implicated by (131)B. In Relevance theory the former is an 
implicated conclusion and the latter, an implicated premise from which the 
conclusion is deduced. The hearer can have strong confidence that these implicatures 
reflect the speaker's belief Indeterminacy, on the other hand, lies in weak 
implicatures which the hearer must take some responsibility for deriving himself, so 
he is not entitled to assume the speaker gives her full backing to any particular ones 
in the range. They are not specifically intended by the speaker as the strongly 
implicated premise and conclusion for (13 l )B were. By uttering (131)B, while the 
speaker provides conclusive evidence that she considers a Mercedes as an expensive 
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car and therefore would not drive in one, she provides less than conclusive evidence 
that she would not drive for instance a Volvo (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 198). 
That is, the utterance has further implicatures, though they are not as strongly 
endorsed as the implicated negative response to A's question. They fall within a 
range of assumptions which the utterance makes weakly manifest; this range would 
include such assumptions as those given in (133), none of which is specifically 
intended by the speaker: 
(133)a. B would not drive a Rolls Royce. 
b. B would not drive a Saab. 
c. B would not live in a grand house. 
d. B does not like displays of wealth. etc. 
What about (132)? The mundane example in (132) does not seem to implicate any 
one assumption strongly. There are a range of assumptions that it makes weakly 
manifest: such as that the speaker is in a more positive frame of mind, that she is 
ready to get on with her work, that she won't be needing a lot of support. I want to 
argue that there is a similar indeterminacy when it comes to recovering the 
unexpressed conjunct of the examples in (116) and (118). That is, here again, a range 
of propositions is made weakly manifest by the utterance, rather than a single clear- 
cut assumption being made strongly manifest; this range would include such 
assumptions as seen in (134)a-c for (116) and (135)a-c for (118): 
(134)a. It's time now kedo (you might be busy). 
b. It's time now kedo (you might not want to go out). 
c. It's time now kedo (you have a lot of things to do). etc. 
(135)a. Tea is ready kedo (you might not want it). 
b. Tea is ready kedo (you might want something else). 
c. Tea is ready kedo (you do not have to come to the table for tea). etc. 
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Such assumptions (i. e. recovered conjuncts) within this range have in common that 
they are, both individually and collectively, in some sort of relation of contradiction 
or at least modification of the request implicated by the first part. So the recovery of 
such a range of assumptions is not entirely unconstrained. It is constrained by the 
semantics of kedo which instructs the hearer to establish a relation of relevant 
contrast between an implication derived from the first part and the recovered 
conjunct. 
The recovery process of such a range of assumptions is a pragmatic process, 
which, I argue, is governed by the criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance. Logically a range of assumptions such as (136)a-c can be compatible with 
the context for (118): 
(136)a. Tea is ready kedo (coffee is not). 
b. Tea is ready kedo (tea is not our favourite drink). 
c. Tea is ready kedo (the pot is broken). 
However (13 6)a-c are not easily accessible in the context in which the announcement 
that tea is ready implicates that the speaker wants the hearer to come to the table for 
tea: i. e. (135)a-c are more accessible. The assumptions (135)a-c are more accessible 
than (136)a-c in any ordinary context in which one person is preparing tea for another 
and there are no particular assumptions about coffee or favourite drinks. 
Furthermore, in line with the Relevance-based pragmatic criterion these would 
achieve an adequate range of effects at no gratuitous cost to the hearer, principally 
politeness effects achieved through the softening of the force of the implicated 
request. 
Other than the constraint encoded by kedo and the pragmatic criterion of 
consistency with optimal relevance, what determines the range of possible recovered 
assumptions is the contextual assumptions accessible to the hearer. There are a range 
of contextual assumptions such as (137)a-f, and the hearer's access to such 
assumptions would guide him to recover such assumptions as (135)a-c. The conjunct 
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that follows kedo is constructed in such a way to modify the force of the implicated 
request, and this is done against such contextual assumptions (13 7)a-f: 
(137)a. The speaker is in inferior position to the hearer 
(in (116) and (118) e. g. wife talking to her husband). 
b. The speaker has no right to impose on the hearer. 
c. The speaker is requesting the hearer to do something. 
d. Requesting is an act of imposing on the hearer. 
e. The speaker has to reconcile the situations a. b. c. and d. 
f. Making a request indirectly by implicating it instead of saying it is not 
polite enough etc..... 
So the pragmatic effect of politeness is derived from the fact that an indeterminate 
but delimited range of assumptions are recovered at the explicit level, and this 
pragmatic process of recovery is governed by the following factors: the constraint 
encoded by kedo , the principle of relevance and accessible contextual assumptions. 
4.5.4 Conclusions 
In many Japanese contexts, kedo-appended implicated requests such as (116) and 
(118) sound softer, less coercive, than the versions without kedo. As I argued, the 
hedging effect arises pragmatically, i. e. not solely being the outcome of the semantics 
of kedo. So there are naturally utterances such as (127)B and (128)B in which the 
utterance-final use of kedo does not give rise to any politeness effect. 
I have argued that the nature of the unexpressed conjunct that follows kedo is 
responsible for the politeness effect in (116) and (118). What characterises the 
recovered second conjunct in (116) and (118) is that it is not a single assumption 
which the speaker has made strongly manifest to the hearer, but an indeterminate 
range of assumptions she has made only weakly manifest to the hearer. In Sperber & 
Wilson (1986), this characteristic is called 'indeterminacy' and it is discussed in 
detail as a feature of implicatures. However, in these examples, 'indeterminacy' is 
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observed not at the level of implicature, but rather at the explicit level: in the 
unexpressed propositions that follow kedo . 
This indeterminate range of assumptions have a relation of contradiction with 
implicatures derived from the first expressed part in (116) and (118), and moderate 
the force of the implicated requests by implicitly giving the hearer an option in 
fulfilling or not fulfilling the speaker's request if the hearer has other interests at that 
moment as observed in (134)a-c and (135)a-c. I have said that this effect is precisely 
the hedging effect, communicating the speaker's weakened or gentle request. 
Now an interesting point is that despite this contrast with and so apparent denial 
of the force of request, the utterances are still interpreted as requests. That is, even 
though the illocutionary force of requesting is very gentle and unassertive, it is not 
totally eliminated. Recall that within the relevance theory approach to interpretation 
there are three sorts of contextual effects that an utterance may have (see Chapter 2): 
i. e. contextual implications, strengthening a contextual assumption, eliminating a 
contextual assumption. 
It is this third effect that the denial of expectation use of but has been argued to 
have by Blakemore (1987,1989). However, in the examples under consideration 
here, I would like to suggest that the contextual effect of this use of kedo is not one 
of contradiction leading to elimination, but contradiction leading to weakening. As I 
mentioned in 2.2.2, I wonder why there should be an effect of strengthening and no 
effect of weakening, but just the total elimination of a contextual assumption. The 
examples here seem to indicate that weakening should indeed be added to the set of 
effects, perhaps with elimination as a special case. 
4.6 Last Remarks on Ne, Tte, Ka and Kedo 
In Chapter 1, I have given the Japanese examples of so-called hedging devices, but I 
have shown that the semantic treatment of these hedging devices are incorrect. I 
argued that the speaker's weak conviction is derived not as part of the semantic 
meaning of respective hedging devices, but as the result of the hearer's pragmatic 
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inferencing in looking for the optimally relevant interpretation, which is based on 
linguistically encoded meaning, contextual information, and a pragmatic criterion. 
In this chapter, I have tried to isolate the linguistically encoded meaning of the 
various particles, independent of any pragmatic, i. e. contextual, influence. I argued 
that ne does not contribute to the proposition expressed but encodes the following 
procedural information: the speaker desires to establish assumptions communicated 
by the utterance as common ground. It is argued that this information constrains the 
recovery of higher-level representations, i. e. higher-level explicatures and/or 
implicatures. 
Tte is claimed to encode quotative attributive use i. e. the procedural information 
that the proposition expressed is attributed to someone's utterance or a former 
thought of the speaker. Like ne, tte does not encode conceptual information but 
constrains the construction of higher-level explicatures. However, unlike ne, tte is 
argued to contribute to the proposition expressed as it suspends the speaker's 
commitment and changes the status of the truth-conditions of the utterance: i. e. it 
makes the utterance interpretive. That is, tte instructs the hearer to interpret the 
utterance to which it is appended as not describing a state of affairs, but as 
representing another similar propositional form attributed to someone else's utterance 
or the speaker's thought. 
Ka is claimed to be an interrogative marker which encodes the procedural 
information that the propositional form of the utterance to which it is appended 
represents a desirable thought and it constrains the construction of a higher-level 
explicature in which various illocutionary forces can be expressed as a result of the 
relevant completion of the incomplete propositional form. It marks interpretive-use, 
which means that it too contributes to the proposition expressed by changing the 
status of the truth-conditional content of the utterance. 
Lastly, utterance-final kedo is not analysed as a hedging particle but as being 
synonymous with the utterance-medial kedo, which is a conjunction with the 
meanings of contrast and denial of expectation. So the analysis of kedo goes parallel 
with that of English but. Apart from the conjoining function, it is claimed to encode 
the procedural information that the second unexpressed conjunct has a 
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relationship of contradiction with assumptions derived by the first kedo-appended 
conjunct. So it seems that what all these utterance-final particles have in common is 
that their semantics is procedural. 
Of course, with the above mentioned encoded meanings, these Japanese so-called 
hedging devices achieve what I defined as hedging effects in some contexts. For 
example, because ne in (1), (repeated below), communicates the speaker's desire to 
establish that John is Irish as common ground between speaker and hearer, this has 
an effect of seeking agreement. 
(1) John is Irish ne. (John is Irish, isn't he? ) 
Seeking agreement conveys in some contexts that the speaker is not certain and 
therefore seeks agreement or confirmation. This way the speaker might 
communicate that she has a limited commitment to the proposition that John is Irish. 
Tte in (4), (repeated below), indicates that the proposition that Kyoto is a beautiful 
town and worth visiting does not directly describe a state of affairs but represents 
what other people say, i. e. it is an attributive use. 
(4) Kyoto is a beautiful town and worth visiting tte. 
The speaker puts responsibility for the truth of the proposition in someone else's 
hands and in this way the speaker may communicate that she does not commit herself 
to its truth. However, all that tte semantically encodes is the information that the 
proposition is attributed to someone's utterance or the speaker's thought. If it is 
attributed to an authority such as a well-established travel advisor (suppose the 
speaker is reading Fodor's guidebook on Japan), then (4) might communicate the 
converse effect, i. e. communicate that the speaker is certain about the truth of the 
proposition. 
Kendal (1985) and the Japanese grammarian Haga (1953) argue that ka encodes 
the speaker's weak commitment. However, the speaker's weak commitment implies 
that the speaker is still committed to the truth of the proposition expressed (Ifantidou 
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1994: 213). In ka-appended interrogatives , the speaker 
does not express anything 
with regard to her belief in the proposition represented (that is the reason why the 
speaker is asking). 
I argue that ka encodes a very abstract property, a sub-type of the Relevance- 
theoretic notion 'desirable thought' and the relevant completion of the proposition 
achieves various effects such as genuine questions, rhetorical questions, reminders, 
surprise questions etc. It is true that by asking a yes-no positive question, the speaker 
indicates that she expects a positive answer, so the hearer might interpret that the 
speaker wishes confirmation. So in some contexts, ka-appended utterance could 
have the hedging effect. 
For utterance-final kedo I have argued that its semantics is the same as in its 
clearly conjunctive use and encodes the procedural information that the second 
conjunct (unexpressed conjunct in this case) has a contradictory relation with 
assumptions derived from the first conjunct, i. e. the kedo-appended utterance. The 
idea comes from Relevance-based analyses of but (Blakemore 1987, Rouchota 1990). 
The procedural information encoded by kedo constrains pragmatic inferential 
processes, i. e. it instructs the hearer to access assumptions that stand in contradiction 
with assumptions derived from the first part of the utterance. 
The recovery of some unexpressed conjunct is constrained by this procedural 
information, contextual information and the criterion of consistency with the 
principle of relevance. The assumption or assumptions recovered might lead to the 
effect of diminishing the speaker endorsement of the implicatures derived by the 
utterance. So for instance, the force of the request to come to the table derived from 
"Tea is ready kedo... " is weakened by recovered second conjuncts such as that you 
may be too busy etc., and this weakening of speaker endorsement could achieve the 
effect of hedging. 
In the analyses of all these particles, Relevance-theoretic notions were necessary 
to provide convincing accounts. They include higher-level representations, 
interpretive use, procedural constraints, etc. The notions used were all theoretically 
motivated, well-defined categories, not having the waste basket nature we discussed 
concerning the Gricean notion of conventional implicatures (see 3.2.3). Pragmatic 
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inferencing explained in the light of Relevance theory makes it possible to isolate and 
focus on the intrinsic semantic meaning of these Japanese so-called hedging devices. 
The encoded semantic content is often a rather abstract property which merely directs 
the hearer towards the various specific interpretations, including the speaker's 
hedging. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have described and explained what linguists informally call `hedging' 
in communication, that is, ways in which speakers may moderate the assertive force 
of their utterances. Discussions of hedging standardly arise in the context of 
sociolinguistically oriented work on politeness phenomena in language use. For 
example, I discussed in 1.2.3 that Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) in their work on 
politeness include hedging as one of the face-preserving strategies, i. e. politeness 
strategies. Among linguistic devices for hedging, they include English phrases I 
guess/suppose/think, particles such as Japanese ne, if-clause descriptions such as if 
you can and if you like which can suspend assumptions of interrogatives and 
imperatives. 
However, I argued that the modulation of social relations through hedging is 
neither its sole nor its intrinsic function and it is therefore not difficult to find 
examples which do not give rise to any social softening effect. For example: 
(1)A: Where are you going to settle for good? 
B: I guess/think/suppose I will live in Tokyo. 
(2) (Accusing the hearer) You have broken the glass ne. 
`You have broken your glass, haven 't you? ' 
(3) (To someone who has lost his memory) What is your name? If you can. 
(4) (To a person who is asking dietary advice) 
Try fish instead of meat, if you like. Or if you don't like fish, try Tofu instead. 
In (1)B the speaker is communicating the speaker's limited conviction in the 
proposition that she will live in Tokyo simply because she does not know for sure, 
not because she wants to be polite to the hearer. In (2) the use of ne has the effect of 
communicating the force of accusation more strongly than the version without this 
particle. This is because ne communicates the speaker's desire to claim the 
unfortunate event as common ground, thus making the mishap more mutually 
manifest, i. e. mutually aware between them. If you can in (3) hedges on the 
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interrogative force but this is not due to any social reason but due to the concern as to 
the ability of the hearer. If you like in (4) likewise hedges on the imperative force but 
does not give rise to any politeness effect either. This phrase purely concerns the 
taste of the hearer who might not like fish at all. All the examples show that hedging 
is not intrinsically social as I claimed in Chapter 1. 
I also claimed that hedging is not intrinsically linguistic either. That is, the 
hedging effect may be achieved by features of the ostensive stimulus other than 
encoded linguistic content; it may be communicated by prosodic features or by such 
non-linguistic means as facial expression and shoulder shrugging etc. I then argued 
that the hedging effect is a broader pragmatic phenomenon communicating the 
speaker's less than complete conviction in the proposition (or a part of the 
proposition) her utterance expresses. For the most part of the thesis, however, my 
detailed analyses focused on particular linguistic expressions. 
In Chapter 1,1 surveyed existing discussions and analyses of hedging devices. 
These fall short of adequacy in a number of ways, the main problem being the lack of 
a sufficiently articulated pragmatic framework within which to locate the different 
ways in which the hedging effect may be achieved. I showed, for example, that 
neither the Gricean notion of `what is said' nor `what is implicated' can explain the 
true parentheticals such as I suppose and I think. They are standardly analysed as not 
contributing to the proposition expressed (Urmson 1966 Greenbaum 1969 Prince et 
al 1982 etc. ), but are not implicitly communicated either. 
For this reason in Chapter 21 turned to Relevance theory which provides a 
cognitively based account of communication, incorporating a number of distinctions 
which are crucial in accounting for how speakers communicate their attitude to a 
proposition communicated by an utterance. Particularly important to my analyses are 
the distinctions between implicature and explicature and between descriptive and 
interpretive attitude/representations. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I proposed relevance-theoretic analyses of particular English 
and Japanese expressions, which appear regularly in the literature on hedging. I tried 
to isolate the intrinsic semantic content of these elements and show how the familiar 
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hedging effects arise as a result of interaction between the encoded content, the 
particularities of context and consideration of optimal relevance. 
In 3.2 1 argued that the Relevance notion of ground-level explicature can explain 
the hedging effect given rise to by the main-clause I suppose that... or probably, 
while higher-level explicature can explain the hedging effect given rise to by the true 
parenthetical I suppose. For example, I argued that I suppose in (5) contributes to the 
proposition expressed and is communicated as the ground-level explicature. On the 
other hand, the true parenthetical, I suppose, in (6) is claimed to contribute to a 
higher-level explicature such as (7). (7) is a higher-level explicature derived by 
embedding the proposition expressed under the propositional attitude of the speaker's 
weak conviction, a modified version of (8) which may be communicated by the 
ordinary assertion `Edinburgh is a beautiful town'. 
(5) I suppose that Edinburgh is a beautiful town,. 
(6) Edinburgh is a beautiful town, I suppose. 
(7) The speaker weakly believes that Edinburgh is a beautiful town. 
(8) The speaker believes that Edinburgh is a beautiful town. 
Japanese sentence-final particles ne, tte and ka in (9), (10) and (11) are, on the 
other hand, claimed to encode procedural semantics and to constrain the construction 
of higher-level explicatures such as (12), (13) and (14). 
(9) Edinburgh is a beautiful town ne (= isn 't it? ) 
(10) Edinburgh is a beautiful town tte (= I hear) 
(11) Edinburgh is a beautiful town ka (= eh? ) 
(12) The speaker wishes to establish as common ground that Edinburgh is a 
beautiful town. 
(13) People say that Edinburgh is a beautiful town. 
(14) The speaker is asking whether Edinburgh is a beautiful town. 
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However, (12)-(14) are not the only interpretation for (9)-(l 1) respectively. (9)-(10) 
might be ironical utterances and (11) might be an expository question. In such cases, 
the following different higher-level explicatures might be derived: 
(15) The speaker wishes to establish as common ground that Edinburgh is not a 
beautiful town. 
(16) It is ridiculous to say that Edinburgh is a beautiful town. 
(17) The speaker is giving information that Edinburgh is a beautiful town. 
What ne, tte and ka semantically encode is a rather abstract property: i. e. 
`establishing common ground', `quotative attributive use' and `a sub-type of 
desirable thought' respectively. And the specific content of the higher-level 
explicatures in any particular case is determined by an interaction of the semantics of 
these particles, contextual information and consistency with the principle of 
relevance. 
Further, the distinction between the attitude of belief and the attitude of desire 
makes a correct prediction that expressions such as I suppose/think and probably 
cannot be appended to interrogatives or exclamatives as seen in (18)-(19): 
(18) How expensive is it to buy a castle in Scotland, I think? * 
(19) How expensive it is to buy a castle in Scotland, I think! * 
The anomaly is precisely because the attitude of (weak) belief is expressed where the 
attitude of desire is encoded by an interrogative or exclamative, i. e. two incompatible 
attitudes are expressed, and therefore (18)-(19) are anomalous. 
The distinction between descriptive and interpretive use captures the semantic 
difference between ne and tte/ka. These particles are standardly analysed as 
belonging to the same category, of sentence-final particles, which are claimed by 
Japanese grammarians (Watanabe 1968 etc. ) to fall outside of the proposition 
expressed and to have the impressionistic function of `acting upon the hearer'. I have 
argued that tte and ka mark interpretive use while ne does not. This means, contrary 
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to Japanese grammarians' claim, tte and ka contribute to the proposition expressed by 
changing the truth-conditional status of the utterance while ne does not, following 
Ifantidou's argument on English hearsay adverbs such as allegedly and reportedly 
(1994: 213). So while (9) has the identical truth-conditional content to that of (20) in 
that the propositions given by (9) and (20) are true if and only if Edinburgh is a 
beautiful town, (10) and (11) do not: i. e. (9) and (20) are specialised for descriptive 
representation while (10)-(l 1) are interpretive representations. 
(20) Edinburgh is a beautiful town. 
As for Lakoffian hedges regular, typical and technically, I have employed the 
ideas on concepts developed by Wilson (1993-4) (see 3.2). I argued that they 
contribute to the proposition expressed but their contributions are quite distinct: 
`concept loosening', `concept narrowing' and `meta-representation', respectively. 
The examples given in 3.2 were: 
(21) Tom is a regular bachelor. 
(22) Tom is a typical bachelor. 
(23) Tom is technically a bachelor. 
My claim was that regular indicates that the concept BACHELOR should be 
interpreted loosely. (21) might be a metaphor in that Tom is married but he has the 
stereotypical properties stored in the encyclopaedic entry of the concept 
BACHELOR. Or Tom might actually be a bachelor but the main relevance is that he 
has the stereotypical properties of bachelors. I claimed that REGULAR 
BACHELOR forms a new concept BACHELOR' whose crucial property is not being 
an unmarried adult male but the stereotypical idea of bachelors as leading a care-free 
life etc. This is the reason why regular bachelor can be predicated of someone who 
is a bachelor as well as someone who is not. 
Typical was claimed to effect a `concept narrowing'. That is, the bachelors that 
typical bachelor refers to are only a sub-set of bachelors, i. e. those who have 
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stereotypical properties. So Tom in (22) cannot be someone who is a bachelor only 
by definition, i. e. cannot be a bachelor who has a family, for example. I claimed that 
the concept TYPICAL BACHELOR forms a new concept BACHELOR' which 
maintains the logical entry of unmarried adult male but restricts the encyclopaedic 
entry to stereotypical properties of bachelors. 
On the other hand, I argued that technically encodes `meta-representation' which 
involves representations by resemblance in form and content. In 2.4.3, I introduced 
the notion `resemblance' which is the means by which interpretive representations 
represent. That is, they do not describe a state of affairs but represent some other 
representation which they `resemble', i. e. with which they share some logical and/or 
contextual implications or some linguistic properties. So the way technically 
contributes to the proposition expressed is rather different from regular and typical in 
that besides making a conceptual contribution, it changes the truth-conditional status 
of the proposition expressed, as tte and ka also do. 
I argued that technically a bachelor means bachelors from the point of view of 
some technical criterion and does not communicate the full conceptual content of 
BACHELOR which includes bachelors with some stereotypical properties. So in 
(23) Tom can be an unmarried adult male who has a family, for example. Here what 
is communicated by TECHNICALLY A BACHELOR and what could be 
communicated by BACHELOR alone share not all but some analytical/contextual 
implications: i. e. `resemblance in content' is exploited here. In contrast with this, in 
(24) insect is not used to communicate the concept INSECT but used to 
communicate a word of English which is the technical word for a bug. (24) was 
claimed to be a case of `mention' involving `resemblance in form'. 
(24) A bug is technically an insect. 
Lastly, in 4.5 the Japanese utterance-final particle kedo (= `but') was claimed to 
be identical with the conjunctive particle kedo in its utterance-medial use. Like 
English but, it is argued to have a procedural semantics. However, it constrains the 
recovery not of implicatures but of explicatures, i. e. of the unexpressed second 
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conjunct. In some contexts, the unexpressed conjunct may be a determinate 
proposition as seen in (25). However, in others, it may be an indeterminate range of 
different assumptions that have a contradictory relation with explicatures or 
implicatures given rise to by the first conjunct as seen in (26). 
(25) (Talking about the differences between Mr. Yamada and his brother) 
Mr. Yamada wears glasses kedo... (his brother does not) 
(26) (The speaker would like the hearer to come to the table for supper) 
Supper is ready kedo... (you might not want it now/you might not be hungry etc. ) 
In (25) the semantics of kedo constrains the recovery of the second conjunct in such a 
way that it has a contrastive relation with the first expressed conjunct. A contrast is 
made between the two properties (wearing glasses and not wearing them) ascribed to 
Mr. Yamada and his brother. Here the recovered second conjunct is a determinate 
proposition. In (26), however, the range of possibilities which have some 
contradictory relation with the first is not limited to a single proposition. There are 
many possibilities as seen in the bracket in (26) though they are only weakly 
manifest. I argued that this indeterminate range of the second conjunct takes away 
the force of the request to come to the table, i. e. has the effect of hedging which 
makes the implicated request even more polite. 
As I pointed out in many places, hedging is a pragmatic phenomenon: its effect is 
derived not semantically but pragmatically based on the criterion of consistency with 
the principle of relevance. However, there is a difference as to how much 
contribution the semantics of the terms in question make. That is, attitudinal 
expressions such as I suppose and possibly make a direct contribution to the ground- 
level or higher-level explicatures. So when one of these is used, the attitude of weak 
belief of the speaker is communicated as part of the explicit content of the utterance. 
On the other hand, the Lakoffian hedges regular and technically yield hedging 
effects which are reflected in implicatures. The proposition of which the new 
concept BACHELOR' is a part in (21) might contextually give rise to implicatures 
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such as (27) because of the focus on stereotypical properties. And the proposition 
expressed in (23) might contextually give rise to implicatures such as (28) because of 
the focus on the defining properties. 
(21) Tom is a regular bachelor. 
(27) The speaker weakly believes that Tom is a bachelor categorically. 
(23) Tom is technically a bachelor. 
(28) The speaker weakly believes that Tom has stereotypical properties of 
bachelors. 
The lines of reasoning used to derive (27) and (28) might be something like: 
(29) If the point of (21) is Tom's stereotypical behaviour of bachelors, the 
speaker is not quite committed to the truth of his being categorically a bachelor. 
(30) If the point of (23) is Tom's membership of the bachelor category, the 
speaker is not quite committed to the truth of his having stereotypical properties. 
However, as was argued in 3.3.3 and 3.3.5, the context might be such that a regular 
bachelor and technically a bachelor do not give rise to (27)-(28) respectively. For 
example: 
(31) Tom has been a bachelor all his life and he has in fact been a regular 
bachelor. 
(32) Tom has been leading a bachelor-like life anyway, but finally, the divorce is 
established. So we can say he is now technically a bachelor. 
Likewise, the hedging effect which might be communicated by (9)-(11) might be 
analysed as implicatures, not part of the explicit content of the utterance: i. e. higher- 
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level explicature. In such an analysis, (9)-(11) might contextually communicate (7) 
(repeated below) as an implicature: 
(9) Edinburgh is a beautiful town ne (= isn't it? ) 
(10) Edinburgh is a beautiful town tte (=I hear). 
(11) Edinburgh is a beautiful town ka (= eh? ) 
(7) The speaker weakly believes that Edinburgh is a beautiful town. 
The reasoning might be the following respectively: 
(33) If the speaker wants to seek agreement as to the beauty of Edinburgh, she is 
not certain about it. 
(34) If the speaker presents the beauty of Edinburgh as second-hand information, 
she is not certain about it. 
(35) If the speaker is asking whether Edinburgh is beautiful or not, she is not 
certain about its beauty. 
The same argument can be applied to the hedging effect created by the use of 
utterance-final kedo: the effect of speaker's weak endorsement is realised as an 
implicature not as a part of the explicit content of the utterance. For example, in (25) 
(repeated below) there is no hedging effect: no speaker's weak commitment is 
communicated to any proposition. 
(25) (Talking about differences between Mr. Yamada and his brother) 
Mr. Yamada wears glasses kedo... (his brother does not) 
In (26) (repeated below), on the other hand, it is clear that the request to come to 
the table is an implicature and the speaker's weak endorsement is expressed to the 
implicature as I argued above: i. e. the hedging effect is realised as an implicature. 
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(26) (The speaker would like the hearer to come to the table for supper) 
Supper is ready kedo... (you might not want it now/you might not be hungry etc. ) 
To summarise, the hedging effect, i. e. the speaker's limited commitment to a 
communicated proposition, as defined in (37) in Chapter 1, is realised both at the 
explicit and the implicit level of communication. Thus, I have shown that the 
expressions that fall under the impressionistic label of `hedges' are a rather 
heterogeneous lot, and an attempt to define the phenomenon in either linguistic or 
social terms would not cover many data we intuitively consider as cases of hedging. 
In this thesis, I have shown that Relevance-based concepts such as descriptive- 
interpretive, procedural-conceptual and desirable/attributed thought distinctions were 
necessary to capture the linguistic meaning of all the hedging terms in question, and 
that concepts such as base-level and higher-level explicatures/implicatures provide 
the representational levels at which the relevant degree of the speaker's belief, 
including the weak one, are communicated. What makes it possible to explain the 
recovery of the speaker's hedging is of course the single pragmatic criterion: i. e. the 
criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance. 
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